Reimagining Centre-State Relations in India: Lessons from the Sarkaria and Punchhi Commissions Amid Governor–Chief Minister Conflicts
Written by Aman Rungta & Shamya Kumari students at Chanakya National Law University, Patna India is a union of states. It has a “Union government” at the central level and different “State governments” for each of the states. The three lists under Schedule VII of the Constitution outline the division of legislative power between the “Union and the State governments.” The “Union government” has plenary authority to legislate on subject matters enumerated in the Union List. The “State governments” have exclusive powers with respect to matters enumerated under the State List in regards to their own respective states. Under the Concurrent List, both the governments have power to legislate and in times of conflict, the law made by the Union prevails over the State made laws. This exclusivity is protected under Art. 246 of the Constitution. When we talk about legislative bodies of the State, it comprises of the “Vidhan Sabha”, the “Vidhan Parishad”, if any and the respective “Governor of the State”. Each of the bill passed by the legislature has to be necessarily accorded assent by the Governor. Under Art. 200, the Governors are authorised to either assent to the bills or send them back for reconsideration by the Assembly or reserve it for consideration by the Hon’ble President. Further, the Governor may exercise executive powers only under the advice of the State’s “Council of Ministers”. Therefore, in conclusion, the Governor must give assent to the bills once the “State government” has passed or reconsidered the bill, except in cases it has to be reserved for presidential assent under the applicable laws. In recent times however, the relationship between the “Union and the State governments” has witnessed increasing strain. The role of the Governors, a figure appointed by the “Union government” to oversee the administration of each state has emerged as a particularly contentious aspect of this intergovernmental dynamics. “State governments”, especially those governed by parties in opposition to the parties ruling in the “Union government”, have increasingly voiced concerns over the perceived misuse of the Governor’s office to advance the Union government’s political agenda. This article aims to provide a comprehensive analysis of India’s federal structure and the multifaceted causes of the escalating friction between the “Union and State governments” and along with a discussion of perspectives and recommendations for fostering a more harmonious union-state relations in the Indian federation. Sarkaria Commission’s Recommendations on Cooperative Federalism The Commission, chaired by Retd. Justice R.S. Sarkaria of the “Supreme Court of India”, was established by the “Government of India” in 1983 to review the existing relationship between the “Union and the States” and suggest appropriate reforms in the evolving socio-economic landscape. The Commission submitted its report to Rajiv Gandhi, the then “Prime Minister of India” in October 1987 with 247 different recommendations, divided into 19 chapters, aimed at maintaining national integrity and unity by identifying reformable governance asymmetries in centre-state relations. The Commission, in its report noted the criticisms expressed by various “State governments” over the unfettered power conferred by Art. 200 and 201 of the Constitution, arguing that the reference of a State’s bill for matters covered under the State List for the President’s consideration encroaches upon the powers of the State legislatures and unconstitutionally subordinates it to the Union Executive. According to the Commission, the Governors may reserve a bill for the President’s consideration only when the bill is tainted with “patent unconstitutionality.” In all other cases, he has to abide by the advice of the Council of Ministers. The discretion of Governor is limited to rare and exceptional circumstances where he is “compelled by the dictates of good conscience and duty to uphold the Constitution.” Prior to the “Sarkaria Commission”, the government of Tamil Nadu had set up the “Rajamannar Commission” to analyse the “Centre-State relations” in a federal setup. It also opined that the Governors’ discretionary powers are “only in relation to the matters in respect of which there are express provisions” and they have to act in “accordance with the advice of the cabinet in all matters.” Further, to maintain the constitutional sanctity of the “Governor’s office”, the “Sarkaria Commission” recommended that politically detached and eminent persons from outside the state should be selected as Governors by the “Vice-President of India” and the “Speaker of the Lok Sabha” in consultation with the Prime Minister. Thus, the Sarkaria Commission has recommended that the Governors should rise above politics in exercise of their official powers and act as the constitutional head of the States. They should aid and assist the functioning of the “State governments” and oversee that their activities conform to the spirit of the Constitution and in the public interest. Punchhi Commission report on Refroming the