BALANCING HATE SPEECH: IMRAN PRATAPGADHI V. STATE OF GUJARAT
Written by Saloni Rani student at Rajiv Gandhi National University of Law, Patiala. INTRODUCTION Section 196 of Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (hereinafter, BNS) penalizes acts that promote enmity, hatred, or disharmony between different groups based on religion, race, language, caste, or community. This section come in light of maintaining social order, and peace in society. Section 299 further extends to penalize acts intended to outrage religious feelings which make it an offence to insult a religion or its belief through words, representation or means, whereby Section 302 makes it illegal to purposefully offend someone’s religious sentiments by using words, sounds, gestures, or objects that are in their line of sight or hearing. India has the highest diversity in world, and in order to maintain the cordial relationship between people of different caste, creed, sex, gender, etc. it is very essential to have the provisions in order to especially prevent minority’s rights. Therefore, it works under the constitutional ambit such as Article 14 (Right to Equality),19 (Right to freedom of speech & expression), 21(Right to Life). This article shall analyse these penal provisions with the recent ruling of Supreme Court in Judgement of Imran Pratapgadhi v State of Gujarat and how the court has balanced Right to Speech & Expression with hate speech which is one of the debateable topic in countries. IMRAN PRATAPGADHI V. STATE OF GUJARAT The case is based on communal violence as the result of video recorded in weeding event. Member of Rajya Sabha attended the weeding at Gujarat whereby he posted the video on social media on platform ‘X’. The video clip relates to the weeding show itself, but at background features an Urdu Poem beginning with lines “Ae khoon ke pyaso, baat suno”. This has ignited tensions between communal groups which led the plaintiff to file FIR against this video. The Supreme Court has reiterated the speech to ascertain the commission of crime. The plaintiff alleged that the poem’s words were provocative, incited communal hatred, and disturbed national unity. The appellant contending the same approached the High Court filling the petition under Article 226 read with Section 528 of Bhartiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS). The Court found him innocent and clarified the actual meaning of the words in comprehensive manner thereby, FIR registered was quashed. The court held that no cognizable offence was made out. These raises two important questions firstly, whether the contents of the poem posted by the appellant amounted to any cognizable offence under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (Sections 196, 299) and secondly, whether the FIR and investigation violated the appellant’s fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a). COURT’S DECISION The Court ruled in favour of the accused by stating that “on plain reading of the poem, we find that the same has nothing to do with any religion, caste, community or any particular group.” The poem’s word does not ignite any communal violence when translated into English by the court. It only seeks to challenge the injustice made by ruler in earlier times. Furthermore, no allegations for any kind of communal movement or violence stands in name of accused which absolve him of any liability under the BNS. The court ruled that the poem does not pertain to any specific religion or caste, and it does not aim to promote any type of differences. Hence, the Court struck down the impugned order passed by High Court to not quash the FIR and it quashed the FIR filled on the name of accused which again does not communicate about any offence committed by him. Thus, the court highlighted the urgency to maintain balance between freedom of speech and reasonable restrictions. ANALYSES The case highlights the importance of balance between Freedom of speech and Expression and views of individuals while expressing their thoughts in any video. It lays emphasis on procedural aspects of criminal law and how an appeal can be filled by an aggrieved party in High Court under Section 528 BNSS. Furthermore, the court also expressed that it is duly bound to uphold and enforce the rights of all the citizens to promote the principle of Natural Justice. This case also says much about the communal violence and how it is perceived by people in the society. A simple video of weeding can evoke communal clashes according to some section of society, and at the same time be peaceful or neutral for other section of society. Howsoever, all must review the content before uploading and publication of the same because these rights can be misused by certain group of an individual to ignite the pressure of administration towards the matter especially if it is posted by a member of political party. APPLYING THE PRECEDENTS In Ramesh v. Union of India, it was held that expressions must be evaluated from reasonable & prudent person’s perspective and not the hypersensitive audiences. In Imran’s case, as ruled by Court the plain reading of the poem does not ignite any tensions. Thus, the actions of a rational man are given high credibility in court of law. This was again held by Court in Bhagwati Charan Shukla v. Provincial Government, C.P. & Berar where the Court stated that any expression must be based on standards of reasonableness, strong-minded, and courageous man. CONCLUSION The Supreme Court’s decision in Imran Pratapgadhi v State of Gujarat is a watershed in free speech and police powers jurisprudence, rebalancing constitutional rights and procedural requirements. By making preliminary inquiries under Section 173 (3) of the BNSS mandatory for charges involving allegations under Article 19 (2) restrictions, the Court has put in place a check against hasty criminalization of speech. This intervention is not procedural but foundational, guaranteeing that the exercise of free expression specifically in artistic or public discussion is protected from capricious state action. The judgment reaffirms that police discretion under Section 173 (3) is not a license for doing nothing but a constitutional obligation to examine allegations with scrutiny. By making higher police officials responsible for
The War Amongst Brands: The 6E Identity Crisis
Written by Yash Somraj Roy student at Hidayatullah National Law University, Raipur. Trademarks and India: A Rocky Relationship A trademark is of utmost essence in today’s modern world with thousands of disputes arising each day. Its main motive is to discern the goods and services of one person or entity from those of another. The rise of trademark disputes, only grow year after year and are expected to grow above and beyond with advancements in artificial intelligence and technology. The World Intellectual Property Organisation has recorded a 57 percent growth that is from 3.3 lakh cases to 5.2 lakh cases of trademark disputes being filed from the years 2018-2023. These astonishing numbers state the need for regulations and laws which revolve around Trademark disputes and focus on solving them efficiently as well as urgently. The recent “Indigo 6E” case, is yet another instance of trademark altercations in India. This case between IndiGo Airlines and Mahindra Ltd. involving dispute over the logo “6E” which IndiGo Airlines considers to be its core identity. The dispute emerged under the legal lens when Mahindra utilised the mark on its newly manufactured SUV model. Subsequently, IndiGo claimed that the utilisation of the mark was an infringement of the airline’s brand identity. Therefore, after repeated tries of reconciliation and on failing to achieve common ground with the automobile company, it approached the court hoping for a legal remedy. However, the lack of uniformity in trademark in judgements and orders passed by courts may create legal hurdles for both the parties. This dispute, between IndiGo and Mahindra involves a rather fundamental and substantial question of trademark law: Does the uncertainty revolving around the “6E” case signal a need for uniformity in trademark interpretations? The author by invoking this question, seeks to delve into the intricacies of the recent “6E” case with respect to trademark disputes and further seeks to explore the possibilities of suggesting changes that may be brought within the existing framework. The author also explores effective precautionary means and