Written by Mahvish Kazmi, Programme Manager, Kautilya Society, Vidhi Centre for Legal Policy & Gaurav Kumar Mandal, Student Convenor at KS- NUSRL & student at the National University of Study and Research in Law, Ranchi
Abstract
India’s interstate river water disputes reveal the complex intersection of constitutional mechanisms, statutory frameworks, and ecological concerns. While Article 262 and the Interstate River Water Disputes Act, 1956, provide a procedural framework for adjudicating disputes through tribunals, the focus has remained on administrative allocation of water based on historical usage, irrigated area, and crop patterns. Environmental principles such as sustainable development, ecological flows, and long-term climate considerations remain marginalised within this system. Case studies from the Cauvery, Krishna, Mahadayi, and Vamsadhara disputes show tribunals’ limited engagement with ecological health and biodiversity. This article argues for reform by incorporating multidisciplinary expertise, mandating environmental impact assessments, and adopting a science-based methodology for equitable and sustainable water sharing. Only by embedding environmental jurisprudence into interstate dispute resolution can India safeguard both its people’s needs and the ecological integrity of its rivers.
India has more than 400 rivers across the subcontinent which are majorly classified into Himalayan, Deccan, Coastal and Inland. A whooping 65% of the Indian population is heavily dependent on water which also leads to water distribution disputes amongst states. The recent Punjab-Haryana water dispute has resurfaced another inter-State conflict concerning the equitable sharing of surplus waters from the Ravi and Beas rivers. This involves Haryana’s challenge in accessing its share due to the non-completion of the Sutlej-Yamuna Link (SYL) Canal. Recently, Haryana reported a sharp decline in water supply from the Bhakra dam and requested the Bhakra Beas Management Board (BBMB) to increase its allocation. The Punjab government opposed this, arguing dam levels were critically low and Haryana had exceeded its share for the depletion period. Despite a partial approval by BBMB and advice from the Centre, the BBMB subsequently cut Haryana’s allocation, citing low reservoir levels, resulting in a continuing deadlock. The BBMB is empowered by the River Boards Act, 1956 (RB Act) to provide for the establishment of River Boards. The core purpose of the Act is the regulation and development of inter-State rivers and river valleys. Under the RB Act, the Central Government may establish a River Board for advising the Governments interested (Governments of States likely to be interested in or affected by the Board’s functions) concerning the regulation or development of a specified inter-State river or river valley, and for performing other functions. Different Boards are established for different inter-State rivers or river valleys. While the procedural limitations are mentioned in the Act, it is imperative to note that bias in terms of political influence, vested interest and differing priorities among states could lead to biased decisions.
Picture Description: India’s interstate river water disputes.
The Central Government empowers the Board to perform specific functions under Section 13, which include advising Governments interested on matters concerning regulation and development, such as co-ordinating activities, conserving water resources, promoting schemes for irrigation, water supply, drainage, hydro-electric power development, flood control, navigation, afforestation, soil erosion control, and pollution prevention. The Board may also be empowered to prepare schemes, including multi-purpose schemes, for regulating or developing the inter-State river or river valley, and advise the Governments interested to execute these schemes. The Board has general powers within its area of operation, including acquiring and disposing of property, undertaking investigations, inspecting works, conducting research, collecting data, and publishing information. It can also require Governments interested to furnish information.
The powers of these Tribunals can be traced in the constitutional framework, particularly Article 262, and the Interstate River Water Disputes Act, 1956 (ISRWD Act). Article 262 grants Parliament the power to legislate for the adjudication of disputes concerning the use, distribution, or control of waters in interstate rivers and river valleys. Notably, Article 262(2) allows Parliament to exclude the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and other courts in such disputes. This is reflected in Section 11 of the ISRWD Act, which states that neither the Supreme Court nor any other court shall have jurisdiction over water disputes referred to a Tribunal under this Act. While water is primarily a State subject under Entry 17 of the State List, the Constitution provides these mechanisms for Union intervention when inter-state interests are involved.
The ISRWD Act of 1956 serves as a primary statutory framework for addressing these disputes. It provides for the constitution of ad hoc water dispute tribunals when the Central Government is satisfied that a dispute cannot be resolved through negotiation such as the BBMB. The process begins when a State Government lodges a complaint with the Central Government, stating that a water dispute has arisen or is likely to arise because its interests in the inter-State river waters have been or are likely to be prejudicially affected by another State’s executive action, legislation, failure to act, or failure to implement agreement terms. The State Government requests the Central Government to refer the dispute to a Tribunal for adjudication in a prescribed form and manner. Upon receiving such a request, if the Central Government is of the opinion that the water dispute cannot be settled by negotiations, it shall, within a period not exceeding one year, constitute a Water Disputes Tribunal for the adjudication of that specific dispute.
