FEDERALISM AND INTER-GOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS IN A CHANGING INDIA
Federalism is a core characteristic of the Indian Constitution, establishing a system that divides legislative, executive and financial powers between the Centre and the states. Rather than serving as a simple administrative tool, this federal system provides a legal framework to balance national unity with regional autonomy across Indias diverse landscapes by distributing authority across multiple governance centres the constitution structure safeguards the nations sovereignty.[1]
The Indian Constitution, unlike the traditional federations like the United States or Australia, whose sovereign political entities came together willingly to form a federation, purposefully characterises India in Article 1 as a “Union of States”.[2] This constitutional formulation is the reflection of the goal of the Constituent Assembly to create indestructible Union with constitutional flexibility in the structure and restructuring of States. The founders abandoned the loosely-knit confederation and the rigorously unitary State in favour of a unique constitutional architecture of federal principles and a relatively powerful Union administration.
The unitary features include sole identity, judiciary, residuary powers of legislation vested in Parliament and extensive emergency provisions. These are accompanied by the separation of legislative in 7th Schedule, elected Government of State and constitutional distribution of executive authority.[3] But the evolution of Indian federalism cannot be understood by merely focusing on the constitutional text. The actual functioning of relation between centre and state has strongly been affected by politics, explanation of judiciary, economic revolts and innovation. Major shift from single political party dominance to coalition politics, round level governance the entry of regional political parties, the economic liberalisation of 1991, the recognition by constitution of through the 73rd and 74th Amendments and the establishment of institutions like GST Council, NITI Aayog have radically changed the nature of inter-governmental relations.[4]These changes show that Indian federalism is neither static or just legal. It is an ongoing constitutional process, responding to changing political, economic and administrative circumstances.
At the same time, the federal system is still confronting serious constitutional issues. The repeated conflicts over fiscal devolution, , the invocation of Art 356, role of central investigative agencies, inter-State River water conflicts and policy coordination during national emergencies have revived debates on the proper checks and balances.[5] Hence, the constitutional validity of federal government goes beyond a matter of formal division of powers, but of commitment to the norms of constitutional morality, institutional discourse and cooperative governance.
The paper contends that the future of Indian federalism resides neither in excessive centralisation nor in a dogmatic declaration of State autonomy. Instead, India’s constitutional success as it approaches the centennial of its independence in 2047 would rely on institutional trust, budgetary justice, constitutional accountability and genuine inter-governmental cooperation to enhance cooperative and collaborative federalism. The paper discusses the constitutional basis of Indian federalism, the trajectory of Centre–State interactions, modern institutional processes and critically assesses the threats to India’s federal system in an age of more complex administration.
It is a constitutional arrangement wherein legislative, executive and budgetary responsibilities are bi-spheric, each of which is empowered directly by the constitution rather than by the other.[6] The discussion over federalism is the question of reconciliation of two conflicting constitutional goals – the protection of the unity of State and the preservation of regional autonomy. A federal form of government divides powers among multiple levels of government by constitutional design, so encouraging democratic accountability, allowing for geographical variety. Federalism in the Indian context, however, has a far wider constitutional role in establishing an institutional structure within which the linguistic, cultural, religious and socio-economic heterogeneity of the nation may find a place in a single constitutional system.[7]
The Indian concept of federalism somewhat differs with traditional federations of other countries. Unlike the federations which have developed via an agreement between formerly autonomous political entities, India’s federal structure was created by a single constitutional document after Independence. The Constituent Assembly had the difficult job of uniting the British ruled Nations jurisdiction with the more than 560 king dominated areas and it did neither accept confederation of autonomous regions or a unitary State.[8] The Constitution’s Article 1, however, defines India “Union of States”, showing authors’ goal in constructing an indestructible Union where the States’ existence is legally guaranteed but no State has a right to unilateral secession. Dr B R Ambedkar said that the, the word “Union” was carefully chosen to underscore the permanence and indivisibility of the Indian State and to preserve the constitutional sovereignty of the component States.[9]
This well-tuned equilibrium finds expression in the constitutional architecture. Federal characteristics indicate the supremacy of the Book, the written allocated legislative powers within Arti 245-254 ,Seventh Schedule, the presence of independent constitutional institutions, judicial review and the partially rigid amendment procedure provided under Article 368.[10] Constitution has simultaneously adopted various unitary aspects such as single citizenship, residuary legislative powers with the Parliament, All India Services, emergency measures and considerable financial powers of the Union. These structural qualities prompted K C Wheare defined our country as a “quasi-federal” State, while contemporary constitutional study has tended to view it as an asymmetric federation with both federal and unitary characteristics.[11] In contemporary constitutional discourse, Indian federalism is increasingly seen as a cooperative constitutional regime where successful administration is ensured by constitutional flexibility and not through strict division of functions.