efficient solutions which can in turn help the judicial ordinances to ensure uniformity in trademark interpretations and could also act as a diminishing force for Trademark disputes in India. The 6E Case and The Lack of Uniformity in Trademark Judgements. The 6E case is a dispute which arose in the “Delhi High Court” when IndiGo Airlines filed a suit of trademark infringement against Mahindra’s newly launched flagship SUV model, the “BE 6E”. IndiGo argued that the “6E” logo was a trademark to the airline and the services it provided, and therefore, Mahindra is deceiving the public by associating with the mark and the company’s image. Mahindra defended itself by stating that the two companies were affiliated with different group of industrial ecosystems and hence, in no way could the utilisation of the mark 6E cause any harm to IndiGo’s image. Trademark judgements in India have no definite boundaries and often have scope for scepticism. In the case of ‘Nandhini Deluxe vs Karnataka Co-Operative Milk Producers Federation’ the court held that similar trademark for products in different industries do not constitute as an infringement of trademark. But contradicting this in the case of ‘L’Air Liquide Société Anonyme pour l’Etude et l’Exploitation des procédés Georges Claude and Anr. vs M/s Liquid AIR & Ors’ the court had a differing opinion and held that even though the products of both the parties were connected to different industries the use of a similar trademark nevertheless comprised of a trademark infringement. The court’s reasoning in the “L’Air Liquide” case to hold trademark infringement was due to a viable functional overlap between both the companies and their involvement in commodities such as air and gas. However, it could be very strongly argued that in the “Nandhini Deluxe” case too, both the parties faced a significant functional overlap with each other as both of them, entailed in the food production sector and hence came under the same umbrella. Therefore, the court, in this case too, should have warranted a finding of trademark infringement. Contradicting judgements of this kind is not rare in the Indian legal ecosystem and multiple cases such as ‘Satyam Infoway Ltd. v. Sifynet Solutions Pvt. Ltd.’ and ‘ITC Limited v. Philip Morris Products S.A’ indicate this. The rigidity and uncertainty of trademark laws in India often have no criteria for distinguishing between what is considered as infringement of a trademark and what is not, and although cases such as the ‘Amritdhara Pharmacy v. Satya Deo Gupta’ have attempted to define what constitutes as trademark infringement. It is important to comprehend that the ruling majorly relies on phonetic similarity while ignoring the scope of cross-industry infringement conflicts. Another major inadequacy of this ruling is its primary reliance on consumer perception which is not only an intangible and unquantifiable factor but also a highly ambiguous factor. A Lackadaisical Approach: Legal Insights from the 6E Case. The Mahindra Group’s utilisation of such a renowned logo has unwarrantedly attracted the eyeballs of the legal fraternity. The Delhi High Court as of now, is yet to pass a ruling, and it is quite possible that it could be in favour of Mahindra considering the different industries the parties operate in, as seen in cases such as ‘ Sony Corporation v. K. Selvamurthy’. Furthermore, the registration of the mark “6E” by Mahindra in class 12 which pertains to vehicles under trademark law, is another primary aspect which could create a favourable ruling for the corporate entity. Registration of trademarks under different classes sets boundaries to the scope of infringement and hence, are an essential factor in deciding on cases of trademark disputes. IndiGo’s registration of the mark “6E link” under classes 9, 35, 39 and 16 and its lack of registration under class 12, paves a way for the automobile giant to argue against IndiGo’s claims of infringement utilizing the contention of different trademark classifications. However, if we plunge deep into the intricacies, there is no way that the risk-to-reward ratios are proportionate with each
Decades of Tenancy: The Supreme Court’s Verdict on Bona Fide Need and Comparative Hardship
Written by Avinash Verma & Anshu Rahi students at National University of Study and Research in Law, Ranchi Seventy-three years is not just the measure of a tenancy it’s the span of nearly three generations, bound by a legal knot that finally unraveled in April 2025. When the Supreme Court handed down its ruling in Murlidhar Aggarwal (D.) Thr. His LR. Atul Kumar Aggarwalv. Mahendra Pratap Kakan (D.) Thr. LRs. and Ors., it did more than decide a property dispute; it brought closure to a saga that had outlasted the independence of India itself. For 63 years after the original lease expired, this cinema hall in Allahabad stood as a testament to stubbornness, hardship, and the tension between security of tenure and a landlord’s genuine need for their property. The Supreme Court, setting aside the High Court’s decision, allowed the eviction—finally bringing the curtains down on this long-drawn legal drama1. II. The Legal Canvas: A History of Tenancy Law To appreciate this judgment, it’s essential to understand the statutory landscape. The Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (the “Act of 1972”) governs urban tenancy disputes in Uttar Pradesh, balancing tenant protection with landlord rights. Section 21(1)(a) enables a landlord to seek eviction if they require the property for “bona fide” occupation, but this right is hedged by provisos that enforce comparative hardship analysis. In simple terms: The law asks, whose need is greater—the landlord’s, or the tenant’s2? The associated Rules of 1972, especially Rule 16(2), instruct the Prescribed Authority to consider factors such as the length of tenancy and the breadth of the landlord’s current business interests when weighing who faces greater hardship. These rules ensure the process isn’t mechanical but tailored, accounting for real human circumstances. III. The Genesis of the Dispute: A Tale of Two Families This is more than just a battle over bricks and mortar. Murlidhar Aggarwal’s predecessor purchased the disputed cinema hall in 1962, which had been leased to the respondents since 1952. The landlord’s family, beset by financial difficulty, argued for the release of their property to start their own business. Evidence revealed that Murlidhar’s son, Atul Kumar Aggarwal, had a low, unstable income, with assets reportedly “in the negative.” For the Prescribed Authority, the hardship was visceral: necessity, not mere convenience3. On the other end, the tenants Ram Agya Singh and his legal heirs claimed that the landlords belonged to a joint family business, with multiple sources of income. They stressed the hardship of losing a business they’d cultivated for decades, and pointed to earlier rounds of litigation dating back to 1965 as proof of the entrenched conflict and tenacity on both sides5. IV. The Judicial Journey: A Reversal of Fortunes The first stop was the Prescribed Authority, which sided with the landlord, weighing the evidence and finding both the need and comparative hardship favoring release of the property. But litigation is seldom straightforward. The Appellate Authority reversed this decision, focusing not on the degree of hardship, but on whether the landlord truly had “no business”—and found their income sufficient to bar eviction. In doing so, the Appellate Authority effectively constructed a new case, sidestepping the details of the landlord’s financial difficulties and ignoring the original finding that the landlord’s need was pressing4. The High Court affirmed the Appellate Authority, further entrenching the tenant’s tenure. It took the Supreme Court’s careful scrutiny to unravel this web: The Court criticized the lower courts’ reasoning as “wholly unsustainable,” noting their failure to appreciate the evidence or to apply the comparative hardship doctrine in its true spirit1. V. The Guiding Principles: A Landmark Judgment’s Legacy The Supreme Court’s reasoning is a textbook example of judicial analysis. Bona Fide Need: The Court reaffirmed that the requirement for a landlord’s occupation under Section 21(1)(a) must be construed liberally extending not just to the landlord but to family members, as established in Joginder Pal v. Naval Kishore Behal 5 and Dwarkaprasad v. Niranjan and Anr.6 Even more notably, the