INDIAN FEDERALISM: SCENARIOS OF POWER SHARING

Written By Arshdeep Kaur student at National University of Study and Research in Law, Ranchi.

INTRODUCTION– We Indians have evolved from the times of Kings to the present-day Democratic Government while we still see countries like Britain with Queen as the apex authority. One of the essential features of monarchs is that the power to make decisions, however sovereign, is concentrated in the hands of a single individual at the ruling position. Contrary to this, we see a division or sharing of power in India between Centre and State where States are also provided with a significant amount of autonomy of their own. This article aims to provide gainful insights into the kind of Federalism India possesses, the changing dynamics or the problems surfacing, and key policy suggestions for improvement.

IS INDIA FEDERAL?

The term Federalism is a dual type of Governance where powers are equally divided between the UNION and the STATES with none being superior to each other, each deriving their respective powers from the same source that is ‘The Law of the Land’. This leads us to the fact that India is not a federal country. The word ‘FEDERAL’ doesn’t appear even once in constitution but ARTICLE 1 describes India as a union of 28 states. The term was coined by Modern Manu-Dr. B.R. Ambedkar because the word ‘UNION’ is indestructible. India as a Federation is not a result of an agreement among States. Thus, are not allowed to secede or separate from the Indian Union. The Constitutional analysts also term India as ‘QUASI FEDRAL’ i.e.; Federal in Structure and Unitary in Spirit or highly Centralized towards the Union (Central Bias). 

India has basically 6 Federal features: 

1. A written constitution.
2. Some provisions are easily amendable with simple majority whereas some need ratification of the state legislatures under Article 356 with a special majority not less than 2/3^rd members of each house present and voting.
3. Schedule 7 divides the power between Union and State Government by confining their respective legislative powers into Union (100 subjects), State (61 subjects) and Concurrent Lists-on which both can make laws (52 subjects).
4. Bicameral Legislature-i.e.; 2 Houses of Parliament: Lok Sabha– Lower House- House of the people and Rajya Sabha– Upper House- Council of States which shows that states do have their representation in Parliament House.
5. Independent Judiciary.
6. Supremacy of Indian Constitution.

Parliament can make laws for the whole or any part of territory of India under Article 245.

The Three lists is however only concerned with powers to legislate whereas Government in India functions through its three organs: – Legislature, Executive and Judiciary within their specific designated areas. In relation to Executive, Union is empowered under Article 73 to exclusively implement the laws made on subjects on which only it has the authority to legislate. State implements under Article 162 respectively the State’s exclusive matters and acts for concurrent subjects unless authority was kept by Union with itself only. Union can transfer its implementing powers to Sates by itself under Article 258. The term ‘Executive Federalism’ comes from Canadian Constitution which doesn’t follow British or American form of Government but a mixture of both. Other inspiration is Government of India Act of 1935 celebrating diversity by giving limited provincial autonomy with a strong Centre. Similarly, Indian Constitution also gives unequal powers to Centre and State.

1. Central Legislation prevails over State Legislation under Article 254 in case of Deadlock or difference however Harmonious Construction may be preferred as held in Forum for People’s Collective Efforts v State of West Bengal.
2. States have to comply with the constitutional machinery and laws of Union as held in Rameshwar Oraon v State of Bihar case, failure to do which President Rule or total submission to Unitary system can be enforced by Union under Article 356. Emergency Powers rest with the President in cases of War, External Aggression, or Military Rebellion under Article 352 and financial contingency under Article 360 and also make laws for State in such situations under Article 250 and State laws contrary to the Centre’s laws will become inoperative under Article 251. Directions may be issued by Centre under Article 256 as held in State of Rajasthan v UOI. Example: State Governments of Kerela in 1959 and West Bengal in 1968 and 1969.
3. Concept of Single Citizenship is promoted and no separate citizenship and constitutions for different states.
4. Judiciary is also integrated where High Courts of States have to follow the precedents establish by Apex Court- Supreme Court.
5. Parliament is bestowed with right to legislate on residuary subjects under Article 248 which are not explicitly mentioned in all three lists and also those in State list if the same is in National Interest under Article 249 if Upper House approves with 2/3d majority.

Thus, with this allocation of disproportionate powers between Centre and States makes States to certain degree subordinate to Centre. But this is often justified in the name of national unity but gives birth to Confusion, clashes, disputes as to jurisdiction. However, despite all these efforts being made, disputes are destined to arise regarding Power Dynamics.