Working of federalism in India gone through a major change since the 1950. During first four decades following Independence, a particular party used to rule at the Union and the State resulted in a very centralised federal government. Although the Constitution provided legal means for Centre-State collaboration, political disputes were ultimately addressed inside the governing party rather than via the official federal institutions. This time also saw the increased consolidation of the power of the Centre via monetary planning the financial hegemony of the Union, and the frequent use of Art 356.The political scene was radically modified from the late 1980s.[12] The reducing power of single party dominance , growth of multi-party administrations , rising prominence of small political parties made the Centre – State interactions a process marked by negotiation, consultation and political bargaining. This period saw the emergence of what experts call negotiating federalism, as the states gained more power in national policy-making via coalition politics and inter-governmental interaction.[13] Further changes in the federal balance were made with economic liberalisation in 1991, which reduced centralised economic planning and encouraged the States to compete for private investment, industrial growth and fiscal innovation. This gave birth to the idea of competitive federalism where rivalry between the States was a major mechanism to enhance governance and economic performance.
Another important milestone is later formation of organisations like the GST Council under Article 279A and the alteration of commission of planning by NITI Aayog. These institutions are embodiment through ideas of cooperative federalism in as far as they facilitate consultation, budgetary coordination and making of decision between the Union and the States.[14] But modern federalism is nonetheless plagued by recurrent constitutional conflicts about budgetary devolution, the position of the Governor, legislative competence, the employment of central investigative agencies and inter-State resource disputes. These concerns illustrate that the constitutional balance is a dynamic and contentious element of constitution.
Thus, the growth of Indian federalism is a process of transition from a primarily centralised constitutional framework to a diversified federal system of co-operation, competition and constant constitutional negotiation. Its resilience is its ability to adapt to changing political conditions without straying from the constitutional commitment to democratic government, national unity and regional autonomy. As India moves closer to the centennial of its independence, the continuing robustness of its federal structure will rely on the building of constitutional institutions, the cultivation of trust between different tiers of govt. as well as continuous adherence as the guiding principle of constitutional governance.
The constitutional foundation of Indian federalism is embedded in Part XII dealing with all 3 pillars between the Union and State. Rather than defining fixed domains of government power, the Constitution forms a system of coordinated governance which focuses balance national unity with regional autonomy. The States have powers legally guaranteed in their particular areas. The Union has greater obligations in upholding sovereignty, probity and economic balance of the Republic. Therefore, the Indian federalism is based on the constitutional interdependence and not on the complete division of authorities.[15]
3.1 Legislative Relations
The legislative powers are distributed by Articles 245–255 read with the Seventh Schedule which enumerates legislative competence in the both the 3 lists.[16].
