Challenging the Boundaries of Consent in India
Written by Divyansh Singh, student at National University of Study and Research in Law Ranchi & Anwesha Mishra After the proceedings in the landmark case of Nipun Saxena Vs. Union of India, there has been a renewed gain in the momentum of symposium surrounding the Age of Consent in India. The current legal age of consent which is 18 years was challenged by Senior Advocate Indira Jaisingh who appeared as amicus curiae in the case who argue for reduction of the legal age of consent to 16 years to address the unintended criminalization of consensual adolescent relationships. The debate initially started after the historic Nirbhaya Case when the minor convict who was reported to be the most brutal of all the other convicts , who gave most brutal wounds to the victim, recieved only three years in reform facility due to his age , he went to trial as per the Juvenile Justice Act. The case raised questions about the challenges of age based legal protection while also holding them accountable for serious crimes, highlighting the need to understand adolescent behaviors and culpability. POCSO Act: Protection or Over Criminalisation? The age of consent according to the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act is 18 years, any sexual activity with person below this age will lead to criminal proceedings regardless of consent. The act was enacted to protect children from sexual exploitation, but the implementation has revealed concerning consequences. Statistical evidence clearly demonstrates the widespread impact of current laws on adolescents. Between 2018 and 2022, POCSO convictions for juveniles (16-18 years) rose from 144 to 213, while detentions increased from 844 to 1,757, resulting in a conviction rate of just 12.12% in 2022. For young adults aged 18 to 22, conviction rates dropped from 13.88% in 2018 to 10.04% in 2022, despite higher arrest figures. Research shows that in cases involving inter caste or inter faith relationships, the POCSO Act was used as a weapon against the juveniles. A 2024 study of child sexual offense cases in India found that 99.2% of cases involved accused persons in friendly relationship with the victims, 85.7% of victims aged 16-18 years had consented to sexual relations, of which all cases were reported by parents or guardians rather than the victims themselves. The human cost faced by those individuals is devastating. Adolescents face imprisonment for years, a huge damage to the reputation and shattered careers. A Karnataka engineering student spent three years in prison before acquittal, rendering his degree worthless and causing severe mental health deterioration. Similarly, a Bihar engineering student spent four years in jail after eloping with his girlfriend, losing job opportunities and attempting suicide twice. Sexual Maturity and Puberty Completion The argument of lowering the age of consent to 16 is strongly supported by biological evidence. The Hypothalamic Pituitary Gonadal axis becomes fully functional during adolescence, hence enabling reproductive capabilities. By the age of 16, most adolescents have achieved complete sexual maturity which includes the development of primary and secondary sexual characteristics. Researchers also stated that sexual development occurs in predictable stages, with most adolescents experiencing first sexual interest and exploration at 14 years of age. The average age of first sexual contact is 14 years, while first intercourse typically occurs around age 16. Sexual hormones like testosterone, estrogen and progesterone experience a surge which drives physical development and also influences cognitive and emotional development related to sexual behaviour . The biological foundation for mature sexual decision making is established since the hormonal changes are largely completed by age of 16. Extensive neuroscientific research reveals that adolescents achieve the same cognitive abilities as compared to the adults by age 16. Studies involving over 900 individuals between ages 10 to 30 demonstrate that logical reasoning, memory, and basic cognitive capacity mature by age 16. Studies have also proved increased maturity and autonomy among modern adolescents compared to previous generations. Improved Nutrition and healthcare coupled with early onset of puberty significantly resulted in today’s 16 years old being psychologically and biologically more mature than their historical counterparts. The concept of evolving capacities was recognized in international human rights law which supported the idea that adolescents should be granted increasing autonomy as they develop. Hence stating that Sexual autonomy is an integral component of human dignity and privacy rights. Social Reality vs. Legal Framework The current legal framework in our country go wrong by not acknowledging social realities. According to the National Family Health Survey (NFHS-5), 6.8% women aged between 15 to 19 years went through pregnancy or had given birth, with states like West Bengal and Bihar with 16% and 11% respectively indicating widespread sexual activities among adolescents in India. The criminalisation of consensual relationships and sexual activities forces young couples to hide their relationship to stay away from legal trouble instead of open talks and education. This approach also undermines public health efforts to provide sexual education and reproductive health services to adolescents. The current age of consent may violate several constitutional provisions. Article 14 provides Right to Equalty to all, but the blinded and blanket criminalisation treats all the sexual activities of person aged under 18 identically without considering context , age difference creating arbitrary distictions. Article 19 provides right to freedom of expression but criminalising consensual relationships restricts freedom of association and expression. Article 21 provides right to life and personal liberty hence sexual autonomy of adolescents should be recognised as part of personal liberty. International Legal Standards Most developed countries in the world have set the age of consent to 16 years. United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and most European countries recognize 16 as an appropriate age of consent. Many jurisdictions also include “close in age” or “Romeo or Juliet” exceptions that prevent prosecution of consensual relationships between adolescents. India’s age of consent at 18 is among the highest globally and is clearly inconsistent with the International standards that believes in balancing child protection while also protecting adolescent autonomy. Judicial Recognition of the problem High courts in our
BETWEEN PROPAGANDA AND CENSORSHIP: THE TWO-FACED CRISIS OF INDIAN MEDIA
