Written by Aman Rungta & Shamya Kumari students at Chanakya National Law University, Patna
India is a union of states. It has a “Union government” at the central level and different “State governments” for each of the states. The three lists under Schedule VII of the Constitution outline the division of legislative power between the “Union and the State governments.” The “Union government” has plenary authority to legislate on subject matters enumerated in the Union List. The “State governments” have exclusive powers with respect to matters enumerated under the State List in regards to their own respective states. Under the Concurrent List, both the governments have power to legislate and in times of conflict, the law made by the Union prevails over the State made laws. This exclusivity is protected under Art. 246 of the Constitution.
When we talk about legislative bodies of the State, it comprises of the “Vidhan Sabha”, the “Vidhan Parishad”, if any and the respective “Governor of the State”. Each of the bill passed by the legislature has to be necessarily accorded assent by the Governor. Under Art. 200, the Governors are authorised to either assent to the bills or send them back for reconsideration by the Assembly or reserve it for consideration by the Hon’ble President. Further, the Governor may exercise executive powers only under the advice of the State’s “Council of Ministers”. Therefore, in conclusion, the Governor must give assent to the bills once the “State government” has passed or reconsidered the bill, except in cases it has to be reserved for presidential assent under the applicable laws.
In recent times however, the relationship between the “Union and the State governments” has witnessed increasing strain. The role of the Governors, a figure appointed by the “Union government” to oversee the administration of each state has emerged as a particularly contentious aspect of this intergovernmental dynamics. “State governments”, especially those governed by parties in opposition to the parties ruling in the “Union government”, have increasingly voiced concerns over the perceived misuse of the Governor’s office to advance the Union government’s political agenda. This article aims to provide a comprehensive analysis of India’s federal structure and the multifaceted causes of the escalating friction between the “Union and State governments” and along with a discussion of perspectives and recommendations for fostering a more harmonious union-state relations in the Indian federation.
Sarkaria Commission’s Recommendations on Cooperative Federalism
The Commission, chaired by Retd. Justice R.S. Sarkaria of the “Supreme Court of India”, was established by the “Government of India” in 1983 to review the existing relationship between the “Union and the States” and suggest appropriate reforms in the evolving socio-economic landscape. The Commission submitted its report to Rajiv Gandhi, the then “Prime Minister of India” in October 1987 with 247 different recommendations, divided into 19 chapters, aimed at maintaining national integrity and unity by identifying reformable governance asymmetries in centre-state relations.
The Commission, in its report noted the criticisms expressed by various “State governments” over the unfettered power conferred by Art. 200 and 201 of the Constitution, arguing that the reference of a State’s bill for matters covered under the State List for the President’s consideration encroaches upon the powers of the State legislatures and unconstitutionally subordinates it to the Union Executive. According to the Commission, the Governors may reserve a bill for the President’s consideration only when the bill is tainted with “patent unconstitutionality.” In all other cases, he has to abide by the advice of the Council of Ministers. The discretion of Governor is limited to rare and exceptional circumstances where he is “compelled by the dictates of good conscience and duty to uphold the Constitution.”
Prior to the “Sarkaria Commission”, the government of Tamil Nadu had set up the “Rajamannar Commission” to analyse the “Centre-State relations” in a federal setup. It also opined that the Governors’ discretionary powers are “only in relation to the matters in respect of which there are express provisions” and they have to act in “accordance with the advice of the cabinet in all matters.”
Further, to maintain the constitutional sanctity of the “Governor’s office”, the “Sarkaria Commission” recommended that politically detached and eminent persons from outside the state should be selected as Governors by the “Vice-President of India” and the “Speaker of the Lok Sabha” in consultation with the Prime Minister.
Thus, the Sarkaria Commission has recommended that the Governors should rise above politics in exercise of their official powers and act as the constitutional head of the States. They should aid and assist the functioning of the “State governments” and oversee that their activities conform to the spirit of the Constitution and in the public interest.
Punchhi Commission report on Refroming the Federal Relations
The Commission was constituted on 27th April 2007 by the “Government of India” to review the contemporary issues of “Centre-State relations” in India. It consisted of “Mr. Dhirendra Singh, Mr. Vinod Kumar Duggal, Dr. N.R. Madhava Menon and Mr. Vijay Shanker” as members. It was chaired by Retd. Justice Madan Mohan Punchhi, former “Chief Justice of India.” The report was presented in seven volumes to the Government on 30th March 2010 with 273 recommendations.