The Constitution, unlike several of the traditional federations, vests the residuary legislative powers in via Art 248. This structure reflects the goal to build a Nation powerful enough to deal with rising constitutional and policy difficulties, yet to preserve the federal distribution of legislative authority.[17]
3.2 Administrative and Financial Relations
Administrative cooperation is an important aspect of Indian federalism. Under Articles 256 and 257, the States are required to conduct their executive functions in accordance with the laws made by both houses. At the same time, it is empowered to provide such directives as may be necessary for guaranteeing compliance with the Constitution. Institutional discussion is provided for under Article 263, which allows the Inter-State Council, established in 1990 on recommendations of the Sarkaria Commission.[18] Although it was envisaged as the key venue for Centre-State engagement, its activity has been sporadic and both Sarkaria and Punchhi Commissions recommended its revival as a permanent mechanism for cooperative federal government.[19] The AIS, especially the IAS and the IPS, which serve the Union and the States, also strengthen administrative coordination and provide administrative continuity throughout the federation.[20]
3.3 Economic relations
Articles 268-293 manage fiscal federalism, specifying the taxing authorities, grants, borrowing and revenue-sharing.[21] The Finance Commission is created under Article 280 and has a key constitutional responsibility in proposing the allocation of central tax revenues and rules guiding. But, again, issues like tax devolution, cesses and surcharges and vertical fiscal imbalance continue to produce problems in Centre-State financial relations.[22]
GST Council under Article 279A, marking the new era of fiscal dept. The Council is composed of representatives of the Union and the States and is a significant institutional innovation in cooperative federalism, promoting consensus-based decision-making on indirect taxes. The Supreme Court has said that Council’s recommendations are persuasive and not binding, confirming the federal character of Constitution.[23]
The Indian federalism is based on constitutional collaboration and not institutional isolation as seen in the constitutional frame work controlling legislative administrative and financial interactions. Its continuing efficacy will rely on reciprocal respect for constitutional limits, genuine inter-governmental interaction and commitment to the ideals of cooperative federalism.
3.4 Institutional Coordination and Constitutional Balance
The replacement of the Planning Commission with NITI Aayog in 2015 marked a transition from centralised planning to cooperative policymaking through the participation of Chief Ministers in its Governing Council. Although NITI Aayog lacks financial allocation powers, it functions as an important forum for inter-governmental coordination and policy dialogue.[24]
The Constitution also confers exceptional powers on the Union to safeguard national integrity. Article 249 where the Rajya Sabha declares it necessary in nations favour, while Articles 250 and 356 permit the expansion of Union authority during emergencies and constitutional breakdowns. Similarly, Articles 2 and 3 empower Parliament to admit, establish, or reorganise States after obtaining the views of the concerned State Legislature.[25]These provisions demonstrate that Indian federalism combines constitutional autonomy with institutional coordination, enabling flexibility while preserving the federal balance.[26]
Although the constitutional framework of Indian federalism has remained largely unchanged since 1950, its operation has evolved through political change, economic reforms, judicial interpretation, and institutional innovation. The decline of one-party dominance in the later 80s and incline of coalition governments strengthened the role of regional parties, giving rise to bargaining federalism, where Centre–State relations increasingly depended on negotiation and political consensus.[27]
Economic liberalisation in 1991 further transformed federal relations by encouraging States to compete for investment, industrial development, and administrative efficiency. This model of competitive federalism promoted economic growth while simultaneously exposing regional inequalities, thereby reinforcing the need for cooperative fiscal arrangements.[28]
GST Council, NITI Aayog, the Finance, Inter-State Council have strengthened cooperative federalism by facilitating consultation on taxation, infrastructure, disaster management, and other matters of national importance.[29] Nevertheless, recurring disputes concerning fiscal devolution, centrally sponsored schemes, and the functioning of central agencies continue to test the constitutional balance. The COVID-19 pandemic illustrated both the pros and cons of this framework, highlighting the importance of institutional trust and coordinated governance.[30]
Contemporary Indian federalism therefore reflects a combination of cooperative, competitive, and bargaining federalism, supported by constitutional institutions and political dialogue. As India approaches its constitutional vision for 2047, strengthening fiscal equity, inter-governmental consultation, and constitutional morality will remain essential to preserving the federal balance.[31]