Written by Amit Dang, fourth year student at National Law University Odisha. INTRODUCTION From the genesis of the printing press by Gutenberg, history has witnessed numerous unsuccessful attempts to curb the dissemination of information by the authority. In 1538 CE, Italy was the first to have an ‘Index of Prohibited Books’; this was further followed by other European states. Works of Nicolaus Copernicus, Giovanni Boccaccio, and Niccolo Machiavelli were added to the list of prohibited books. The freedom of speech and expression was made an inalienable man’s right in the French Revolution and is considered an inseparable substantive element of democracy, set in Abrams v. Abrams. The freedom of the press or media is one of the domains of freedom of speech and cannot be curtailed. However, looking into the contemporary media situation in the 20th and 21st centuries. The accessibility, control and dissemination of information have altogether revolutionised. The invention of the internet and mobile devices has not only made the accessibility to information easier but has also handed over the power to generate and create new information. A new dilemma has emerged: the media is being used to promote propaganda. The authority or governments have always tried to control and regulate media for dissemination of their propaganda; the heightened historical account of such use was seen in Nazi Germany by Adolf Hitler. In contemporary democratic states, although there is no direct control over the media, but indirect control. The media houses are owned by businessmen whose political alignment and support are toward any political party affiliation, or are owned by family members or those directly involved in politics. The government is bringing in new laws to regulate the media, and there is apprehension about what the government can regulate or control that is being generated by the media. CONSTITUTION AND MEDIA FREEDOM The Black Law Dictionary defines ‘media’ as “Every broadcasting and narrow casting medium, like newspapers, magazines, TV, radio, billboards, direct mail, telephone, fax, and internet are part of what is the Media.” However, the traditional understanding of media refers to a medium which provides news and information, i.e newspapers, press and news channels. Though there has been a new evolution of news providing sources through digital devices and internet companies like YouTube. Due to this evolution, there is ambiguity in defining or delineation what is media and what is not media. The right to freedom of the press is guaranteed in India by Article 19(1)(a) as Freedom of speech and expression, unlike in the US, where it explicitly states freedom of the press. However, this right is not absolute and is under the restrictions described under Article 19(2) as “ Nothing in sub-clause (a) of clause (1) shall affect the operation of any existing law, or prevent the State from making any law, in so far as such law imposes reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the said sub-clause in the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State, friendly relations with Foreign States, public order, decency or morality or in relation to contempt of court, defamation or incitement to an offence.” So, Article 19 clearly outlines that under the grounds of “the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State, friendly relations with Foreign States, public order, decency or morality or in relation to contempt of court, defamation or incitement to an offence” government can impose restriction on the circulation of information by the media. However, these are vague and understanding of what will be constituted as “public order” has evolved from the three landmark judgements in the “Ramesh Thappar v. State of Madras (The Cross Road Newspaper), Brij Bhushan v. State of Delhi (Organiser Newspaper) and State of Bihar v. Shailabala (Bharati Press)” cases. MEDIA REGULATION Media, which are mostly preferred to visual television and digital, are self-regulated through the “News Broadcasting Standards Authority (NBSA)”, and the press or printed media is self-regulated by the “Press Council of India (PCI)” under the aegis of the “Press Council Act” of 1978. The self-regulation means there is monitoring of the work through its own rules and regulations. India and many countries in the world have the self-regulation mechanisms for the media because it is a general postulation that if the media of press comes under the regulation or control of government then it would mean intervention of media autonomy and freedom, ultimately violating the fundamental right under 19(1) freedom of “speech and expression”. The “Central News Media Accreditation Guidelines” are to be complied with by the electronic media houses, and if they are found to be broadcasting any false or fraudulent news, then the media house would face a penalty in the form of debarment form of accreditation up to a maximum of five years. Apart from that, there are internal mechanisms to fact-check the authenticity of the news. The Ministry of Information and Broadcasting regulate the television content through acts such as the “Cable Television Networks (Regulation) Act 1995” and associated rules and codes. Furthermore, the “Broadcasting Services (Regulation) Bill, 2023” has proposed to modernize the regulatory framework for broadcasting in India in this digital age. It aims to replace the old “Cable Television Networks (Regulation) Act, 1995” and expands the scope to OTT content, IPTV, DTH and Digital news on the internet. TWO-FACED DELIMMA India’s position in the world freedom of the press index is 151. There has been a decline in the freedom of the press since the coming of the BJP government in 2014. The case of India is somewhat different from the other countries. There have been attacks on journalists, arbitrary arrests and imprisonment under the allegation of sedition. Business tycoons and politically aligned people own the media houses that promote the agendas of specific political ideologies. This poses a great threat to the free press, which doesn’t disseminate any propaganda. Most of the media houses are either owned by politicians or business tycoons who have
Tunnel Vision of the Apex Court: A Double-Edged Approach to Justice and Parity
Written by Pralipsa Panda student at National Law University Odisha “I wish men had menstruation, then only, they would understand,” Far from being a casual remark parroted by the general public, the quoted text reflects the anguish voiced by Justices B.V. Nagarathna and N. Kotiswar Singh. In 2024, as the apex court took suo-moto cognizance after a decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court, the two-judge bench presented a poignant concern that highlighted the perpetuating discrimination against women. Slamming the judgment of the High Court terminating the services of women civil judges in the State and refusing to reinstate some of them added points of gender sensitivity to the books of the Supreme Court. However, with its recent judgment restoring the mandatory three-year practice in advocacy for judiciary aspirants, the top Court has pushed the dreams of women and various aspirants into a dark sinkhole, marking a sharp contrast from standing as the guardian of Fundamental Rights. This ruling came as a response to the concerns raised by multiple High Courts about the absence of exposure in a courtroom and practical experience among recent law graduates who entered the judiciary. By surmising that experience links to eligibility to preside on the bench, the Court failed to consider the impediments encountered by candidates from disadvantaged or humble backgrounds. Earlier Background The mandated three-year practice for judiciary aspirants is not a newly formulated rule but a restoration of what the Supreme Court scrapped in 2002, overruling the 1993 All India Judges Association case. This topic has been a matter of contemplation since the 116th Law Commission Report, 1983, recommended abolishing the rule. To put it chronologically, in 1993, the Supreme Court backed this rule of three years of advocacy. Later when the Shetty Commission in 1996 recommended abolishing this requirement, the Supreme Court in 2002 sanctioned the recommendation. Rejection of harsh realities: the cyclic inequalities. While the requirement appears neutral on paper, in actuality, it perpetuates inequality. In a country like India where the right to work is a guaranteed fundamental right, ironically, the inviolable right to dignity becomes violable to women, particularly in the workforce. In an interview with the Supreme Court Observer, Justice B.V. Nagarthana stressed the crucial role of domestic support in the professional