Federal Relations The Commission was constituted on 27th April 2007 by the “Government of India” to review the contemporary issues of “Centre-State relations” in India. It consisted of “Mr. Dhirendra Singh, Mr. Vinod Kumar Duggal, Dr. N.R. Madhava Menon and Mr. Vijay Shanker” as members. It was chaired by Retd. Justice Madan Mohan Punchhi, former “Chief Justice of India.” The report was presented in seven volumes to the Government on 30th March 2010 with 273 recommendations. Before the “Punchhi Commission”, the “National Commission to Review the Working of the Constitution” (NCRWC), chaired by “Justice M.N. Venkatachalaiah” recommended a four months’ time for Governors to decide on giving assent to bills or reserving it for the presidential consideration, and proposed restricting their discretionary powers unless constitutionally mandated. With these recommendations, the NCRWC aimed to do away with the practise of ‘killing’ of “State government’s” bills by the “Union government.” The “Punchhi Commission” recommended that these reforms should be implemented immediately by bringing in Constitutional Amendments. The Commission further recommended that the impression that Governors had discretionary powers under Art. 163(2) “needs to be dispelled.” The Article does not envisage unfettered discretion to the Governor to act contrary to or independent of the advice of the “Council of Ministers.” The exercise of such power must be guided by reason,
Federalism and Centre-State Relations: Balancing Harmony and Autonomy in India’s Constitutional Framework
Written by Shri Ganarchit.B India’s constitutional framework establishes a unique federal system that seeks to harmonize a strong central authority with regional autonomy, creating a delicate balance between national unity and state diversity. Described as a “Union of States” under Article 1, India’s quasi-federal structure grants states their own governments and legislatures while embedding them within a unified polity. This note explores the constitutional design, division of powers, fiscal federalism, executive and emergency provisions, cooperative mechanisms, and contemporary tensions, providing a comprehensive analysis of Centre-State relations as of July 2025. Constitutional Design and Federal Identity Article 1 of the Constitution declares, “India, that is Bharat, shall be a Union of States,” emphasizing an indestructible union rather than a federation allowing secession. This reflects a quasi-federal system where states have significant autonomy but are subject to central oversight. For example, Article 3 empowers Parliament to alter state boundaries or create new states, as seen in the 2014 formation of Telangana, typically after consulting the affected state legislature. This provision underscores the Centre’s pivotal role in shaping the federal landscape while fostering cooperation to maintain national unity. The Preamble further reinforces this balance, protecting states’ existence as integral to India’s federal identity. Division of Legislative Powers The Constitution meticulously divides legislative powers through the Seventh Schedule, which categorizes subjects into three lists under Article 246: Article 248 grants the Centre residuary powers to legislate on unenumerated subjects, which can lead to jurisdictional disputes. Courts resolve these using the “pith and substance” doctrine, assessing a law’s core intent to determine its validity. For instance, a state law on agriculture that incidentally affects banking (a Union subject) is upheld if its primary purpose falls within the State List. Constitutional amendments, such as those under Article 3, allow flexibility for national priorities, but the basic structure doctrine, as affirmed in Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973), prevents the dissolution of states, safeguarding federalism. Articles 249–252 further enable central intervention in state domains under specific conditions, such as a Rajya Sabha resolution or state consent, exemplifying cooperative federalism. This structure ensures clear responsibilities while allowing adaptability for shared concerns. Fiscal Federalism and Financial Dynamics Financial interdependence is a cornerstone of India’s federal system, governed by Article 280, which mandates the Finance Commission to recommend tax-sharing formulas every five years. The 14th Finance Commission (2015–2020) increased the states’ share of central taxes from 32% to 42%, and the 15th Finance Commission (2021–2026) adjusted this to 41% following Jammu & Kashmir’s reorganization into Union Territories. According to the Union Budget 2025-26, tax devolution to states is estimated at ₹14,22,444 crore, reflecting a 10.5% increase from 2024-25 revised estimates. However, challenges persist. Cesses and surcharges, excluded from the divisible pool, reduce actual devolution, with their share in gross tax revenue rising in recent years, prompting state criticism. The GST regime, introduced under Article 279A, compensates states for revenue losses, with ₹1,15,662 crore released in 2022–23 to address cess shortfalls. Centrally Sponsored Schemes (CSS), funded under Article 282, provide critical support in sectors like