PRESENT DAY POWER DISPUTES:-

1. Today’s contention between State and Centre goes back to Imposition of GST in 2017. Issues are regarding compensation to states for revenue shortfalls. States depend on Centre’s releasing of GST compensation reduces fiscal autonomy of states. It also limits their control over indirect taxes.
2. Centre is often accused of unfair allocation of central funds for various objectives and especially by States where Opposition Party holds the Government. Tamil Nadu filed a case in the Supreme Court in 2025 demanding ₹2,291 crore as education funds, for National Education Policy (NEP) and the three-language policy more importantly. It received only 30% against 15th Finance Commission’s recommendation of 41%. More since Economic Liberalisation in 1991, States have become more dependent on Centre. States have limited financial autonomy and non-tax revenue sources, increasing their dependence on the Centre for revenue receipts.
3. Governors, appointed by the Centre, have discretionary and Veto powers in some matters. States, especially Opposition-ruled, view Governors as Centre’s agents, undermining state autonomy. In Tamil Nadu, the Governor with-held and delayed his assent to bills passed by the state legislature led to filing of petition in Supreme Court by State in 2025. In Maharashtra, the Governor’s delayed the election of the Speaker. Governors have discretionary powers, including recommending President’s Rule under Article 356, are often misused for political purposes, weakening cooperative federalism. In Punjab, Governor Purohit didn’t give approval for appointment of Vice Chancellors for universities and holding of Special Assembly Session on 19 and 20 July 2023.
4. The Centre is eager to legislate on subjects in the Concurrent List encroaching their domain. For example: the Centre’s push for uniform social sector policies, such as the National Education Policy, has been resisted by states like Tamil Nadu, which view it as an imposition. It often overrides state laws under Article 254 and makes laws in the name of “national interest” under Article 249. Amendments to RPF Act, giving additional powers to BSF and setting up of NCTC by Centre are some examples.
5. Water Disputes like Bhakra and Nangal dams between Punjab and Haryana often require central intervention, but reluctancy of Centre to decisively resolve them has led to accusations of inaction. In 2025, tensions escalated when Punjab refused to release additional water to Haryana, prompting central involvement. Process of resolution under Inter-State Water Disputes Act, 1956 is slow or biased.
6. Politics is everywhere. We can’t escape it. It’s just that it doesn’t appear in true form before common citizen. Centre is often accused of misusing central agencies like the Enforcement Directorate (ED) to have political gains. Supreme Court criticized ED in the TASMAC liquor case, the Central Agencies being misused to pressure non-BJP states.
7. Some states are benefited biasedly by Centre basically those which can give political gains. States like UP (King-maker), Bihar, Maharashtra, MP with higher population and vote bank are disproportionately focused while entire North-East lacks investment and the case of Manipur is also very evident where the issue was not that important to grab our PM’s attention. Centre’s policies often fail to address regional disparities. The reorganizing of states to create Union Territories (e.g., J&K and Ladakh in 2019) is also a debated subject.
8. Kejriwal Government at National Capital Territory (NCT) of Delhi and Lieutenant Governor (LG) appointed by Centre often fight over Jurisdiction that even went to Supreme Court.

Supreme Court, under Article 131, plays a critical role in resolving Centre-State disputes. However, inconsistent rulings on whether states can challenge central laws under this article have created ambiguity, necessitating clearer judicial guidelines.

IMPROVING THE RELATION: POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS: –

NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL: formed on 6 August 1952 comprising of PM, CMs and Planning Commission members to strengthen relations besides fostering National Development plans and Common Economic Policies.

NITI AAYOG (National Institute for Transforming India): It is the think tank of government replacing Planning Commission set up in 2016 with PM Modi as its chairman and BVR Subramaniyam as current CEO enabling states to form economic policy, promote cooperative federalism, Plan and design long term policies for inclusive development.

COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM UNDER INTER-STATE COUNCIL: established under Article 263 by President in 1990 to discuss common areas of interest between Centre and State, Inter-State disputes and present policy recommendations under Article 263(b) and (c) on Sarkaria Commission recommendation. 

A conference was held at Srinagar in 1983 organised by non-communist CMs to bring together Left Parties, Akali Dal, National Conference and Telegu Desam where demand for greater autonomy was put forward by Shri Jyoti Basu, CMO West Bengal that led Central Government to appoint Sarkaria Commission headed by Ranjit Singh Sarkaria (290+ recommendations) over 6 years. But it met only 10 times till 2012 and last in 2006. It recommended on non-financial issues like: -Role of Governors- to be appointed by president out of 3 suggested non-political faces by CM (violated) -Misuse of Article 356 (104 times), time-limit imposition to curb delay in state legislations getting presidential assent.

Parliamentary debates talk about States receiving only 32% of Central Tax revenues under CMP despite contributing 60% of development expenditure. So, demand was made for 50% share. Lack of funds in Centrally sponsored schemes, lack of State’s consent in International Treaties and Centre unfair market domination was pointed out. Most cited case is that of 1994 Bommai Judgement that clarified that Indian Constitution is not truly federal with people as legal sovereign and Political Sovereign to be divided into Centre and States, also purposed under GOI Act of 1935. To access situation, Government has time to time appointed commissions like Administrative Reforms Commission chaired by Morarji Desai first on 5 January 1966 under Indira Gandhi due to rise of non-congress state governments in 1967 and 2^nd in 2005 to improve public administration by ensuring efficiency, transparency, and accountability. Later, Punchhi Commission came on 27 April 2007 under Justice Madan Mohan Punchhi.

CONCLUSION:

Indian federalism thus balances a Strong Centre with state autonomy, shaped by historic constitutional debates and frameworks like the GOI Act, 1935 and 1994 Bommai Judgment. While institutions like the Inter-State Council and NITI Aayog aim to foster cooperative federalism, challenges such as fiscal disparities, limited state consultation, and centralization still exist. Strengthening Centre-State collaboration and enhancing autonomy, are crucial for a vigourous, inclusive federal structure.