advancement of women advocates. The honorable judge was undoubtedly correct in her view. As women navigate through the second shift, familial support becomes vital to topple the social norms that place a dual burden on women. The Supreme Court has long positioned itself as a caretaker of women’s rights, evident in former Chief Justice D.Y. Chandrachud’s strong and eloquent opinion in the Indian Young Lawyers’ Association to landmark rulings like Shayara Bano. Contrary to its earlier standpoints, the Court has reversed advancement for women by restoring the three-year mandatory bar practice requirement. These additional years of precariousness will force many women to abandon their goals and submit to societal norms. The judiciary has always witnessed a dearth of gender diversity. According to the Indian Justice Report, 38% of Judges in District Courts are women. While the number marks a clear progress from the old days, this judgment by the apex court reasserts the glass ceiling. What invokes concern is the dismissal of this reality. Over the past few days, numerous instances revealed the discrimination women in law face. For example, in Allahabad High Court, a decree passed by a male judge trivialized rape attempts. Although this judgment was stayed by the Supreme Court, it nonetheless depicts the need for gender diversity in the judiciary to foster a more empathetic and morally sane approach. This approach is feasible only when the presence occupying the benches is diverse. In a judicial diaspora where female judges continue to face entrenched challenges ranging from misogynistic attitudes to institutional neglect, this decision by the Supreme Court aggravates it. Recently, a woman judge in a Delhi court was openly threatened inside her courtroom by a convicted lawyer and his client following a verdict in a cheque bounce case. The female judge faced a direct and gendered threat. This captures the daily risks women in the judiciary bear. Such incidents only sharpen the irony of the Supreme Court’s recent move to make entry into the judiciary more challenging for women. In a vicinity where sitting female judges already face threats and systemic oppression, the three-year practice requirement aids in filtering out aspirants before they can even reach the bench, thus acting as an additional barrier to an already hostile system. In 2023, the Allahabad High Court directed the astrology department of Lucknow University to determine whether the rape complainant was ‘Manglik’ as a response to the accused’s assertion that he could not marry her due to astrological incompatibility. Despite the Supreme Court’s stay in the order, it raises grave concerns. Why should any court apply this outdated rationale in the first place? Such decisions by the bearers of justice betray even the rudimentary standards of legal reasoning. One would anticipate such a superstitious mindset to be disposed of by the admission of young rational minds into the judicial field. However, with the Supreme Court’s mandate, this seems to be an improbable possibility. Another serious lapse generated by the Supreme Court’s ruling is its potential to discourage aspirants belonging to humble or underprivileged backgrounds from pursuing a judicial career. This requirement by the Supreme Court creates an economic quagmire. In many regions, junior lawyers have to work without any formal source of payment. Most senior advocates and law firms offer no stipends, pushing young lawyers to depend on family support, resources many simply do not enjoy. For example, in Tiruchi district, junior lawyers continue to struggle financially despite the Madras High Court’s 2024 order mandating a minimum stipend. The order directs established lawyers to pay juniors at least ₹20,000 per month in cities like Chennai, Madurai, and Coimbatore, and ₹15,000 in other parts of Tamil Nadu and Puducherry. However, this order faces lapses in its implementation, thus exposing the disconnect between judicial
Decades of Tenancy: The Supreme Court’s Verdict on Bona Fide Need and Comparative Hardship
Written by Avinash Verma & Anshu Rahi students at National University of Study and Research in Law, Ranchi Seventy-three years is not just the measure of a tenancy it’s the span of nearly three generations, bound by a legal knot that finally unraveled in April 2025. When the Supreme Court handed down its ruling in Murlidhar Aggarwal (D.) Thr. His LR. Atul Kumar Aggarwalv. Mahendra Pratap Kakan (D.) Thr. LRs. and Ors., it did more than decide a property dispute; it brought closure to a saga that had outlasted the independence of India itself. For 63 years after the original lease expired, this cinema hall in Allahabad stood as a testament to stubbornness, hardship, and the tension between security of tenure and a landlord’s genuine need for their property. The Supreme Court, setting aside the High Court’s decision, allowed the eviction—finally bringing the curtains down on this long-drawn legal drama1. II. The Legal Canvas: A History of Tenancy Law To appreciate this judgment, it’s essential to understand the statutory landscape. The Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (the “Act of 1972”) governs urban tenancy disputes in Uttar Pradesh, balancing tenant protection with landlord rights. Section 21(1)(a) enables a landlord to seek eviction if they require the property for “bona fide” occupation, but this right is hedged by provisos that enforce comparative hardship analysis. In simple terms: The law asks, whose need is greater—the landlord’s, or the tenant’s2? The associated Rules of 1972, especially Rule 16(2), instruct the Prescribed Authority to consider factors such as the length of tenancy and the breadth of the landlord’s current business interests when weighing who faces greater hardship. These rules ensure the process isn’t mechanical but tailored, accounting for real human circumstances. III. The Genesis of the Dispute: A Tale of Two Families This is more than just a battle over bricks and mortar. Murlidhar Aggarwal’s predecessor purchased the disputed cinema hall in 1962, which had been leased to the respondents since 1952. The landlord’s family, beset by financial difficulty, argued for the release of their property to start their own business. Evidence revealed that Murlidhar’s son, Atul Kumar Aggarwal, had a low, unstable income, with assets reportedly “in the negative.” For the Prescribed Authority, the hardship was visceral: necessity, not mere convenience3. On the other end, the tenants Ram Agya Singh and his legal heirs claimed that the landlords belonged to a joint family business, with multiple sources of income. They stressed the hardship of losing a business they’d cultivated for decades, and pointed to earlier rounds of litigation dating back to 1965 as proof of the entrenched conflict and tenacity on both sides5. IV. The Judicial Journey: A Reversal of Fortunes The first stop was the Prescribed Authority, which sided with the landlord, weighing the evidence and finding both the need and comparative hardship favoring release of the property. But litigation is seldom straightforward. The Appellate Authority reversed this decision, focusing not on the degree of hardship, but on whether the landlord truly had “no business”—and found their income sufficient to bar eviction. In doing so, the Appellate Authority effectively constructed a new case, sidestepping the details of the landlord’s financial difficulties and ignoring the original finding that the landlord’s need was pressing4. The High Court affirmed the Appellate Authority, further entrenching the tenant’s tenure. It took the Supreme Court’s careful scrutiny to unravel this web: The Court criticized the lower courts’ reasoning as “wholly unsustainable,” noting