Before the “Punchhi Commission”, the “National Commission to Review the Working of the Constitution” (NCRWC), chaired by “Justice M.N. Venkatachalaiah” recommended a four months’ time for Governors to decide on giving assent to bills or reserving it for the presidential consideration, and proposed restricting their discretionary powers unless constitutionally mandated. With these recommendations, the NCRWC aimed to do away with the practise of ‘killing’ of “State government’s” bills by the “Union government.” The “Punchhi Commission” recommended that these reforms should be implemented immediately by bringing in Constitutional Amendments.
The Commission further recommended that the impression that Governors had discretionary powers under Art. 163(2) “needs to be dispelled.” The Article does not envisage unfettered discretion to the Governor to act contrary to or independent of the advice of the “Council of Ministers.” The exercise of such power must be guided by reason, good faith and caution and must not be arbitrary or fanciful.
Thus, the recommendations of the “Punchhi Commission” endorsed the foundational principles of prior commissions, with updated contextualization. It clarified that such reservation of bills should be an exception, and not the rule. The act of reference should not be politically motivated and used as a means to interfere with state autonomy. The Commission stressed on the impartiality, transparency and accountability from the office of the Governor.
Case study: the State of tamil nadu v. the governor of tamil nadu & anr. 2025 insc 481
The instant case came for consideration before the Hon’ble “Supreme Court of India” when the Governor of Tamil Nadu failed to act on any of the twelve bills forwarded to his office for assent. Aggrieved by this inaction, the “State government”, approached the “Supreme Court” praying for appropriate reliefs.
The Court affirmed that the Governor cannot withhold assent to any bill such that it ‘falls through.’ A bill has to be necessarily sent for reconsideration if the Governor decides to withhold assent. Therefore, a bill can only fall through if the legislature chooses not to repass it. The Governor cannot keep a bill permanently “with him without according assent to it nor can he declare simpliciter withholding of assent thereby killing the bill.”
Further, the “Supreme Court” recorded the difficulty in stipulating a definitive timeframe for Governors to decide on bills as facts and circumstances in each case may be unique and precarious. Nonetheless, the Court also acknowledged the fact the if no timeframe would be specified, Governors would again tend to sit on the bills, thereby delaying the effective functioning of the elected governments. Therefore, the “Supreme Court” has fixed a maximum timeline of one to three months for decision under Art. 200. Any inaction beyond this period would be subject to judicial review.
Therefore, the “Supreme Court” upheld the supremacy of elected “State governments” in legislating on matters in State List. It effectively closed the door on the misuse of the so-called ‘pocket veto,’ ensuring that unelected Governors cannot arbitrarily stall the legislative will of the elected State Assemblies. The judgment drew heavily on the recommendations of the “Punchhi Commission” and previous “Supreme Court” precedents, emphasizing that the Governors are constitutional facilitator and not a political actor, and that the advice of the “Council of Ministers” must ordinarily prevail. Further, by invoking Article 142 to deem the bills as having received assent upon their re-presentation, the Court not only remedied the specific injustice in Tamil Nadu but also set a robust precedent for similar disputes in other states. Effectively, this ruling restores trust in India’s federal structure, fortifies the autonomy of state legislatures, and serves as a stern reminder that constitutional offices must be exercised with integrity, impartiality, and respect for democratic norms.
Conclusion and Way forward
India, being unique in its federal design, has suffered immensely under the friction of centre-state relations, marked by both cooperation and conflict. The Governor’s office has increasingly become a focal point in this power rivalry due to his discretionary powers in the state affairs. The supporters of the existing framework argue that the Governors serve as crucial link between the “Centre and State governments” and simultaneously coordinate State government’s action with the Constitution. However, the critics of the present institutional setup have contended that the Governors are becoming more of political leaders, acting as agent of the “Union governments” in opposition ruled states rather than being impartial constitutional functionaries.
Various commissions and court rulings have articulated insightful recommendations for maintaining the dignity and constitutional efficacy of the office of Governors. Keeping the interests of the states at heart, the respective “State governments” must be consulted with for the appointing Governors, and the Constitution should be amended to uphold State legislatures’ supremacy over State List matters. Moreover, in furtherance of Sarkaria Commission’s recommendations, Governors should be apolitical. In the considered opinion of the distinguished “Jawaharlal Nehru”, Governors should be such eminent educationists or persons who would cooperate fully with the Government and assist in carrying out its policies. Further, Governors shall not arbitrarily exercise their power under Art. 200 of the Constitution; their decisions, especially when withholding assent, must be well-reasoned. He must acknowledge the fact that the government elected by the popular masses is supreme in all aspects of legislative business and that the role of the nominated Governor is limited to upholding the constitutionality of the government and the spirit of the constitution in all state actions.
Hence, the Governors must assist the functioning of the “State Governments” and act as a facilitator and not a saboteur.