health and education but often come with central guidelines, limiting state discretion. Critics argue these schemes create vertical fiscal imbalances, as states bear significant expenditure responsibilities with constrained revenue autonomy. Table: Key Financial Devolution Figures (2025-26 Budget Estimates) Item Amount (₹ crore) % Change from 2024-25 RE Total Transfer to States 25,59,764 12.5% Tax Devolution 14,22,444 10.5% Grants (including FC Grants) 11,37,320 – Capital Expenditure Loans 1,50,000 20.0% Source: PRS Legislative Research, Union Budget 2025-26 Analysis, https://prsindia.org/budgets/parliament/union-budget-2025-26-analysis Executive Authority and Emergency Provisions Administratively, the Centre exercises oversight through Articles 256 and 257, mandating state compliance with Union laws and allowing central directives. Governors, appointed by the President, serve as Union agents, with powers to reserve state bills or recommend President’s Rule under Article 356. This provision, used over 100 times by 1994, has been controversial, often perceived as central overreach to dismiss opposition-led state governments. The landmark S.R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994) case addressed this misuse, ruling that President’s Rule proclamations must be based on objective material, are subject to judicial review, and require a floor test to verify a state government’s majority. The Supreme Court emphasized that states are “not mere appendages” of the Centre, reinforcing federalism as a basic structure of the Constitution. Emergency provisions, such as Article 352 (National Emergency) and Article 360 (Financial Emergency), further amplify central authority, allowing Parliament to legislate on state subjects or control state finances. Article 131 enables states to challenge central actions in the Supreme Court, as seen in West Bengal’s 2024 suit over CBI jurisdiction, ensuring judicial checks on federal overreach. Institutional Mechanisms for Cooperation India employs several institutions to promote cooperative federalism. The GST Council, established under Article 279A, unites Union and state finance ministers to set GST policies through weighted voting (75% majority, with states holding two-thirds votes). NITI Aayog, replacing the Planning Commission in 2015, facilitates policy dialogue through its Governing Council, comprising the Prime Minister and all Chief Ministers. The Inter-State Council, under Article 263, aims to enhance policy coordination but remains underutilized due to infrequent meetings. Other mechanisms, like tribunals under Article 262 for inter-state river disputes, provide platforms for resolving conflicts without immediate judicial intervention, embedding state voices in national governance. Contemporary Tensions and Trends India’s federalism faces ongoing challenges, particularly from policies perceived as centralizing. The 2016 demonetization, which invalidated 86% of currency notes, disrupted state economies without prior consultation, drawing sharp criticism from states like West Bengal. Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee called it a “financial chaos and disaster,” highlighting its impact on cash-dependent sectors like agriculture. Similarly, the 2020 labor codes, consolidating 29 central laws into four, faced opposition from states like Tamil Nadu and Kerala, who argued they undermine worker protections, particularly for informal workers. Trade unions and opposition-ruled states criticized the codes for favoring employers and lacking tripartite consultation, violating International Labour Organization principles. Despite these tensions, cooperative federalism endures. The GST framework emerged from extensive Centre-State negotiations, and regional parties have
INDIAN FEDERALISM: SCENARIOS OF POWER SHARING
Written By Arshdeep Kaur student at National University of Study and Research in Law, Ranchi. INTRODUCTION– We Indians have evolved from the times of Kings to the present-day Democratic Government while we still see countries like Britain with Queen as the apex authority. One of the essential features of monarchs is that the power to make decisions, however sovereign, is concentrated in the hands of a single individual at the ruling position. Contrary to this, we see a division or sharing of power in India between Centre and State where States are also provided with a significant amount of autonomy of their own. This article aims to provide gainful insights into the kind of Federalism India possesses, the changing dynamics or the problems surfacing, and key policy suggestions for improvement. IS INDIA FEDERAL? The term Federalism is a dual type of Governance where powers are equally divided between the UNION and the STATES with none being superior to each other, each deriving their respective powers from the same source that is ‘The Law of the Land’. This leads us to the fact that India is not a federal country. The word ‘FEDERAL’ doesn’t appear even once in constitution but ARTICLE 1 describes India as a union of 28 states. The term was coined by Modern Manu-Dr. B.R. Ambedkar because the word ‘UNION’ is indestructible. India as a Federation is not a result of an agreement