Indian federalism has successfully maintained national unity and accommodated regional diversity but continues to confront severe budgetary, political and institutional obstacles. The Constitution offers a strong foundation but the shifting needs of government and political contestation have brought out the recurring structural conflicts.[32]
5.1 Fiscal Federalism
Fiscal imbalance is a key concern. States are mostly responsible for providing public services, but their ability to raise cash is restricted and they rely on payments from the Union. The GST has increased cooperative fiscal governance, but disagreements about GST compensation during the COVID epidemic and the growing use of cesses and surcharges have highlighted concerns about fiscal autonomy and fair resource allocation.[33]
5.2 Institutional and Political Issues
Growing impression of political centralisation has led to more conflicts with in the Centre and States. Originally conceived as a neutral authority, the position of the Governor has increasingly been a source of contention on matters such as assent to Bills and government formation. In the same line, the rising importance of central investigative agencies, has raised apprehensions about State autonomy with several States withdrawing general approval for CBI investigations.[34]
5.3 Legislative and Emerging Federal Issues
There has been more and more overlap between issues in the State List. This has led to constitutional difficulties. For example, the Farm Laws, 2020 and the National Education Policy, 2020. Similarly, the planned delimitation of parliamentary seats and the constitutional restructuring of Jammu and Kashmir have reopened discussions about political representation, budgetary equality and the future of asymmetric federalism.[35]
These experiences suggest that the stability of Indian federalism does not lie on the constitutional allotment of powers, but on ongoing inter- governmental interaction, constitutional constraint and institutional trust. As India heads towards 2047, the need of building cooperative federalism for balancing national integration with State autonomy will remain.[36]
5.4 Representation and Emerging Federal Concerns
Another delicate federal issue is the proposed delimitation of parliamentary constituencies following the existing constitutional freeze. Despite their effectiveness in population control, several southern states have raised concern that representation based solely on current population figures may reduce their political influence. Since population considerations also influence fiscal devolution, the problem has important implications for regional equity and political representation. The reconstruction of Jammu and Kashmir and the alteration of its unique constitutional position have also revived discussions about asymmetric federalism, posing broader queries regarding about the scope of Union authority and the constitutional safety of special federal arrangements.
5.4 Federalism in the India @2047 vision
The future of Indian federalism will also be shaped by emerging governance challenges like climate change, digital governance, cybersecurity, artificial intelligence and public health emergencies, which require coordinated action between different levels of government. The COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted the importance of national coordination, but also exposed gaps in inter-governmental consultation, particularly in relation to lockdown measures, resource allocation and fiscal support. The experiences highlight the need for stronger institutional mechanisms that can respond to future crises without damaging the federal balance.
Ultimately, the biggest challenge to Indian federalism is to maintain constitutional trust between the Union and the States. Constitutional provisions alone are insufficient for federation to flourish; ongoing communication, fiscal equity, political moderation, and respect for democratic mandates are all necessary. In order for India’s constitutional democracy to succeed as 2047 draws near, cooperative federalism must be strengthened so that regional goals and national priorities work in complement rather than against one another.
The SC ruled a significant part in shaping it by interpreting the Constitution so as to maintain the checks and balances. In State of West Bengal v Union of India the court held that India is a stronger Union than the conventional federations yet they get their powers from the Constitution.[37] Kesavananda Bharati v State of Kerala increased the constitutional status of federalism, acknowledging federalism as a component of the Basic Structure of the Constitution and consequently outside the amending power of Parliament.[38]The idea was further strengthened in S R Bommai v Union of India when the Supreme Court subjected Article 356 proclamations to judicial scrutiny and declared federalism as a core part of it thereby limiting arbitrary dismissal of State governments. [39] Further recent rulings have further fortified cooperative federalism. The Court in Rameshwar Prasad v Union of India knocked down the premature dissolution of the Bihar Legislative Assembly, reiterating the constitutional responsibilities.[40] Few days ago, in Government of NCT of Delhi v Union of India, collaborative governance and constitutional morality has been emphasised. In Union of India v Mohit Minerals Pvt Ltd, it has been held that the recommendations are persuasive and not binding and reiterated that it’s based on consensus, not central dominance.[41] The cumulative effect of these opinions is to highlight the role of the Court in preserving the federal balance of India while operating the Government under the Constitution.