their failure to appreciate the evidence or to apply the comparative hardship doctrine in its true spirit1. V. The Guiding Principles: A Landmark Judgment’s Legacy The Supreme Court’s reasoning is a textbook example of judicial analysis. Bona Fide Need: The Court reaffirmed that the requirement for a landlord’s occupation under Section 21(1)(a) must be construed liberally extending not just to the landlord but to family members, as established in Joginder Pal v. Naval Kishore Behal 5 and Dwarkaprasad v. Niranjan and Anr.6 Even more notably, the Court invoked Section 21(7), holding that the death of the original landlord does not kill the claim if an heir, such as Atul Kumar Aggarwal who is crippled and without income demonstrates genuine need. Comparative Hardship: The Court’s approach here was nuanced. Even assuming the tenants’ assertions about the landlords’ other businesses were entirely true, both sides were “equally poised” financially1. What tipped the balance was the tenant’s failure, spanning decades, to make any attempt to locate alternative premises. Citing Mohd. Ayub v. Mukesh Chand, the Bench insisted: “It is not the requirement of law that applicant should sit idle till his premises are not released”. Rule 16(2): Rule 16(2) was used by the respondents to argue that the landlord’s existing business interests weakened their claim. The Court disagreed, holding that business interests, the length of tenancy, and other factors must be considered together, not in isolation. The pressing need for the landlord and the tenants’ inertia neutralized the long-standing tenancy1. VI. Conclusion: A Clear Message for the Future This decision sends a sharp, unambiguous signal through Indian tenancy law: Tenant protection cannot fossilize occupation and frustrate a landlord’s right, especially where hardship is demonstrable and alternatives are available. The right to remain cannot become a lifetime entitlement in the face of compelling, bona fide need. The Supreme Court’s order granting the tenants time until December 31, 2025 to vacate, subject to compliance sets a final, decisive endpoint. A tenant cannot cling to property for decades, hoping law will indefinitely shield inertia. Where a landlord’s necessity is clear, judicial compassion must yield to reason, reminding us that justice delayed need not be justice denied. 1 Verdictum. “Bona Fide Requirement For Occupation Of Landlord Must Be Liberally Construed.” 25 Apr 2025. 2 “The Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972.” Section 21(1)(a). 3 IJTR.nic.in. “By: Justice S.U. Khan – Judicial Training & Research Institute.” Rule 16 of the Rules. 4 IJTR.nic.in. “By: Justice S.U. Khan – Judicial Training &
JUDGING THE JUDGE:RE-VIEWING JUDICIAL RECUSAL THROUGH AN ETHICAL LENS
Written by Bhuvi Gupta & Netra Karnam students at Institute of Law, Nirma University Introduction Every judge, before starting their career, takes an oath “that I will duly and faithfully and to the best of my ability, knowledge, and judgment perform the duties of my office without fear or favor, affection or ill will, and that I will uphold the Constitution and the laws”. These words, enshrined in Schedule III of our Constitution, succinctly summarize the core values of professional, moral, and ethical responsibility and bestow upon them the role of guardians of justice. The Indian judicial ethical values, crystallized over the years through practice, are founded on the twin pillars of impartiality and independence. In 1997, the Supreme Court of India unanimously adopted a Charter on Restatement of Values of Judicial Life. The Charter outlines the principles of an ideal judicial life and supports equitable justice through recusal of judges. This blog aims to delve into the concept of judicial recusal. It will draw a comparative analysis of practices of recusal followed in different countries. Further, it will examine the same in the Indian context and provide recommendations. Concept of Recusal Black’s Law Dictionary defines recusal as the “removal of oneself as a judge or policymaker in a particular matter, especially because of a conflict of interest.” When a judge has some interest in the case before him, he may, voluntarily or at the behest of either of the parties, recuse himself from the case. Interest may create bias in the mind of the judge, leading to the possibility of partiality against or preference towards a party.For justice to be delivered in its true sense, it is necessary that the same be done by an impartial adjudicator. This is a prerequisite to give meaning to the other components of due process of law, such as the right to an advocate, a hearing, and cross-examination of witnesses. Impartiality here connotes the absence of bias, real and perceived. There should not only be freedom from partiality but also from the appearance of partiality. Thus, the judicial codes and practices aim to prevent biased individuals from presiding over cases. The rationale behind judicial recusal emanates from the idea of bias rule, originating from the principles of natural justice. The rule was established in Dr. Bonham’s case where Lord Coke had propounded the maxim nemo judex in causa sua, which translates to “no one is a judge in his own cause”. This means that no person should be a judge in a case where he or she is a party to it or has any interest in its outcome. The principle preserves judicial sanctity and institutionalizes the aspect of fairness in judicial, quasi-judicial, and administrative work. Over the years and across jurisdictions, various grounds have been identified as rationales for recusal. Automatic disqualification occurs when the adjudicator may have a monetary interest in the outcome of the case. In the case of N.B. Jeejeebhoy v. Assistant Collector, Thana Prant, Thana, the Hon’ble Chief Justice of India reconstituted the bench when it was found out that one of the members was a member of the cooperative society for which the land had been acquired. Another ground for recusal is personal bias that the judge may develop with respect to the subject matter or his relationship with the parties. In A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India, the acting Chief Conservator of the forest was a member of the selection committee for the All India Forest Services Cadre and was also one of the candidates who had applied through the same. While it was ascertained that he hadn’t involved himself in the selection process, the court held that there was a definite conflict of interest and that there was a definitive likelihood of bias. A subject-matter bias is when the adjudicating authority has a predisposition towards any issue. For example, in the case of Gullapalli Nageswara Rao & Ors. v. Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation & Ors, the Hon’ble Supreme Court quashed the Andhra Pradesh government’s decision to nationalize road transport stating, that the secretary of the transport department who pronounced the hearing held a subject-matter interest. The judge may recuse himself voluntarily or be asked to recuse himself at the request of the litigant. If a recusal takes place due to an objection raised by a litigant, reasons for the same should be provided to promote transparency and avoid forum shopping. For example, Justice U.U. Lalit automatically recused himself from the hearing for the land dispute in Ayodhya after it was brought to his notice that he had earlier appeared as counsel for the former Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh in the 1997 contempt hearing. However, in Assam Sanmilita Mahasangha v. Union of India, the then CJI, Ranjan Gogoi, was requested to recuse himself from hearing the case as he had made certain comments during a previous hearing causing the petitioner to believe that the CJI had certain preconceived notions about the matter. However, the CJI refused to comply with the request. Lord Hewart, in R. v. Sussex Justices, had remarked, “Justice should not only be done, but it shall also seem to be done.” In addition to recusal due to actual and apparent bias, the judge may also recuse himself to avoid an appearance or apprehension of bias in the mind of an observer. However, here the possibility of bias should be “real” and not a remote probability. The test to determine bias involves two stages. First, the judge must identify any factors that could cause a well-informed observer to reasonably fear that the case might not be decided solely on its merits. Second, the judge must determine whether there is a clear and logical link between those factors and the apprehension of bias. Recusal in Foreign Nations English Common Law:The custom of recusal globally stemmed from the maxim “nemo judex in causa sua”, which has its genesis in the common law of UK. There is an absence of any codified law on recusal in