among States. Thus, are not allowed to secede or separate from the Indian Union. The Constitutional analysts also term India as ‘QUASI FEDRAL’ i.e.; Federal in Structure and Unitary in Spirit or highly Centralized towards the Union (Central Bias). India has basically 6 Federal features: Parliament can make laws for the whole or any part of territory of India under Article 245. The Three lists is however only concerned with powers to legislate whereas Government in India functions through its three organs: – Legislature, Executive and Judiciary within their specific designated areas. In relation to Executive, Union is empowered under Article 73 to exclusively implement the laws made on subjects on which only it has the authority to legislate. State implements under Article 162 respectively the State’s exclusive matters and acts for concurrent subjects unless authority was kept by Union with itself only. Union can transfer its implementing powers to Sates by itself under Article 258. The term ‘Executive Federalism’ comes from Canadian Constitution which doesn’t follow British or American form of Government but a mixture of both. Other inspiration is Government of India Act of 1935 celebrating diversity by giving limited provincial autonomy with a strong Centre. Similarly, Indian Constitution also gives unequal powers to Centre and State. Thus, with this allocation of disproportionate powers between Centre and States makes States to certain degree subordinate to Centre. But this is often justified in the name of national unity but gives birth to Confusion, clashes, disputes as to jurisdiction. However, despite all these efforts being made, disputes are destined to arise regarding Power Dynamics. PRESENT DAY POWER DISPUTES:- Supreme Court, under Article 131, plays a critical role in resolving Centre-State disputes. However, inconsistent rulings on whether states can challenge central laws under this article have created ambiguity, necessitating clearer judicial guidelines. IMPROVING THE RELATION: POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS: – NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL: formed on 6 August 1952 comprising of PM, CMs and Planning Commission members to strengthen relations besides fostering National Development plans and Common Economic Policies. NITI AAYOG (National Institute for Transforming India): It is the think tank of government replacing Planning Commission set up in 2016 with PM Modi as its chairman and BVR Subramaniyam as current CEO enabling states to form economic policy, promote cooperative federalism, Plan and design long term policies for inclusive development. COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM UNDER INTER-STATE COUNCIL: established under Article 263 by President in 1990 to discuss common areas of interest between Centre and State, Inter-State disputes and present policy recommendations under Article 263(b) and (c) on Sarkaria Commission recommendation. A conference was held at Srinagar in 1983 organised by non-communist CMs to bring together Left Parties, Akali Dal, National Conference and Telegu Desam where demand for greater autonomy was put forward by Shri Jyoti Basu, CMO West Bengal that led Central Government to appoint Sarkaria Commission headed by Ranjit Singh Sarkaria (290+ recommendations) over 6 years. But it met only 10 times till 2012 and last in 2006. It recommended on non-financial issues like: -Role of Governors- to be appointed by president out of 3 suggested non-political faces by CM (violated) -Misuse of Article 356 (104 times), time-limit imposition to curb delay in state legislations getting presidential assent. Parliamentary debates talk about States receiving only 32% of Central Tax revenues under CMP despite contributing 60% of development expenditure. So, demand was made for 50% share. Lack of funds in Centrally sponsored schemes, lack of State’s consent in International Treaties and Centre unfair market domination was pointed out. Most cited case is that of 1994 Bommai Judgement that clarified that Indian Constitution is not truly federal with people as legal sovereign and Political Sovereign to be divided into Centre and States, also purposed under GOI Act of 1935. To access situation, Government has time to time appointed commissions like Administrative Reforms Commission chaired by Morarji Desai first on 5 January 1966 under Indira Gandhi due to rise of non-congress state governments in 1967 and 2nd in 2005 to improve public administration by ensuring efficiency, transparency, and accountability. Later, Punchhi Commission came on 27 April 2007 under Justice Madan Mohan Punchhi. CONCLUSION: Indian federalism thus balances a Strong Centre with state autonomy, shaped by historic constitutional debates and frameworks like the GOI Act, 1935 and 1994 Bommai Judgment. While institutions like the Inter-State Council and NITI Aayog aim to foster cooperative federalism, challenges such as fiscal disparities, limited state consultation, and centralization still exist. Strengthening Centre-State collaboration and enhancing autonomy, are crucial for a vigourous, inclusive federal structure.
Centre vs. State: The Federal Tug-of-War in India and the U.S.