Comparative federalism teaches us that effective federal systems are predicated on institutional collaboration rather than on strict constitutional architecture. The United States has a lot of constitutional autonomy for its States, but Canada mixes provincial sovereignty with a far more powerful federal government. Germany presents an important example of cooperative federalism in the Bundesrat, which gives States a role in national law and fosters systematic inter-governmental coordination.[42]
While India’s constitutional system is a product of its own historical and political conditions,
these comparative experiences underscore the significance of budgetary balance, institutional discourse and cooperative decision-making. Both the govt. must come jointly on an ongoing basis on new concerns including climate change, digital governance, cybersecurity, artificial intelligence and public health catastrophes. The COVID-19 epidemic has shown that good governance requires on institutional trust as much as on constitutional authority.[43]
As India gets closer to 2047, the strength of its federal system will rely on reinforcing
cooperative federalism via constitutional morality, fair budgetary relations and ongoing inter-governmental communication. The future of Indian federalism is not in centralisation or in competitive autonomy, but in a constitutional partnership which reconciles national interests with regional desires.[44]
8. REFORMS AND THE ROAD TO INDIA @2047
The viability of India’s federal democracy will depend on fortifying the institutions and customs that uphold cooperative governance rather than altering the constitutional structure as the country approaches its centennial of independence in 2047. The Constitution already offers a robust federal structure; the bigger issue is to promote constitutional morality, cooperative governance and mutual trust with in them.[45] Reforms that support institutional communication, fiscal justice, and democratic accountability while upholding the harmony between national unity and state sovereignty are necessary for robust federal system.
Implementation of recommendations of Sarkaria and Punchhi Commissions should be given priority. Their suggestions for restricting the application of Article 356, revitalising the Inter-State Council and guaranteeing open and politically impartial nominations of Governors will improve Centre-State relations and eliminate institutional conflict.[46]
Fiscal changes are also very important. Timely tax devolution, reduction in dependency on cesses and surcharges and strengthening them as real forums of cooperative decision-making would be necessary to ensure budgetary stability and State autonomy.[47]
Future federal governance will also need to address new concerns such as climate change, digital governance, artificial intelligence, cybersecurity and public health crises all requiring continuous inter-governmental collaboration. As India gears itself for future parliamentary delimitation, any change has to combine democratic representation and regional equality to maintain national cohesiveness.[48]The success of India @2047 would ultimately rely less on constitutional reforms than on the successful functioning of federal institutions via conversation, consultation and cooperative governance.
Indian federalism went from a constitutionally centralised paradigm to a dynamic form of collaboration, negotiation and constitutional adaptation. Institutions like the GST Council and court pronouncements like S R Bommai have bolstered the federal balance, but questions of fiscal autonomy, political centralisation, and institutional trust remain potent in inter-relations.
Future of federalism in our Nation is not between hegemony of the Union or the States but in their capacity to act as equal constitutional partners. Fiscal justice, institutional accountability and constitutional morality would be critical in strengthening cooperative federalism and realising the constitutional goal of a resilient, inclusive and developed India @2047.
REFERENCES
[1] Granville Austin, The Indian Constitution: Cornerstone of a Nation (Oxford University Press 1966) 186–205.
[2] Constitution of India 1950, art 1; Constituent Assembly Debates, vol XI (18 November 1949).
[3] Constitution of India 1950, arts 245–263; Seventh Schedule; HM Seervai, Constitutional Law of India (4th edn, Universal Law Publishing 2015) vol 1, 289–314.
[4] Constitution (Seventy-third Amendment) Act 1992; Constitution (Seventy-fourth Amendment) Act 1992; Constitution (One Hundred and First Amendment) Act 2016; Louise Tillin, Remapping India: New States and Their Political Origins (Hurst 2013) 32–55.
[5] S R Bommai v Union of India (1994) 3 SCC 1; Commission on Centre–State Relations (Justice MM Punchhi Commission), Report of the Commission on Centre–State Relations (Government of India 2010) vol I.