Court invoked Section 21(7), holding that the death of the original landlord does not kill the claim if an heir, such as Atul Kumar Aggarwal who is crippled and without income demonstrates genuine need. Comparative Hardship: The Court’s approach here was nuanced. Even assuming the tenants’ assertions about the landlords’ other businesses were entirely true, both sides were “equally poised” financially1. What tipped the balance was the tenant’s failure, spanning decades, to make any attempt to locate alternative premises. Citing Mohd. Ayub v. Mukesh Chand, the Bench insisted: “It is not the requirement of law that applicant should sit idle till his premises are not released”. Rule 16(2): Rule 16(2) was used by the respondents to argue that the landlord’s existing business interests weakened their claim. The Court disagreed, holding that business interests, the length of tenancy, and other factors must be considered together, not in isolation. The pressing need for the landlord and the tenants’ inertia neutralized the long-standing tenancy1. VI. Conclusion: A Clear Message for the Future This decision sends a sharp, unambiguous signal through Indian tenancy law: Tenant protection cannot fossilize occupation and frustrate a landlord’s right, especially where hardship is demonstrable and alternatives are available. The right to remain cannot become a lifetime entitlement in the face of compelling, bona fide need. The Supreme Court’s order granting the tenants time until December 31, 2025 to vacate, subject to compliance sets a final, decisive endpoint. A tenant cannot cling to property for decades, hoping law will indefinitely shield inertia. Where a landlord’s necessity is clear, judicial compassion must yield to reason, reminding us that justice delayed need not be justice denied. 1 Verdictum. “Bona Fide Requirement For Occupation Of Landlord Must Be Liberally Construed.” 25 Apr 2025. 2 “The Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972.” Section 21(1)(a). 3 IJTR.nic.in. “By: Justice S.U. Khan – Judicial Training & Research Institute.” Rule 16 of the Rules. 4 IJTR.nic.in. “By: Justice S.U. Khan – Judicial Training &
JUDGING THE JUDGE:RE-VIEWING JUDICIAL RECUSAL THROUGH AN ETHICAL LENS
Written by Bhuvi Gupta & Netra Karnam students at Institute of Law, Nirma University Introduction Every judge, before starting their career, takes an oath “that I will duly and faithfully and to the best of my ability, knowledge, and judgment perform the duties of my office without fear or favor, affection or ill will, and that I will uphold the Constitution and the laws”. These words, enshrined in Schedule III of our Constitution, succinctly summarize the core values of professional, moral, and ethical responsibility and bestow upon them the role of guardians of justice. The Indian judicial ethical values, crystallized over the years through practice, are founded on the twin pillars of impartiality and independence. In 1997, the Supreme Court of India unanimously adopted a Charter on Restatement of Values of Judicial Life. The Charter outlines the principles of an ideal judicial life and supports equitable justice through recusal of judges. This blog aims to delve into the concept of judicial recusal. It will draw a comparative analysis of practices of recusal followed in different countries. Further, it will examine the same in the Indian context and provide recommendations. Concept of Recusal Black’s Law Dictionary defines recusal as the “removal of oneself as a judge or policymaker in a particular matter, especially because of a conflict of interest.” When a judge has some interest in the case before him, he may, voluntarily or at the behest of either of the parties, recuse himself from the case. Interest may create bias in the mind of the judge, leading to the possibility of partiality against or preference towards a party.For justice to be delivered in its true sense, it is necessary that the same be done by an impartial adjudicator. This is a prerequisite to give meaning to the other components of due process of law, such as the right to an advocate, a hearing, and cross-examination of witnesses. Impartiality here connotes the absence of bias, real and perceived. There should not only be freedom from partiality but also from the appearance of partiality. Thus, the judicial codes and practices aim to prevent biased individuals from presiding over cases. The rationale behind judicial recusal emanates from the idea of bias rule, originating from the principles of natural justice. The rule was established in Dr. Bonham’s case where Lord Coke had propounded the maxim nemo judex in causa sua, which translates to “no one is a judge in his own cause”. This means that no person should be a judge in a case where he or she is a party to it or has any interest in its outcome. The principle preserves judicial sanctity and institutionalizes the aspect of fairness in judicial, quasi-judicial, and administrative work. Over the years and across jurisdictions, various grounds have been identified as rationales for recusal. Automatic disqualification occurs when the adjudicator may have a monetary interest in the outcome of the case. In the case of N.B. Jeejeebhoy v. Assistant Collector, Thana Prant, Thana, the Hon’ble Chief Justice of India reconstituted the bench when it was found out that one of the members was a member of the cooperative society for which the land had been acquired. Another ground for recusal is personal bias that the judge may develop with respect to the subject matter or his relationship with the parties. In A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India, the acting Chief Conservator of the forest was a member of the selection committee for the All India Forest Services Cadre and was also one of the candidates who had applied through the same. While it was ascertained that he hadn’t involved himself in the selection process, the court held that there was a definite conflict of interest and that there was a definitive likelihood of bias. A subject-matter bias is when the adjudicating authority has a predisposition towards any issue. For example, in the case of Gullapalli Nageswara Rao & Ors. v. Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation & Ors, the Hon’ble Supreme Court quashed the Andhra Pradesh government’s decision to nationalize road transport stating, that the secretary of the transport department who pronounced the hearing held a subject-matter interest. The judge may recuse himself voluntarily or be asked to recuse himself at the request of the litigant. If a recusal takes place due to an objection raised by a litigant, reasons for the same should be provided to promote transparency and avoid forum shopping. For example, Justice U.U. Lalit automatically recused himself from the hearing for the land dispute in Ayodhya after it was brought to his notice that he had earlier appeared as counsel for the former Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh in the 1997 contempt hearing. However, in Assam Sanmilita Mahasangha v. Union of India, the then CJI, Ranjan Gogoi, was requested to recuse himself from hearing the case as he had made certain comments during a previous hearing causing the petitioner to believe that the CJI had certain preconceived notions about the matter. However, the CJI refused to comply with the request. Lord Hewart, in R. v. Sussex Justices, had remarked, “Justice should not only be done, but it shall also seem to be done.” In addition to recusal due to actual and apparent bias, the judge may also recuse himself to avoid an appearance or apprehension of bias in the mind of an observer. However, here the possibility of bias should be “real” and not a remote probability. The test to determine bias involves two stages. First, the judge must identify any factors that could cause a well-informed observer to reasonably fear that the case might not be decided solely on its merits. Second, the judge must determine whether there is a clear and logical link between those factors and the apprehension of bias. Recusal in Foreign Nations English Common Law:The custom of recusal globally stemmed from the maxim “nemo judex in causa sua”, which has its genesis in the common law of UK. There is an absence of any codified law on recusal in
From Rumour to retribution: A Legacy of superstition; Bihar’s Battle Against Witch Hunting