Revising Section 63 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita to Make it Gender Neutral
Written by Akshat Kumar student at National University of Study and Research in Law, Ranchi & Shruti Udayan, student at National Law University, Jodhpur. INTRODUCTION: With the implementation of BNS, many changes were brought with it, aiming to modernise legal provisions; however, like many legal provisions, certain sections remain rooted in gender-specific language. One such section is Section 63 of the BNS. In 2007, a survey was conducted by the Ministry of Women and Child Welfare, a government body of India, where it was found that 53.2% of children reported having been abused sexually at least once in their lifetime; out of these, 52.9% were boys. According to a study done by SP (Railways) and a commandant of a women’s police battalion of Kerala in November 2020, boys were victims of sexual abuse in 17 per cent of cases, and in several of these incidents, culprits were women. In a country where male rape is more stigmatised than female and where male survivors find it difficult to come forward and talk about such incidents due to the fear of being mocked by society, such gender-biased laws make the situation even worse. This article explores the necessity of revising Section 63 to make it gender-neutral, it will delve into the changes in Laws related to the rape of males, transgender individuals, and animals that were brought after the implementation of BNS it will also delve into the global approach of different countries regarding male rape cases. Changes in Laws Related to the Rape of Males, Transgender Individuals, and Animals in Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS): With the implementation of BNS, several changes were brought, to the the legal definition of various words; one such word is “rape”. The new definition of rape which is given in section 63 of BNS reduces gender neutrality which was already a significant concern in our legal system. Now section 63 of BNS, which is a reproduction of Section 375 of IPC, starts with “A man is said to commit “rape” if he…” Here, words like “he” and “man” vividly indicate how the BNS limits the instances of rape where the perpetrator is male. The BNS does not recognise forced intercourse with adult males as a criminal offence. This absence creates a legal void where male victims have no recourse under the law for sexual violence. Apart from this, in the new law, even the word “animal” is omitted, which means the new law not only excludes the rape of men and transgender but now even acts of bestiality is decriminalised. Contrary to this, section 377 of the IPC reads, “Whoever voluntarily has carnal intercourse against the order of nature with any man, woman, or animal shall be punished with imprisonment for life or with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years and shall also be liable to a fine.” However, men and transgender persons may seek limited redress under Section 18 of the Transgender Persons (Protection of Rights) Act, 2019 or Section 114 of the BNS, which talks about grievous hurt, and it is a bailable offence with a maximum imprisonment of seven years. But, the penalties in these provisions are only between 6 months to 2 years, notably lighter than the punishment for rape under Section 63, which mandates imprisonment of 10 years to life. Furthermore, acts of bestiality are no longer criminalised under the new framework. This is clearly against Article 14 of the Indian Constitution, which forbids unjustified discrimination and ensures equality before the law. Here, the concept of “reasonable classification” mentioned in the case of Gauri Shanker v. Union of India, where the Court emphasised that “equals should not be treated unlike and unlike should not be treated alike”, becomes irrelevant because there is no rational justification for the trauma and experience of rape to vary according to the gender of the perpetrator or the victim. Global Approaches and lessons for India’s BNS reforms: The global approach to addressing male rape and gender-neutral sexual violence laws reveals significant variations, with progressive frameworks in some jurisdictions offering lessons for India’s BNS. The Sexual Offences Act 2003 of the United Kingdom recognises male victims, but it restricts perpetrators to males by defining rape as the non-consensual penetration of the mouth, anus, or vagina with “a penis.” However, female perpetrators can be charged under Section 4 of the same act for “causing sexual activity without consent“, which carries the same penalties of life imprisonment as rape. South Africa, under its Sexual Offences Act (2007), uses a better definition of rape and follows more gender-neutral laws. The act says rape occurs when a person forces another to have sexual intercourse without their consent. The law explicitly protects men, women, and LGBTQ+ individuals. It also provides provisions for the support and protection of the victims who experienced sexual assaults, providing access to both psychiatric and medical services as well as legal aid for the protection, development and help of all victims. The US, too, have gender-neutral laws for non-consensual sexual acts under Chapter 109A of the United States Code. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) defines sexual assaults and rapes as ‘penetration, no matter how slight, of the vagina or anus with any body part or object, or oral penetration by a sex organ of another person without the consent of the victim’ and the term ‘another person’ implies gender neutrality in the provision. In Singapore, there are two different sections for sexual violence for women in section 375(1) of the penal code defining rape as male-perpetrated penetration of a female, “unlawful sexual penetration”, and for males or transgender individuals in section 376. However, both carry identical penalties. France criminalised any non-consensual sexual penetration (vaginal, anal, or oral) as rape, regardless of the victim’s gender. This includes male survivors and cases involving female perpetrators using objects under Article 222-23 of the French Penal Code. Conclusion We can conclude from this article that excluding men, transgenders, and animals from the definition of rape
The Procedural Limits of the Inter-State River Water Disputes Act: The Need for Scientific and Equitable Apportionment Frameworks