[6] KC Wheare, Federal Government (4th edn, Oxford University Press 1963) 10–28.
[7] Granville Austin, The Indian Constitution: Cornerstone of a Nation (Oxford University Press 1966) 186–205.
[8] Constituent Assembly Debates, vol XI (18 November 1949); B Shiva Rao (ed), The Framing of India’s Constitution: Select Documents (Indian Institute of Public Administration 1968) vol IV.
[9] Constituent Assembly Debates, vol XI (25 November 1949) (Dr BR Ambedkar).
[10] Constitution of India 1950, arts 245–254, 368 and Seventh Schedule.
[11] KC Wheare (n 7) 27–29; HM Seervai, Constitutional Law of India (4th edn, Universal Law Publishing 2015) vol 1, 289–314; DD Basu, Introduction to the Constitution of India (23rd edn, LexisNexis 2021) 329–345.
[12] Sarkaria Commission, Report of the Commission on Centre–State Relations (Government of India 1988) vol I, chs 1–3.
[13] Louise Tillin, Remapping India: New States and Their Political Origins (Hurst 2013) 32–55; Rekha Saxena, Situating Federalism: Mechanisms of Intergovernmental Relations in Canada and India (Manohar 2006) 171–198.
[14] Constitution (One Hundred and First Amendment) Act 2016; Constitution of India 1950, art 279A; Commission on Centre–State Relations (Justice MM Punchhi Commission), Report of the Commission on Centre–State Relations (Government of India 2010) vol I.
[15] Constitution of India 1950 pts XI–XII; Granville Austin, The Indian Constitution: Cornerstone of a Nation (Oxford University Press 1966) 186–205.
[16] Constitution of India 1950 arts 245–255 and Seventh Schedule
[17] Constitution of India 1950 art 248 and Seventh Schedule, Union List, Entry 97; KC Wheare, Federal Government (4th edn, Oxford University Press 1963) 27–29.
[18] Constitution of India 1950 arts 256–257.
[19] Constitution of India 1950 art 263; Sarkaria Commission, Report of the Commission on Centre–State Relations (Government of India 1988) vol I; Commission on Centre–State Relations (Justice MM Punchhi Commission), Report of the Commission on Centre–State Relations (Government of India 2010) vol I.
[20] Constitution of India 1950 art 312; MP Jain, Indian Constitutional Law (9th edn, LexisNexis 2023) 654–660.
[21] Constitution of India 1950 arts 268–293.
[22] Constitution of India 1950 arts 275 and 280; Fifteenth Finance Commission, Report for 2021–26 (Government of India 2020) vol I.
[23] Constitution (One Hundred and First Amendment) Act 2016; Constitution of India 1950 art 279A; Union of India v Mohit Minerals Pvt Ltd (2022) 4 SCC 481.
[24] NITI Aayog, About NITI Aayog (Government of India) https://www.niti.gov.in/about-us accessed 31 July 2026
[25] Constitution of India 1950 arts 2, 3, 249, 250 and 356.
[26] S R Bommai v Union of India (1994) 3 SCC 1; Granville Austin, The Indian Constitution: Cornerstone of a Nation (Oxford University Press 1966) 214–223.
[27] Rekha Saxena, Situating Federalism: Mechanisms of Intergovernmental Relations in Canada and India (Manohar 2006) 171–198; Louise Tillin, Remapping India: New States and Their Political Origins (Hurst 2013) 58–76.
[28] Nirvikar Singh and T N Srinivasan (eds), Federalism and Economic Reform: International Perspectives (Cambridge University Press 2006) 217–240.
[29] Constitution of India 1950 arts 263, 279A and 280; Constitution (One Hundred and First Amendment) Act 2016; Commission on Centre–State Relations (Justice MM Punchhi Commission), Report of the Commission on Centre–State Relations (Government of India 2010) vol I.
[30] Union of India v Mohit Minerals Pvt Ltd (2022) 4 SCC 481; Government of NCT of Delhi v Union of India (2018) 8 SCC 501.