Written By Adv. Amarjeet[i], Yogesh Anand[ii] & Subham Babu[iii] The recent outcry in Purnia, Bihar, wherein five members of a family were brutally murdered on suspicion of witchcraft, has again put the age-old practice of witch-hunting in the limelight. The evil practice, while old, is still claiming innocent lives, especially in Bihar and Jharkhand. One of the strongest sociological explanations for the prevalence of such practices is that there exists an overall low level of education and awareness in society. Individuals are still unaware and do not understand that accusing another of being a “witch” (Daain) is not only baseless but also against the law in India. Over 2,500 women have been killed in India on the charges of witchcraft since 2000, according to the National Crime Records Bureau. To counter this evil, Bihar achieved the distinction of being the first Indian state to pass a special legislation, the Prevention of Witch (Daain) Practices Act, 1999[iv]. The Act aimed at curbing and ultimately ending torture, humiliation, and murder of women on accusations of witchcraft, which is an extremely common form of oppression in tribal regions and rural enclaves of the state. The Act gives significant definitions to define pivotal words. A “witch” or a “Daain” is a woman who is accused, by a person, of having supernatural evil powers in the form of black magic, evil eyes, or harmful mantras which might cause harm to people or the general public as well[v]. The “identifier” is the person who first identifies a woman as a witch[vi]. The Act also prescribes individuals such as “Ojha,” “Guni,” or “Shekha”, native healers or spiritualists, who assert the faculty of identifying or “curing” witches[vii]. The Act consists of eight sections, of which Sections 3 to 6 elaborate on the main offences and the corresponding punishments. Section 3 criminalises any individual who identifies another as a witch. Whether the identification is by words, behaviour, or action, the offender is punishable by imprisonment for a term which may be up to three months, or by a fine of ₹1,000, or by both[viii]. Section 4 penalises further those who, on such identification, go on to physically or mentally torture the identified witch. This is also punishable with six months’ imprisonment or a fine of ₹2,000 or both[ix]. Section 5 prohibits the offence of abetment. It states that whoever abets another, encourages or induces any other person to call a woman a witch intentionally or unintentionally becomes liable to be punished with imprisonment for a term not exceeding three months, a fine of ₹1,000, or both[x]. Section 6 makes “witch curing,” that is, acts done by persons such as Ojhas or Gunis of conducting risky rituals or physically or mentally torturing the accused witch in the guise of exorcism or purging, a criminal offense. The offense can bring a maximum punishment of one year’s imprisonment, or a ₹2,000 fine, or both[xi]. Section 7 of the Act criminalises all such offences identification, torture, abetment, and witch-curing as cognizable and non-bailable offences. This implies that the police may arrest the accused on their own volition and bail can’t be claimed as a matter of right[xii]. In spite of the strong judicial system, the persistence of the witch-hunting cases in Bihar indicates some essential questions regarding the degree of transparency among the citizens as well as the efficiency of law and order machinery. There has been a catena of cases that have come before the Patna High Court in the year 2025 relating to witch hunting. In Munni Devi Vs. The State of Bihar[xiii], dated 17-06-2025, the appellant, Munni Devi had filed an appeal against an order of acquittal dated 09.09.2024 under Section 372 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 whereby the respondents-accused had been acquitted by the Trial Court. The FIR No. Gurua P.S. Case No.178/2020 was lodged under Sections 341/323/302/504/34 of the Indian Penal Code, and also under Sections 3/4 of the Prevention of Witch Practices Act. The informant’s charge was that on 3rd August 2020, Pratima Kumari tortured her daughter, Nirmala Kumari, informing her that Nirmala’s mother (the informant, Munni Devi) was a ‘dain’ (witch) and that she was preventing the marriage of Pratima Kumari. This turned into a physical attack on Pratima Kumari by Arjun Choudhary, Akhilesh Choudhary, and Phulesh Devi, during which Munni Devi’s husband Sarjun Chaudhary received head injuries that resulted in his death two days later at Blue Diamond Hospital, Patna. But the High Court dismissed the appeal, holding that there was no defect on the part of the Trial Court in the acquittal order because the prosecution was unable to establish the case against the respondents-accused beyond a reasonable doubt. The court observed substantial delay in lodging the FIR, non-production of certificates of injury to the claimed injured eye-witnesses (PW-1 and PW-2) and examination-in-chief of PW-3 (deceased’s mother), deposing that her son had expired after drinking liquor and collapsing, unequivocally denying the accused persons to have caused his death. The High Court also looked into the double presumption of innocence on the part of the accused in acquittal appeals. The appeal was heard by Honourable Mr. Justice Vipul M. Pancholi and Honourable Mr. Justice Sunil Dutta Mishra. In Rakesh Hembram and Others v. The State of Bihar[xiv] dated 24.03.2025, also pertains to “witch hunting” being the reason for the reported assault and killing. The prosecution witnesses continued alleging that the deceased mother Jasni Murmu was suspected of being a “Dain” i.e., a witch. In particular, PW-3 (Parvati Tuddu, the victim’s daughter) deposed that the accused individuals said they had killed her mother on the assumption that she was a “witch” who murdered a child. PW-4 (Arjun Tuddu, victim’s husband) also testified about an incident before the murder where some of the accused persons had visited his house, categorically saying that his family members were “witch” and attempted to kidnap him on the pretext of “putting out the lamp”. PW-1 (Shiban Tuddu, son of the victim), though initially averring that no one told
“No Means No”: Section 149 BSA and the Evidentiary Dignity of the Prosecutrix
By Onam Sourabh & Avinash Verma, Students at the National University of Study and Research in Law, Ranchi Pink, the 2016 Bollywood courtroom drama that transcended beyond the boundary of a cinema to reflect an elementary yet intense subject: ‘No means no’. Amitabh Bachchan takes on a whole lot of conventional wisdom to declare that clothes or lifestyle or sex partners do not indicate consent. What played out on the big screen was a realisation of a legal state our courts had been articulating for long and finally one which finds legislative sanctity under Section 149, Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA). This provision prohibits cross-examination with regard to the character of the general immoral or a prior sexual experience of the victim in prosecutions for sexual offences for proving consent. The in-built anchor is constitutional (protection of the dignity, privacy and autonomy of the prosecutrix under Articles 14 and 21) but it also reinforces the integrity of the fact-finding process by ensuring that a trial remains focused on facts of the particular incident rather than be derailed via character assassination or to start passing a moral judgment. From Colonial Evidence Rules to Victim-Centric Safeguards Section 120 BSA (formerly Section 114-A of the Evidence Act), which stipulates that once sexual intercourse is proved and the prosecutrix testifies to absence of consent, the court shall presume non-consent. This statutory presumption shifts the evidentiary burden to the accused a deliberate policy choice recognising the unique evidentiary challenges in prosecuting sexual crimes, where often the only direct evidence is the testimony of the victim herself. The principle underlying Section 149 had been taking shape in judicial pronouncements. In State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh (1996) 2 SCC 384, the Supreme Court famously declared: “Even if the prosecutrix… has been promiscuous in her sexual behaviour earlier, she has a right to refuse… because she is not a vulnerable object or prey for being sexually assaulted by anyone and everyone” (para 16). Likewise, in State (NCT of Delhi) v. Pankaj Chaudhary (2019) 11 SCC 575, the Court observed: “Even if the allegations of the accused that the prosecutrix is of immoral character are taken