Once constituted, the Central Government shall refer the water dispute and any connected or relevant matters to the Tribunal for adjudication.There have been 9 tribunals constituted out of which 5 have been disposed and 4 are active. The tribunals are tasked with investigating the matters referred to it. It must forward a report setting out its findings and decision to the Central Government within a period of three years, which can be extended by the Central Government by a further period not exceeding two years for unavoidable reasons. If, after considering the decision, the Central or a State Government requires an explanation or guidance on a point not originally referred, they may refer the matter back to the Tribunal within three months. The Tribunal may then provide a further report within one year (extendable), and the original decision is deemed modified accordingly. If the Tribunal members differ in opinion, the majority view prevails.
The ISRWD Act requires the Central Government to constitute a Tribunal within one year of receiving a request if the dispute cannot be settled by negotiations. Tribunals consist of a Chairman and two other members nominated by the Chief Justice of India from among Supreme Court or High Court Judges, and may appoint assessors to advise them. The Tribunal is required to investigate the matters referred and forward a report with its decision to the Central Government within three years, with a possible extension of up to two years.
India’s environmental jurisprudence recognises principles like the Right to a Clean and Healthy Environment, Sustainable Development, the Precautionary Principle, Polluter Pays Principle, and the Public Trust Doctrine, these principles are conspicuously absent or marginalized in the functioning of the specific legal framework for resolving interstate river water disputes. The Interstate River Water Disputes Act, 1956, which governs tribunals, does not mandate them to consider environmental flow needs, ecological degradation, long-term climate impacts, or conduct Environmental Impact Assessments. Tribunals tend to focus on administrative allocation based on factors like historical usage and irrigated area, with environmental concerns often remaining peripheral in the final awards.
Articles 252 and 253 of the Constitution offer a legislative window for incorporating environmental concerns by allowing Parliament to make laws on State List matters with state consent or to implement international obligations, but these powers have been underutilised in this context. In the Cauvery River Dispute, the Tribunal’s award focused on equitable apportionment based on historical usage and crop patterns, with a minimal allocation for environmental protection (10 TMC) that lacked detailed ecological assessment. The dispute adjudicated by the Cauvery Water Disputes Tribunal (CWDT) involves the sharing of water from the inter-state Cauvery river basin among Tamil Nadu, Karnataka, Kerala, and Puducherry. The Tribunal’s interim order provided a specific apportionment mechanism, such as directing Karnataka to release 205 million cubic feet (TMC) of water annually to the Mettur reservoir in Tamil Nadu, and Tamil Nadu to provide 6 TMC to Puducherry, with schemes later developed for implementing these directions. Even the Supreme Court’s modification in 2018, while emphasising the Cauvery as a “national asset,” primarily focused on human consumption and agricultural needs, with environmental considerations remaining peripheral. For the Krishna River Dispute, the second tribunal (KWDT-II) notably reduced the water reserved for environmental flows from 448 TMC to 171 TMC to reallocate it for consumptive use, raising concerns about downstream ecological health. The Mahadayi (Mandovi) River Dispute, involving a basin rich in biodiversity within the Western Ghats, highlights how diversion projects raise significant environmental concerns, yet the tribunal allowed limited diversion, and the environmental implications remain contentious. Similarly, in the Vamsadhara and Mahanadi Disputes, environmental aspects like ecological flow requirements, biodiversity impacts, and the effect on wetlands and fisheries received limited attention in the adjudication process.
For instance, the Cauvery Water Disputes Tribunal’s award allocated water based on historical usage and crop patterns, and the Krishna Water Disputes Tribunal’s first award considered factors like catchment area, population, and cultivable land.
However, a critical deficiency in the tribunals’ appreciation of facts lies in their marginalisation or limited consideration of environmental and ecological factors. The ISRWD Act is procedural and crucially does not lay down any clear criteria or scientific methodology for water apportionment, and it fails to specify the substantive criteria or scientific methodology to be used in reaching decisions. There is no mandate for tribunals to consider environmental impact assessments (EIAs), carrying capacity of rivers, seasonal variability, or ecological flows (e-flows) as part of their factual appreciation. Consequently, ecological health, biodiversity impacts, river basin health, and long-term climate impacts are often not effectively integrated into their decisions.
A core recommendation is to move beyond tribunals composed primarily of judicial and administrative members by ensuring multidisciplinary expertise, specifically including environmental scientists, hydrologists, and climate experts, in the tribunal or the broader dispute resolution framework. In essence, the suggested changes aim to fundamentally alter the type and scope of facts that tribunals are required and equipped to appreciate, shifting from a narrow focus on administrative and historical data towards a more science-based, environmentally conscious, and holistic understanding of river systems.