[31] Sarkaria Commission, Report of the Commission on Centre–State Relations (Government of India 1988) vol I; MP Jain, Indian Constitutional Law (9th edn, LexisNexis 2023) 676–682.
[32] Granville Austin, The Indian Constitution: Cornerstone of a Nation (Oxford University Press 1966) 214–223; Commission on Centre–State Relations (Justice MM Punchhi Commission), Report of the Commission on Centre–State Relations (Government of India 2010) vol I.
[33] Constitution of India 1950 arts 268–281; Constitution (One Hundred and First Amendment) Act 2016; Fifteenth Finance Commission, Report for 2021–26 (Government of India 2020) vol I; Union of India v Mohit Minerals Pvt Ltd (2022) 4 SCC 481.
[34] Sarkaria Commission, Report of the Commission on Centre–State Relations (Government of India 1988) vol I; Government of NCT of Delhi v Union of India (2018) 8 SCC 501; Nabam Rebia v Deputy Speaker, Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly (2016) 8 SCC 1.
[35] Constitution of India 1950 arts 3 and 246; In Re: The Constitution (Application to Jammu and Kashmir) Order, 2019 (2023) 16 SCC 1; Ministry of Education, National Education Policy 2020 (Government of India 2020).
[36] HM Seervai, Constitutional Law of India (4th edn, Universal Law Publishing 2015) vol 1, 289–314; MP Jain, Indian Constitutional Law (9th edn, LexisNexis 2023) 676–682.
[37] State of West Bengal v Union of India AIR 1963 SC 1241.
[38] Kesavananda Bharati v State of Kerala (1973) 4 SCC 225; H M Seervai, Constitutional Law of India (4th edn, Universal Law Publishing 2015) vol 1, 312–318.
[39] S R Bommai v Union of India (1994) 3 SCC 1; M P Jain, Indian Constitutional Law (9th edn, LexisNexis 2024) 643–648.
[40] Rameshwar Prasad (VI) v Union of India (2006) 2 SCC 1.
[41] Government of NCT of Delhi v Union of India (2018) 8 SCC 501; Government of NCT of Delhi v Union of India (2023) 11 SCC 1; Union of India v Mohit Minerals Pvt Ltd (2022) 4 SCC 481.
[42] K C Wheare, Federal Government (4th edn, Oxford University Press 1963) 10–37; Ronald L Watts, Comparing Federal Systems (3rd edn, McGill-Queen’s University Press 2008) 73–120; Daniel J Elazar, Exploring Federalism (University of Alabama Press 1987) 162–188.
[43] In Re: Distribution of Essential Supplies and Services During Pandemic (2021) 7 SCC 772; M Govinda Rao, ‘Fiscal Federalism and the COVID-19 Crisis in India’ (2021) 56(27) Economic and Political Weekly 12.
[44] Granville Austin, Working a Democratic Constitution: The Indian Experience (Oxford University Press 1999) 700–713; M P Jain, Indian Constitutional Law (9th edn, LexisNexis 2024) 651–659.
[45] M P Jain, Indian Constitutional Law (9th edn, LexisNexis 2024) 651–659; D D Basu, Introduction to the Constitution of India (27th edn, LexisNexis 2023) 410–417.
[46] Commission on Centre–State Relations (Sarkaria Commission), Report of the Commission on Centre–State Relations (Government of India 1988) vol I, ch VI; Commission on Centre–State Relations (Punchhi Commission), Report of the Commission on Centre–State Relations (Government of India 2010) vol I, 255–289.
[47] Constitution of India arts 270, 279A and 280; Fifteenth Finance Commission, Report for 2021–26 (Government of India 2021); Arvind Panagariya, The New India: Reclaiming Growth (HarperCollins 2020) 183–195.
[48] Constitution of India arts 81, 82 and 170; NITI Aayog, India@75: Strategy for New India (Government of India 2018); Government of India, Viksit Bharat @2047 https://www.india.gov.in accessed 31 July 2026.