to be correct, the same does not give any right to the accused persons to commit rape on her against her consent” (para 27). And in State of Maharashtra v. Madhukar Narayan Mardikar (1991) 1 SCC 57, the Court went further, stating: “Even a woman of easy virtue is entitled to privacy… and is equally entitled to the protection of the law” (para 12). These pronouncements dismantle the “implied consent” myth and firmly anchor the legal standard in the prosecutrix’s autonomy, underscoring that her past cannot diminish her present rights. The Presumption of Absence of Consent Section 120 BSA reinforces this protection with a presumption that, once the prosecutrix testifies to the absence of consent and sexual intercourse is proved, the court shall presume non-consent. In Yedla Srinivasa Rao v. State of A.P. (2006) 11 SCC 615, the Court clarified: “…where sexual intercourse by the accused is proved and the question is whether it was without the consent of the woman alleged to have been raped and she states… that she did not consent, the court shall presume that she did not consent” (para 15). Similarly, in Anurag Soni v. State of Chhattisgarh (2019) 13 SCC 1, the Court held that such a presumption leaves no scope for drawing inferences of consent from surrounding circumstances or prior intimacy unless the accused can produce compelling and credible rebuttal evidence. In Maksud Sheikh Gaffur Sheikh v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 SCC OnLine Bom 2151, the Bombay High Court reaffirmed the fundamental principle that sexual consent must be explicit, informed, and contemporaneous, and that its absence renders sexual intercourse an offence under §375 IPC. The Bench, speaking through Nitin B. Suryawanshi and M.W. Chandwani, JJ., emphasised that rape is not merely a sexual offence but an act of aggression violating the victim’s bodily integrity, mental autonomy, and privacy. The Court categorically rejected any presumption of consent based on a woman’s past sexual history, invoking §53A of the Indian Evidence Act to exclude character evidence as irrelevant to the question of consent. Significantly, it clarified that prior intimacy does not confer perpetual licence for sexual access, and that a refusal a “No” is conclusive in law. The judgment further underlined that even within prior or ongoing relationships, consent must be specific to each act and may be withdrawn at any time, thereby reinforcing the autonomy and dignity of the prosecutrix. In Rajkumar v. State of Karnataka, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 257, the Supreme Court, per Aniruddha Bose and Sanjay Kumar, JJ., reaffirmed that consent in sexual relationships is not a static or once-for-all grant, but must be present at every stage of the relationship. While acknowledging the precedent in Shambhu Kharwar v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2022 SCC OnLine SC 1032) that a genuinely consensual relationship does not attract the offence of rape, the Court clarified that the consensual nature of an initial phase does not immunise later acts from scrutiny if one partner withdraws consent. The Bench stressed that the moment one party expresses unwillingness to continue, the relationship loses its consensual character, and any sexual act thereafter would be assessed in light of §375 IPC. By distinguishing between past consent and continuing consent, the judgment reinforced the principle that sexual autonomy is ongoing, dynamic, and revocable. In RIT Foundation v. Union of India, the Delhi High Court engaged in a profound constitutional and human rights analysis of marital rape, holding that non-consensual sex within marriage is as violative of dignity, bodily integrity, and personal liberty as sexual assault outside it. The Court underscored that under Article 21 of the Constitution, the offence of rape is defined by the absence of consent, not by the identity of the perpetrator, and that the marital relationship cannot be a shield for forced sexual intercourse. Observing that modern marriage is a relationship of equals, the Court rejected
THE EQUILIBRIUM OF ADR AND JUDICIAL SAFEGUARDS IN THE CPC
Written by Ankush Saxena & Kushagra Nigam student at UPES, Dehradun The code of Civil Procedure, 1908. serves as a Cornerstone of India’s civil justice system, which strives to strike a delicate balance between two crucial objectives that is, the fostering growth of Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) Mechanisms for the amicable and speedy settlements on one hand, and preserving a strong procedural framework so as to ensure thorough and just adjudication of disputes within the formal Court of Justice on the other. This dual approach tells how well balanced the vision of aiming to reduce the burden on quotes is while safeguarding the right to justice through due process. In this article, the significant provisions of the CPC that promote ADR, like Section 89 and Order XXIII, are critically examined, followed by an examination of procedural steps to ensure a fair trial as well as mechanism ensuring finality of orders. Section 89 of the CPC was introduced through the Amendment Act of 1999 to reduce the burden on courts by mandating judicial referral to ADR mechanisms in appropriate cases. It provides for resolution through arbitration, conciliation, mediation, judicial settlement (including Lok Adalats). The objective is to ensure speedy and cost-effective dispute resolution, aligning with India’s policy of reducing litigation backlog. The following are a brief about the different modes of ADR for which the court may direct the parties: Judicial Interpretation of Section 89 The Supreme Court in Afcons Infrastructure Ltd. v. Cherian Varkey Construction Co. (P) Ltd. clarified that Section 89 must be read with flexibility to promote ADR and avoid procedural hurdles. Similarly, in Salem Advocate Bar Association v. Union of India, the Court emphasized that ADR mechanisms under Section 89 must be actively pursued by judges and litigants. Order XXIII of the CPC governs the withdrawal and compromise of suits, ensuring that disputes can be amicably settled at any stage of litigation. Rule 1 allows a plaintiff to withdraw a suit with permission to file afresh if there is sufficient cause. Sub-rule 1 of Rule 1 states a plaintiff may withdraw a suit at any stage without seeking permission from the court. However, in cases like these, they four feet the right to institute a fresh suit. Further, sub rule two of rule one States that if the plaintiff wants to withdraw the suit and file a fresh one they must obtain the court’s permission which is only granted if the withdraw of the initial suit is due to formal defects or other reasonable grounds. This provision helps in safeguarding against frivolous litigation, While ensuring that the plaintiffs Are not unjustly penalised for the procedural shortcomings. Case Law on Order XXIII In Banwari Lal v. Chando Devi, the Supreme Court held that once a lawful compromise is recorded under Order XXIII Rule 3, it operates as a final judgment and is enforceable like a decree. The promotion of ADR under CPC aligns with constitutional mandates such as Article 39A, which emphasizes access to justice. Further, ADR mechanisms reduce judicial backlog, lower litigation costs, and promote amicable resolution, fostering commercial and social harmony. The various provisions of the CPC establish procedural safeguards evidence rules including fair pleadings, impartial adjudication ensuring fairness and litigation, complying with the CPC’s main objectives. Principles of Natural Justice The CPC incorporates several procedural safeguards so as to ensure a fair trial routed in the principles of natural justice. These include audi alteram partem the right to be heard, and nemo judex in causa sua the rule against bias. To make sure that the justice is not hindered by the technicalities section 153-A of the CPC empowers courts to amend any defect or error in proceedings. In Manohar Lal Chopra v. Rai Bahadur Rao Raja Seth Hiralal, The Supreme Court underscored that the procedural rules are intended to not to hinder but to advance the cause of justice. This principle was laid down in the Order VI Rule 17, Permitting the amendment of pleadings and to ensure that the true matters in the dispute are effectively resolved. Order V mandates proper service of summons, ensuring the defendant is informed and has the opportunity to contest the suit. In Sangram Singh