Written by Supriya Kumari & Atulya tripathi students at Chanakya National Law university, Patna. IntroductionIn India, the federalism model was adopted to manage its vast diversity of languages, cultures, and regional identities while still maintaining unity. But what does federalism actually mean in practice? And how does India’s version differ from other countries like the USA? What is federalism? Federalism essentially means “distribution of power.” It ensures that one central authority cannot make all of the decisions. Instead, it delegated some powers to smaller units, like states, enabling them to govern themselves in specific areas. For example, think of a large school with various departments: the principal (Centre) is responsible for discipline and a host of policies, while each department (state) is responsible for its students, teaching and learning, and curricula within established parameters. Where Did This Idea Come From? The concept of federalism was shaped by thinkers like John Locke, who believed in limited government to protect individual freedom, and Montesquieu, who stressed the importance of separating powers (like the judiciary, executive, and legislature). These ideas influenced countries like the USA, which became the first modern federal state. Federalism in the Indian Constitution The Indian Constitution doesn’t use the word “federation” directly, but it is very clear about what it means. There are three lists in our Constitution that distribute powers between the Union (Centre) and the States: The Union List is for the Centre, the State List is for the states, and the Concurrent List is for joint duties. However, Indian federalism is not a copy of the American model. It is more centralized because India needed strong unity after Partition and independence. We refer to it as “quasi-federal” for this reason.” This centralization was critical for integrating India’s national integrity and unity with its considerable regional and cultural diversity. In the first three decades after independence, the central government had a significant monopoly on authority and power. The subsequent two or so decades saw a move away from centralization to a more balanced federal structure based on cooperative and competitive federalism. Cooperative federalism emphasized the dialogue between the states and the Centr, while competitive federalism encouraged states to engage in competition to attract investment and enhance development governance through the operation of market forces. Several factors contributed to the rebalancing of federalism, including economic liberalization beginning in 1992, political decentralization due to the introduction of multitiered government, and the growing role and significance of regional parties in state governance stemming from both economic and political decentralization. These factors transformed the power of states, enabled greater autonomy, and allowed states to exercise influence over national decisions as they gained in importance as key players. Centre-State Relations: The Reality While the Constitution gives states certain powers, the Centre has many tools to control or intervene in state matters. It can declare President’s Rule if a state government fails. During emergencies (like war or natural disaster), the Centre can make laws on subjects in the state list. The governor, who is appointed by the Centre, can play a role in state politics. This process sometimes leads to conflict. For example, state governments might feel the Centre is interfering too much, especially if they are ruled by opposition parties. Federalism in the United States In the US there are two paramount clauses, the supremacy clause and the necessary clause, which predominantly shape its federalism. The Supremacy Clause means that law adopted by the federal government will take priority over any state law created to be in antagonism with the prior. The state law will only be valid if it is in line with federal law. Without the Supremacy Clause, each state could have its interpretation or application of a law, which may lead to contradictory applications of federal laws. There would be a mix-up of laws that could only lead to chaos. The Supremacy Clause allows essential national policies, such as civil rights protections, immigration regulations, and income taxes-to be administered uniformly across the states. A classic example is the marijuana legalization issue. While some states in the U.S. have legalized marijuana for medical or recreational use, it is illegal under federal law. Under the Supremacy Clause, federal law technically trumps state law, although in practice the federal government tends not to strictly enforce this conflict, creating somewhat of a legal void. However, The federal government does have the power to override state legislation. The Supreme Court has confirmed the Supremacy Clause in numerous decisions. For instance, in McCulloch v. Maryland, the Court decided that Maryland could not tax a federal bank or otherwise interfere with the actions of federal employees that were legal. On the other hand, the required clause lets Congress make laws that aren’t precisely named in the Constitution, as long as those laws are required for carrying out the authorities enumerated. The Constitution, for example, provides Congress the ability to organize and finance armies. But it doesn’t say how. Under the Necessary and Proper Clause, Congress can pass laws related to military recruitment, supply chains, or establishing training facilities because these all fit the necessary part of executing the fundamental power of maintaining a national defense. The Necessary and Proper Clause is a tool for practical governance, not a blank check. Some people worry that this clause gives Congress unlimited power, as if it could pass any law just because it claims it is “necessary and proper.” But that is not how it operates. The clause does not create new powers; it merely provides Congress with the authority to select effective means of carrying out its already authorized constitutional powers. Any government must have the means to carry out its responsibilities. The section simply states that Congress has the authority to carry out its duties in accordance with the Constitution. The Supreme Court said in the same decision, McCulloch v. Maryland, that the federal government can form a national bank even though the Constitution doesn’t say anything about banks. The case established that Congress has implied