Written by Mahvish Kazmi, Programme Manager, Kautilya Society, Vidhi Centre for Legal Policy & Gaurav Kumar Mandal, Student Convenor at KS- NUSRL & student at the National University of Study and Research in Law, Ranchi Abstract India’s interstate river water disputes reveal the complex intersection of constitutional mechanisms, statutory frameworks, and ecological concerns. While Article 262 and the Interstate River Water Disputes Act, 1956, provide a procedural framework for adjudicating disputes through tribunals, the focus has remained on administrative allocation of water based on historical usage, irrigated area, and crop patterns. Environmental principles such as sustainable development, ecological flows, and long-term climate considerations remain marginalised within this system. Case studies from the Cauvery, Krishna, Mahadayi, and Vamsadhara disputes show tribunals’ limited engagement with ecological health and biodiversity. This article argues for reform by incorporating multidisciplinary expertise, mandating environmental impact assessments, and adopting a science-based methodology for equitable and sustainable water sharing. Only by embedding environmental jurisprudence into interstate dispute resolution can India safeguard both its people’s needs and the ecological integrity of its rivers. India has more than 400 rivers across the subcontinent which are majorly classified into Himalayan, Deccan, Coastal and Inland. A whooping 65% of the Indian population is heavily dependent on water which also leads to water distribution disputes amongst states. The recent Punjab-Haryana water dispute has resurfaced another inter-State conflict concerning the equitable sharing of surplus waters from the Ravi and Beas rivers. This involves Haryana’s challenge in accessing its share due to the non-completion of the Sutlej-Yamuna Link (SYL) Canal. Recently, Haryana reported a sharp decline in water supply from the Bhakra dam and requested the Bhakra Beas Management Board (BBMB) to increase its allocation. The Punjab government opposed this, arguing dam levels were critically low and Haryana had exceeded its share for the depletion period. Despite a partial approval by BBMB and advice from the Centre, the BBMB subsequently cut Haryana’s allocation, citing low reservoir levels, resulting in a continuing deadlock. The BBMB is empowered by the River Boards Act, 1956 (RB Act) to provide for the establishment of River Boards. The core purpose of the Act is the regulation and development of inter-State rivers and river valleys. Under the RB Act, the Central Government may establish a River Board for advising the Governments interested (Governments of States likely to be interested in or affected by the Board’s functions) concerning the regulation or development of a specified inter-State river or river valley, and for performing other functions. Different Boards are established for different inter-State rivers or river valleys. While the procedural limitations are mentioned in the Act, it is imperative to note that bias in terms of political influence, vested interest and differing priorities among states could lead to biased decisions. Picture Description: India’s interstate river water disputes. The Central Government empowers the Board to perform specific functions under Section 13, which include advising Governments interested on matters concerning regulation and development, such as co-ordinating activities, conserving water resources, promoting schemes for irrigation, water supply, drainage, hydro-electric power development, flood control, navigation, afforestation, soil erosion control, and pollution prevention. The Board may also be empowered to prepare schemes, including multi-purpose schemes, for regulating or developing the inter-State river or river valley, and advise the Governments interested to execute these schemes. The Board has general powers within its area of operation, including acquiring and disposing of property, undertaking investigations, inspecting works, conducting research, collecting data, and publishing information. It can also require Governments interested to furnish information. The powers of these Tribunals can be traced in the constitutional framework, particularly Article 262, and the Interstate River Water Disputes Act, 1956 (ISRWD Act). Article 262 grants Parliament the power to legislate for the adjudication of disputes concerning the use, distribution, or control of waters in interstate rivers and river valleys. Notably, Article 262(2) allows Parliament to exclude the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and other courts in such disputes. This is reflected in Section 11 of the ISRWD Act, which states that neither the Supreme Court nor any other court shall have jurisdiction over water disputes referred to a Tribunal under this Act. While water is primarily a State subject under Entry 17 of the State List, the Constitution provides these mechanisms for Union intervention when inter-state interests are involved. The ISRWD Act of 1956 serves as a primary statutory framework for addressing these disputes. It provides for the constitution of ad hoc water dispute tribunals when the Central Government is satisfied that a dispute cannot be resolved through negotiation such as the BBMB. The process begins when a State Government lodges a complaint with the Central Government, stating that a water dispute has arisen or is likely to arise because its interests in the inter-State river waters have been or are likely to be prejudicially affected by another State’s executive action, legislation, failure to act, or failure to implement agreement terms. The State Government requests the Central Government to refer the dispute to a Tribunal for adjudication in a prescribed form and manner. Upon receiving such a request, if the Central Government is of the opinion that the water dispute cannot be settled by negotiations, it shall, within a period not exceeding one year, constitute a Water Disputes Tribunal for the adjudication of that specific dispute. Once constituted, the Central Government shall refer the water dispute and any connected or relevant matters to the Tribunal for adjudication.There have been 9 tribunals constituted out of which 5 have been disposed and 4 are active. The tribunals are tasked with investigating the matters referred to it. It must forward a report setting out its findings and decision to the Central Government within a period of three years, which can be extended by the Central Government by a further period not exceeding two years for unavoidable reasons. If, after considering the decision, the Central or a State Government requires an explanation or guidance on a point not originally referred, they may refer the matter back to the
Reimagining Centre-State Relations in India: Lessons from the Sarkaria and Punchhi Commissions Amid Governor–Chief Minister Conflicts