v. Election Tribunal, the Supreme Court held that the CPC aims to ensure a fair hearing and prevent ex-parte decrees in the absence of due service. Order XVIII governs the examination of witnesses, reinforcing procedural fairness. Cross-examination rights ensure that parties can challenge adverse evidence, a principle upheld in K.L. Tripathi v. State Bank of India. The principle of audi alteram partem, embedded in Order IX Rule 7, guarantees a litigant’s right to present their case. Further, Order XLVII provides for review, enabling corrections in case of procedural or substantive errors. Ensures reliability of evidence through cross-examination. Provide options to challenge faulty judgments. Ensuring Impartiality and Transparency The CPC also ensures transparency and fairness through provisions such as Order XVIII, which requires witnesses to be examined in open court, and Order XIX, which governs the issuance of commissions for the witness examination. These provisions ensure that the trial process is conducted fairly and that parties have an opportunity to present their case effectively. In State of Punjab v. Shamlal Murari (1976), the Supreme Court held that the examination of witnesses in open court is essential to maintain public confidence in the judicial process. This underscores the importance of procedural safeguards in ensuring a fair trial. In Satyadhyan Ghosal v. Deorajin Debi, the Supreme Court emphasized that procedural safeguards in the CPC prevent miscarriage of justice. However, judicial delays often undermine these safeguards. Malik Mazhar Sultan v. U.P. Public Service Commission led to case flow management rules, introducing mandatory timelines for different litigation stages⁵. Finality of judgments is crucial for maintaining judicial efficiency. The CPC establishes mechanisms to prevent endless litigation and ensure certainty in legal outcomes. The doctrine of res judicata prevents parties from re-litigating an issue that has been conclusively adjudicated. In Daryao v. State of U.P., the Supreme Court held that res judicata applies
Threshold for Justice: Legal Analysis of Section 7 Proviso for Homebuyers
Written by Aanchal Ahuja student at Maharashtra National Law University, Aurangabad Abstract This article delves into a comprehensive analysis of the threshold requirement introduced under Section 7 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, specifically concerning homebuyers. It requires that in order to start CIRP, at least 100 allottees or 10% of allottees in the same real estate project, whichever is smaller, must jointly submit an application. The article assesses the justification for this modification, which was proposed to limit pointless or speculative filings, and looks at its applications. It outlines the scope of its applicability to ongoing and new cases, its operation in single and multi-tower projects, and the administrative burden it imposes on allottees. The article also highlights procedural challenges such as determining the number of allottees in a project, collecting consent, and delays caused by compliance requirements. It identifies ambiguities in the interpretation and application of the provision and attempts to clarify them through judicial pronouncements. Keywords: IBC, 2016, Section 7, homebuyers, 2020 Amendment, threshold The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 describes two kinds of creditors. Section 5(7) defines a financial creditor as a person to whom a financial debt is owned and may include any person to whom such a debt has been transferred or assigned legally. Whereas, Section 5(20)defines an operational creditor as a person to whom an operational debt is owned or any such person to whom such debt has been legally transferred or assigned. The key word herein is legally, such transfer must not be illegally or for any unlawful purpose. There had been a perpetual ambiguity and confusion existing regarding the position of homebuyers in India under the Code. However, subsequent to the landmark judgment of Chita Sharma v. UOI , where the Hon’ble SC expressed apprehension in regard to the position of homebuyers. Following the judgment, an Insolvency Law Committee led by Injeti Srinivas was set up by the govt. which recognized the catastrophic consequences of the non-inclusion of home-buyers depriving them of their rights. The first major amendmentin 2018 was a turning point which explicitly gave the status of FCs to home-buyers and recognizing financial debts,Section 5(8) now included the money raised from allottees in the real-estate projects.Such allottees were also entitled to file an application under Section 7 to initiate CIRP against the corporate debtor. The landmark judgment of Pioneer Urban Land and Infrastructure v. UOI upheld the constitutional validity of this amendment wherein it was clarified that home-buyers who are not allotted houses within the stipulated time-period will be treated as FCs. Furthermore, it was also observed that in real estate projects, money is collected from homebuyers in return for the promise of getting property in the future, which clearly reflects the time value of money. This credit collected from homebuyers falls under Section 5(8)(f), even without needing to refer to the explanation added later through the amendment. Furthermore, the 2020 amendment by virtue of Section 3 added Proviso 7, specifying the minimum threshold required for filing an application by home-buyers/ allottees. The petition initiating the CIRP against the builders can befiled only if it is done by at least 100 homebuyers/allottees from the same real estate project, or by at least 10% of the total number of homebuyers in that particular project, whichever is lesser. Further, Section 7(3)also requires that a financial creditor must bring on record the proof of default, either from an information utility or any other evidence, along with the name of the proposed interim professional. Non-compliance of either of these requirements leads to rejection of the application. As per Proviso 4 of Section 7, the information provided by IUs holds evidentiary value, and the AA is required to determine the existence of a financial debt default within 14 days of receipt of the application. In Manish Kumar v. UOI, the issue pertaining was that the classification made by the IBC by setting a threshold limit for home-buyers alone, levying no such condition for other Financial Creditors was unreasonable and violative of their rights. The 3 Judge Bench of the Hon’ble SC held that the position of home-buyers cannot be considered to be identical or compared with other financial creditors and the threshold limit set is not violative of Art. 14 or arbitrary. The 2020 amendment does not infringe upon the rights of the home-buyers to initiate CIRP, but only puts a minimum threshold limit for the same. A petition for initiation of the CIRP by home-buyers is maintainable subject to the minimum threshold limit as specified being met. A petition is rejected if the petitioners do not meet the requirements set up by the 2020 amendment. One of the most notable requirements is that all the allottees must be of the sameproject. In the judgement of Pankaj Mehta v. M/s Ansal Hi-Tech Township, the Hon’ble NCLAT rejected the application since there were several individual projects and the allottees were spread over and associated with different projects, and hence the threshold limit was not met.The NCLT has expressed a similar view by rejecting the petitions not meeting the minimum requirement. In Mr. Rajesh Khanna & 82 Ors.v. M/s. Vardhman Infradevelopers Pvt. Ltd., the applicant claimed that the application out of 929 units in the project, the application was filed by 209 allottees. But the memo of parties displayed only 83 applicants, therefore the NCLT rejected the petition since it was unable to meet the limit set. The Hon’ble SC in the Manish Kumar Case (supra)held that the quoram of 100 or 10% of the allottees from the same project is to be seen as “on the date of presentation of the petition” rather than at the time of admission or hearing of the petition. The legitimacy of a petition must be assessed based on the facts that existed at the time it was filed. Furthermore, in Tarun Ahuja v. Puri Construction Pvt. Ltd., the NCLAT held that the withdrawal of certain allottees in pursuance of a settlement or any other reason would not
Attempt to Rape: Trapped Between Rape and Outraging Modesty – A Legal Dilemma?