Iska Ram, Kiska Ram: Party-Bound Speakers & Their Enduring Impact On The Legislative Process
Written by Sakshi Vimal student at National Law Institute University, Bhopal. INTRODUCTION “…the Speaker upholds the dignity and freedom of the House, symbolizing liberty and democracy, and must be held by individuals of exceptional ability and impartiality.” ~ Former Prime Minister Nehru The Constitution of India provides for a bicameral system of Parliament, consisting of the Lok Sabha (‘House of the People’) and the Rajya Sabha (‘Council of States’). The office of the Speaker and the Deputy Speaker is an important checkpost in the federal constitution scheme. The convention of Speakers resigning from their party membership has not been developed in India. The current procedure for the election of the Speaker and the Deputy Speaker through election by the majority, therefore, needs to be called into question, especially in light of various instances of misuse of power, the most prominent being bias towards the ruling party. POWERS OF THE SPEAKER AND THE DEPUTY SPEAKER Articles 93-96 of the Constitution deal with the office of the Speaker and the Deputy Speaker of the Lok Sabha and Articles 178-181 deal with the office of the Speaker and the Deputy Speaker of the Legislative Assembly. Moreover, each house has its own rules governing the Procedures and Conduct of Business in the Legislative Assembly, which outline processes such as the election of the Speakers & Deputy Speakers. The Speaker plays a crucial role in ensuring the smooth functioning of the House. The Speaker regulates debates, maintains order, and exercises control over questions, motions, and amendments. The Deputy Speaker performs the Speaker’s duties in their absence. While not vested with the same level of discretion, the Deputy Speaker ensures the continuity of proceedings and upholds the decorum of the House. One of the most important powers vested in the Speaker is under Paragraph 6 of the Tenth Schedule which empowers the Speaker to carry out the disqualification of members of the house. The Speaker/Chairman of the House gives the final decision regarding any disqualifications made under the provisions of the Schedule. However, the biggest loophole is that there exists no procedure or a time bar for the disqualification process. The lack of framework and transparency, more often than not, empowers the Speakers to act arbitrarily and in a partisan manner. SITUATIONS INVOLVING MISUSE The key challenge is that the political affiliations of the Speakers with their parties are a fundamental issue that contributes to the misuse of power in the form of partisanship. Neutrality and non-partisanship are the key requirements for the position of the Speaker. However, there have been instances of delayed decisions by the Speakers to benefit the ruling party, which compromises the impartiality and public trust in the Office. To elaborate, in the case of Nabam Rebia and Bamang Felix v. Deputy Speaker, Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly & Others (2016), the Court openly expressed doubts about the ability of Speakers to remain impartial and neutral in the instances of deciding disqualification petitions. Notably, in Dr. Wilfred A. De Souza v. Tomazinho Cardozo (1999), the Court ruled that the Impartiality of a Speaker is an indispensable requirement for the successful functioning of a democratic system. The office of the Speaker has always been surrounded by controversy in multiple states. For example, in the 2011 case of Balachandra L. Jarkhioli v. B.S. Yeddyurappa, 13 MLAs affiliated with BJP wrote a letter to the Governor stating that they had lost all hope in the leadership of their party after the elections. This action led the Speaker to determine they had voluntarily given up party membership under Paragraph 2(1)(a), leading to their disqualification. Further, the Speaker was seen to have favored a member of the parliament unabashedly. This tendency of the Speaker to act contrary to the constitutional mandate of neutrality was also most evident in the case of Shrimanth Balasaheb Patil v. Hon’ble Speaker, Karnataka Legislative Assembly, the case of 2019. Justice J.S. Verma and Justice Lalit Mohan Sharma, in their dissent in Kihoto v. Zachillhu, were of the opinion that the Speaker’s tenure is dependent upon the continuous support of the majority party and therefore, such a person cannot be considered an impartial adjudicating authority, adding that such an impartial authority is an attribute of the democratic system which is a basic feature of our constitution. This poses a serious constitutional question in relation to the powers of the Speaker & the Deputy Speaker. On paper, the post of the Speaker is a creation of the Constitution and hence, requires the powers of the Speaker to be exercised in accordance with the Constitution. However, the Speaker’s powers to carry out the disqualification of House members lead to Speakers often taking advantage of these legislative loopholes to stray away from their constitutional duty. Further, the Court in Kuldip Nayar v. Union of India has upheld that the role of the upper house, as an institution of federal bicameralism, constitutes a part of the basic structure of the Constitution. But the Party-bound Speakers add to creating a crisis of democracy. CONTEMPORARY RELEVANCE Today, the position has succumbed to being a reward for politicians affiliated with various political parties. The role of the Speaker was meant to be upheld by individuals of exceptional ability and impartiality. However, it has become a comfortable job for politicians nearing retirement who further favor their political parties in key matters and affairs. In light of this, although the Speaker’s role is that of the representative of the House, they simultaneously represent their constituency and often rely on the political party’s leadership for approval to contest future elections from the same constituency. This dual role of the Speaker is obsolete and compromises the independence and impartiality required for the Speaker’s position leading to biasness in decisions thereby undermining the constitutional principle of fairness in legislative proceedings and infringing on the sanctity of parliamentary democracy. At the heart of the issue lies the health of India’s constitutional democracy. If the current approach continues, where Speakers remain closely aligned with their political parties,