Written by Aman Rungta & Shamya Kumari students at Chanakya National Law University, Patna India is a union of states. It has a “Union government” at the central level and different “State governments” for each of the states. The three lists under Schedule VII of the Constitution outline the division of legislative power between the “Union and the State governments.” The “Union government” has plenary authority to legislate on subject matters enumerated in the Union List. The “State governments” have exclusive powers with respect to matters enumerated under the State List in regards to their own respective states. Under the Concurrent List, both the governments have power to legislate and in times of conflict, the law made by the Union prevails over the State made laws. This exclusivity is protected under Art. 246 of the Constitution. When we talk about legislative bodies of the State, it comprises of the “Vidhan Sabha”, the “Vidhan Parishad”, if any and the respective “Governor of the State”. Each of the bill passed by the legislature has to be necessarily accorded assent by the Governor. Under Art. 200, the Governors are authorised to either assent to the bills or send them back for reconsideration by the Assembly or reserve it for consideration by the Hon’ble President. Further, the Governor may exercise executive powers only under the advice of the State’s “Council of Ministers”. Therefore, in conclusion, the Governor must give assent to the bills once the “State government” has passed or reconsidered the bill, except in cases it has to be reserved for presidential assent under the applicable laws. In recent times however, the relationship between the “Union and the State governments” has witnessed increasing strain. The role of the Governors, a figure appointed by the “Union government” to oversee the administration of each state has emerged as a particularly contentious aspect of this intergovernmental dynamics. “State governments”, especially those governed by parties in opposition to the parties ruling in the “Union government”, have increasingly voiced concerns over the perceived misuse of the Governor’s office to advance the Union government’s political agenda. This article aims to provide a comprehensive analysis of India’s federal structure and the multifaceted causes of the escalating friction between the “Union and State governments” and along with a discussion of perspectives and recommendations for fostering a more harmonious union-state relations in the Indian federation. Sarkaria Commission’s Recommendations on Cooperative Federalism The Commission, chaired by Retd. Justice R.S. Sarkaria of the “Supreme Court of India”, was established by the “Government of India” in 1983 to review the existing relationship between the “Union and the States” and suggest appropriate reforms in the evolving socio-economic landscape. The Commission submitted its report to Rajiv Gandhi, the then “Prime Minister of India” in October 1987 with 247 different recommendations, divided into 19 chapters, aimed at maintaining national integrity and unity by identifying reformable governance asymmetries in centre-state relations. The Commission, in its report noted the criticisms expressed by various “State governments” over the unfettered power conferred by Art. 200 and 201 of the Constitution, arguing that the reference of a State’s bill for matters covered under the State List for the President’s consideration encroaches upon the powers of the State legislatures and unconstitutionally subordinates it to the Union Executive. According to the Commission, the Governors may reserve a bill for the President’s consideration only when the bill is tainted with “patent unconstitutionality.” In all other cases, he has to abide by the advice of the Council of Ministers. The discretion of Governor is limited to rare and exceptional circumstances where he is “compelled by the dictates of good conscience and duty to uphold the Constitution.” Prior to the “Sarkaria Commission”, the government of Tamil Nadu had set up the “Rajamannar Commission” to analyse the “Centre-State relations” in a federal setup. It also opined that the Governors’ discretionary powers are “only in relation to the matters in respect of which there are express provisions” and they have to act in “accordance with the advice of the cabinet in all matters.” Further, to maintain the constitutional sanctity of the “Governor’s office”, the “Sarkaria Commission” recommended that politically detached and eminent persons from outside the state should be selected as Governors by the “Vice-President of India” and the “Speaker of the Lok Sabha” in consultation with the Prime Minister. Thus, the Sarkaria Commission has recommended that the Governors should rise above politics in exercise of their official powers and act as the constitutional head of the States. They should aid and assist the functioning of the “State governments” and oversee that their activities conform to the spirit of the Constitution and in the public interest. Punchhi Commission report on Refroming the Federal Relations The Commission was constituted on 27th April 2007 by the “Government of India” to review the contemporary issues of “Centre-State relations” in India. It consisted of “Mr. Dhirendra Singh, Mr. Vinod Kumar Duggal, Dr. N.R. Madhava Menon and Mr. Vijay Shanker” as members. It was chaired by Retd. Justice Madan Mohan Punchhi, former “Chief Justice of India.” The report was presented in seven volumes to the Government on 30th March 2010 with 273 recommendations. Before the “Punchhi Commission”, the “National Commission to Review the Working of the Constitution” (NCRWC), chaired by “Justice M.N. Venkatachalaiah” recommended a four months’ time for Governors to decide on giving assent to bills or reserving it for the presidential consideration, and proposed restricting their discretionary powers unless constitutionally mandated. With these recommendations, the NCRWC aimed to do away with the practise of ‘killing’ of “State government’s” bills by the “Union government.” The “Punchhi Commission” recommended that these reforms should be implemented immediately by bringing in Constitutional Amendments. The Commission further recommended that the impression that Governors had discretionary powers under Art. 163(2) “needs to be dispelled.” The Article does not envisage unfettered discretion to the Governor to act contrary to or independent of the advice of the “Council of Ministers.” The exercise of such power must be guided by reason,
The Consent Illusion: Tribal Autonomy and the Failure of Participatory Governance in India
Written by Akhil Yadav student at Gujarat National Law University, Gandhinagar. Introduction India’s constitutional safeguards grant self-governance to tribal citizens in the Fifth Schedule and the PESA Act of 1996. Close to three decades after PESA took effect, the gap between constitutional promise and ground reality is a testament to a constitutional failure in its very essence. This blog tries to analyze how well-intentioned legal frameworks generated an illusion of consent without ever posing a threat to actual tribal self-determination. Tribal participatory governance theory is based on the premise that the natives must get actual power to decide about their lives and resources. Practice has always led to what could be described as a “consent illusion” rather than actual decision-making authority in the form of actual choices. Constitutional Engineering and PESA’s Potential The Fifth Schedule of the Indian Constitution regulates tribal regions in ten states, and PESA was passed in 1996 to extend panchayati raj provisions to Scheduled Areas with adaptations which accorded weightage to tribal culture. PESA was a deviation from the top-down model of development, vowing to place tribal people at the center of decision-making. Theoretical foundations of PESA are in three basic principles: strengthening Gram Sabhas as part of the institutions of governance with decision-making authority over natural resources, recognition of traditional institutions and customary law, and provision of mechanisms for conservation of culture. The act grants statutory rights of consultation to Gram Sabhas in the event of projects affecting tribal people and minor forest produce and water bodies. Implementation Failure: The Reality Gap Even with progressive provisions, PESA implementation has been characterized by grave issues that reflect structural inadequacies. The most rudimentary one is the dearth of congruence between legal provisions and administrative practice. The state governments have been hesitant to decentralize significant powers to the tribal people, especially in the issue of resource management and developmental activities. Bureaucratic resistance has also manifested itself as delayed action, institutional