Written by Saumya Tripathi student at Dr. Ram Manohar Lohiya National Law University, Lucknow Introduction Attempt to commit a crime takes place when a person develops the intention to commit an offense and does everything that is required to commit it but fails. Attempt is punishable under the Section 62 of the Bhartiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (hereinafter, ‘BNS’). Although the BNS does not clearly define the term attempt, the Supreme Court has interpreted it through cases. The law regarding attempts remains complex and unclear due to several reasons, inter alia, a lack of a precise definition of attempt, differences in mental and physical elements, and the lack of a narrow interpretation. This article seeks to analyse the jurisprudence surrounding the attempt to rape in India and how the subjectivity and inconsistency in law has been unfavourable to women in general. In light of the recent controversial verdict of Allahabad High Court which held that groping and untying strings of the pyjama of a minor girl does not constitute attempt to rape, has sparked the debate around the blurring lines of what constitutes preparation and attempt, specifically in rape cases, which is one of the most stigmatised crimes for the victim. The ground is fraught with difficulties due to the sensitive nature of the crime and the non-adaptation to the 2013 amendment which broadened the net of rape laws. The judicial ambiguity about what is the penultimate act in rape cases is a by-product of the fact that it is still stuck in the discarded statutory definition of rape, wherein penetration was the ultimate requirement. The only new input is that the intention of the accused is the key factor in distinguishing cases of attempt to rape and outraging the modesty of women. But again, the matter of fact is that intention is to be gauged by the acts of the accused. Analysing Attempt to Rape Between rape and attempt to commit rape, there is a rare area covered by section 354 IPC i.e. assault or criminal force to woman with intent to outrage her modesty or indecent assault. The dividing line between attempt to commit rape and indecent assault is not only thin but also is practically invisible. The contemporary understanding of the law is intention-centric. In Koppula Venakat Rao, it was held that an accused guilty of an attempt with intent to commit rape, court has to be satisfied that the accused, when he laid hold of the prosecutrix, not only desired to gratify his passions upon her person, but that he intended to do so at all events, and notwithstanding any resistance by her. Incidentally, the line from judgement, “Indecent assaults are often magnified into attempts at rape..” is often quoted to support the argument that to constitute an attempt to rape, severe circumstances of culpability are required. However, it is well to be noted that surrounding factors may not necessarily indicate whether an infallible determination to rape existed. It is to be noted that it is a case of the year 2004, and had this been a case post-2013 amendments, it would squarely fall within the boundaries of the offence of rape. State of MP v. Mahendra was a case where the limits of proximity test were extended and the court recognized that the stage of preparation ends, and attempt begins in a rape case begins the moment accused with a carnal intent takes the victim to a secluded location. The Court held that the act of the accused of closing the doors and taking the victims to a room with the motive of carnal knowledge was the end of ‘preparation’. His following action of stripping the prosecutrices and rubbing his genitals against theirs was deliberately done with manifest intention to commit rape and was reasonably proximate to the offence. On these lines, the judgement of the Allahabad HC in Akash and Ors v. State of UP, that the actions of the accused—grabbing the X’s breasts, breaking the string of her pyjama, and attempting to drag her beneath a culvert—did not constitute an attempt to rape raises significant concerns regarding its interpretation of the law and its application to sexual offences. The accused’s actions in breaking X’s pajama string and attempting to drag her beneath the culvert constitute a direct movement towards commission of rape. The next immediate step would have been rape itself, had the witnesses not interrupted. The Court failed to recognize that the accused had progressed beyond preparation and into the realm of attempt, as they had already engaged in acts directly proximate to the completion of rape. The Problems with the Proximity test Different Interpretations The Supreme Court has established two different criteria under the proximity rule to distinguish between preparation and attempt. The first is an intention-based approach, where the proximity of the act is gauged in relation to the individual’s intention rather than physical actions. The second focuses on physical proximity, considering an act to be an attempt if it is physically close to the commission of the offence. The intention-based approach suggests that an act must reflect intent, which, in most cases, is determined with aid of circumstantial evidence. Scholars and jurists have proposed different interpretations to refine this classification. For example, in a New Zealand case, an objective assessment of physical actions was considered the sole determinant of proximity. These differing perspectives make it difficult to establish a universal interpretation. Complexity of Mens Rea of Attempt to Rape In Koppula Venkat Rao v. State of Andhra Pradesh, it was held that indecent assaults can amount to an attempt to commit rape if the accused intended to perform all the necessary acts leading to the offence but failed. Therefore, determining whether mere disrobing qualifies as an attempt to commit rape hinges on the presence of mens rea. The basic challenge is to distinguish between the specific intent to outrage modesty and the intent to commit rape. In terms of outraging the modesty, mens rea involves an intent to outrage modesty
Reciprocity and Regulation: Analyzing the 2025 Amendments to BCI Rules on Foreign Legal Practice in India
Written by Jagatpal Choudhary, a student at Gujarat National Law University, Gandhinagar. Introduction The Bar Council of India [hereinafter “BCI”] has notified Amendment Rules for Registration and Regulations of Foreign Lawyers and Foreign Law Firms in India [hereinafter “Rules”] (such power is conferred by Section 7(1)(d), (e), (ic), (l) and (m) and Section 49(1)(ah), (ag), (c), (e), and (h) read together with Section 24, 29, and 47 of the Advocates Act, 1961), allowing foreign lawyers and law firms [hereinafter “Foreign Lawyers and Firms”] to practice foreign law in India on a reciprocity basis, which means “Indian advocates and law firms may register as foreign lawyers or foreign law firms, allowing them to expand their practice to foreign law and international law consultancy without relinquishing their rights to practice Indian law in domestic forums. This dual registration provides Indian lawyers with an opportunity to broaden their professional horizons while maintaining their status as advocates under Indian law.” Objective of the Amendment Bought Here, answering succinctly to the above questions this, there is a dissenting judgment with the AK Balaji, regarding the expression “fly in and fly out”, it was put forth that it will only cover a casual visit not amounting to “practice” and nothing else, and in case of any doubt, then the interpretation of BCI will have an upper hand as and when decided. Secondly, it was held that there is no absolute right of the foreign lawyer to conduct arbitration proceedings in respect of disputes arising out of a contract relating to international commercial arbitration. Thirdly, the expression mentioned in the Para 63(iv) of the 2012 judgement, B.P.O. Companies providing wide range of customized and integrated services and functions to its customers like word processing, secretarial support, transcription services, proof reading services, travel desk support services, etc. do not come within the purview of the Advocates Act, 1961 or the Bar Council of India Rules. Definition Clause:- Scope and eligibility of Practice for Foreign Lawyers and Law Firms Registration and Regulatory Requirements Validity and Renewal of Registration The Nature of Restrictions and Ethical Obligations on Foreign Lawyers and Firms: Impact on Indian Legal Professionals and Law Firms Implications and Repercussions on the Indian Legal Practice System In conclusion, while the amendments offer substantial opportunities for growth, learning, and internationalization, they also demand vigilance from regulators and adaptability from practitioners. For Indian lawyers and law firms, the move prompts new pathways, competitive benchmarks, and partnership prospects.
Centre vs. State: The Federal Tug-of-War in India and the U.S.
Written by Supriya Kumari & Atulya tripathi students at Chanakya National Law university, Patna. IntroductionIn India, the federalism model was adopted to manage its vast diversity of languages, cultures, and regional identities while still maintaining unity. But what does federalism actually mean in practice? And how does India’s version differ from other countries like the USA? What is federalism? Federalism essentially means “distribution of power.” It ensures that one central authority cannot make all of the decisions. Instead, it delegated some powers to smaller units, like states, enabling them to govern themselves in specific areas. For example, think of a large school with various departments: the principal (Centre) is responsible for discipline and a host of policies, while each department (state) is responsible for its students, teaching and learning, and curricula within established parameters. Where Did This Idea Come From? The concept of federalism was shaped by thinkers like John Locke, who believed in limited government to protect individual freedom, and Montesquieu, who stressed the importance of separating powers (like the judiciary, executive, and legislature). These ideas influenced countries like the USA, which became the first modern federal state. Federalism in the Indian Constitution The Indian Constitution doesn’t use the word “federation” directly, but it is very clear about what it means. There are three lists in our Constitution that distribute powers between the Union (Centre) and the States: The Union List is for the Centre, the State List is for the states, and the Concurrent List is for joint duties. However, Indian federalism is not a copy of the American model. It is more centralized because India needed strong unity after Partition and independence. We refer to it as “quasi-federal” for this reason.” This centralization was critical for integrating India’s national integrity and unity with its considerable regional and cultural diversity. In the first three decades after independence, the central government had a significant monopoly on authority and power. The subsequent two or so decades saw a move away from centralization to a more balanced federal structure based on cooperative and competitive federalism. Cooperative federalism emphasized the dialogue between the states and the Centr, while competitive federalism encouraged states to engage in competition to attract investment and enhance development governance through the operation of market forces. Several factors contributed to the rebalancing of federalism, including economic liberalization beginning in 1992, political decentralization due to the introduction of multitiered government, and the growing role and significance of regional parties in state governance stemming from both economic and political decentralization. These factors transformed the power of states, enabled greater autonomy, and allowed states to exercise influence over national decisions as they gained in importance as key players. Centre-State Relations: The Reality While the Constitution gives states certain powers, the Centre has many tools to control or intervene in state matters. It can declare President’s Rule if a state government fails. During emergencies (like war or natural disaster), the Centre can make laws on subjects in the state list. The governor, who is appointed by the Centre, can play a role in state politics. This process sometimes leads to conflict. For example, state governments might feel the Centre is interfering too much, especially if they are ruled by opposition parties. Federalism in the United States In the US there are two paramount clauses, the supremacy clause and the necessary clause, which predominantly shape its federalism. The Supremacy Clause means that law adopted by the federal government will take priority over any state law created to be in antagonism with the prior. The state law will only be valid if it is in line with federal law. Without the Supremacy Clause, each state could have its interpretation or application of a law, which may lead to contradictory applications of federal laws. There would be a mix-up of laws that could only lead to chaos. The Supremacy Clause allows essential national policies, such as civil rights protections, immigration regulations, and income taxes-to be administered uniformly across the states. A classic example is the marijuana legalization issue. While some states in the U.S. have legalized marijuana for medical or recreational use, it is illegal under federal law. Under the Supremacy Clause, federal law technically trumps state law, although in practice the federal government tends not to strictly enforce this conflict, creating somewhat of a legal void. However, The federal government does have the power to override state legislation. The Supreme Court has confirmed the Supremacy Clause in numerous decisions. For instance, in McCulloch v. Maryland, the Court decided that Maryland could not tax a federal bank or otherwise interfere with the actions of federal employees that were legal. On the other hand, the required clause lets Congress make laws that aren’t precisely named in the Constitution, as long as those laws are required for carrying out the authorities enumerated. The Constitution, for example, provides Congress the ability to organize and finance armies. But it doesn’t say how. Under the Necessary and Proper Clause, Congress can pass laws related to military recruitment, supply chains, or establishing training facilities because these all fit the necessary part of executing the fundamental power of maintaining a national defense. The Necessary and Proper Clause is a tool for practical governance, not a blank check. Some people worry that this clause gives Congress unlimited power, as if it could pass any law just because it claims it is “necessary and proper.” But that is not how it operates. The clause does not create new powers; it merely provides Congress with the authority to select effective means of carrying out its already authorized constitutional powers. Any government must have the means to carry out its responsibilities. The section simply states that Congress has the authority to carry out its duties in accordance with the Constitution. The Supreme Court said in the same decision, McCulloch v. Maryland, that the federal government can form a national bank even though the Constitution doesn’t say anything about banks. The case established that Congress has implied