duplicity creating parallel structures that go around the Gram Sabha, and the creation of independent development bodies that function outside the tribal institutions. This side-stepping is an indication of institutional biases that treat tribal societies as hindrances to development, and not as co-operators in governance. Capacity building is also a problem. PESA assumes that tribal citizens will be able to rapidly develop technical and administrative capacity to perform high-level government activities. However, decades of underdevelopment have deprived most of the people of human resources to interact with modern administrative machinery. The Illusion of Consent in Practice Illusion of consent is defined as the case where procedural mechanisms of consultation exist but devoid of material engagement of the community or where consent is elicited through coercion or shallow exchange of information. Tribal developmental programs of the region always invoke consent of the community in terms of Gram Sabha resolutions, but problems expose consultations that are carried out without meaningful exchange of information or with involvement of small groups instead of grassroots community-level debate. Conventional decision-making in the mainstream based on conventional tribal consensus rests on consensus-making with a requirement of extensive deliberation and broad consensus. Formal requirements under PESA are, however, read in the context of majoritarian democracy, and the majority vote constitutes valid consent. This tension between conventional consensus-making and formalism opens up room for manipulation. Power asymmetries between external entities and tribal communities create the illusion of consent. During state agency or corporation-tribal community negotiations, the negotiations were always going to be unequal with external entities possessing more resources and communities not having independent expertise. Ground Realities: Hasdeo Arand and Niyamgiri Chhattisgarh’s Hasdeo Arand forest, almost 170,000 hectares in area, is one of India’s largest remaining forest blocks and the home to a number of Adivasi groups, such as the Gonds and the Oraons. Even after the Forest Rights Act (FRA) and PESA, there have been charges that sanction to Hasdeo Arand mining projects were forged. A 2024 investigation by the Chhattisgarh State Scheduled Tribes Commission discovered permissions to mining in the Parsa block issued on the basis of forged documents, in vindication of long-time claims by residents that their sanction was neither sought nor given. It was the same with Odisha’s Niyamgiri Hills, which are sacred to the Dongria Kondh tribe. The hills were a location of indigenous protest against Vedanta Resources’ bauxite mine. In a historic 2013 judgment, India’s Supreme Court upheld the rights of the Dongria Kondh and declared that any mine proposal in the region must be vetted by local Gram Sabhas. All twelve villages consulted later rejected the mine project, voting unanimously against it, thereby stopping the project in its tracks. All these examples underscore the imperative need for participatory government and compliance with legal requirements to safeguard indigenous rights. The Challenge of Implementing Forest Rights Act The 2006 Forest Rights Act, following in the steps of PESA, provides yet another lens through which to view participatory governance problems. While the act provides rights to the community over the forest and increases tribal authority over forest resources, implementation of the act has been persistently thwarted by opposition from forest departments. In Madhya Pradesh and Maharashtra, for instance, forest departments have used bureaucratic strategies to slow down recognition of community forest rights, keeping the process under central control. This resistance signals institutional cultures that view tribal communities as a threat to forest conservation, rather than able custodians of forest ecosystems. Where rights in community forests have been conferred, the experience has been positive. Tribal communities in some areas of Maharashtra and Chhattisgarh have shown good forest management, balancing traditional conservation practices with the most advanced monitoring technology. These are exceptions, not norms, and the distance between policy promise and performance in implementation delivery is wide. The Double Displacement Dilemma: Displaced from Land, Excluded from Power Tribal land displacement is always a second-order act of bodily displacement it is frequently a process of gradual dispossession. What the tribal people experience is double displacement: the first, spatial, and material is dispossession from their homelands;
Justice at the Margins: Legal Empowerment as a Tool for Social Transformation
Written by Rohaan Thyagaraju, student at Symbiosis Law School, Hyderabad. Access to justice in India’s multifaceted socio-legal environment is heavily conditioned by class, caste, gender, religion, and geography. Constrained by constitutional promises of equality and non-discrimination, the poor and marginalized remain far from able to access legal institutions that are geared mainly towards the affluent. Traditional approaches to access to justice have accepted “the narrowing focus on formalizing legal aid services as a necessary, but not sufficient response to deeply entrenched patterns of exclusion” that an unequal state justice system perpetuates. This analysis looks at an alternative paradigm. Legal empowerment is a change that changes power relations so that marginalised communities are empowered to become active agents of their struggle for justice and rights. Albeit not the only way to conceive of legal empowerment, in the analyses presented in this work, legal empowerment involves more than the provision of legal services to people experiencing poverty; it involves processes through which the people that they are designed to empower develop capacities to know, use, and master the law. This approach acknowledges that possible access to justice is conditioned by institutional changes in systems of law and by the development of capacities within the communities that would be able to work with the systems of law. Through a study of novel legal empowerment programs in India, this analysis outlines the successes, trends, pitfalls of practice, and possible policy architectures by which such transformative approaches may be sustained and scaled. The traditional “access to justice” paradigm has concentrated chiefly on eliminating barriers to formal legal institutions via mega aid, simplifying procedures and institutional reforms. Although these initiatives remain vital, they typically present marginalised communities as passive recipients of legal services, rather than as integrated participants in legal justice procedures. The legal empowerment approach, in contrast, thrives on agency, capability and structural change. Based on the capability approach and legal empowerment scholarship of Amartya Sen, the following framework conceptualises justice as fair procedures and expanded substantive freedoms. Legal empowerment initiatives then seek to build citizen capacities, such as legal knowledge, confidence and resources, to act in legal systems in concert with efforts to change those systems themselves. This combined attention sets up opportunities for sustainable change that consider immediate needs and underlying power gaps. Legality literacy initiatives are grounded on building the base of knowledge of rights and laws as a precondition for claiming justice. In contrast to the traditional one-way flow of information dissemination of conventional legal awareness campaigns, practical legal literacy takes the participatory methodologies of linking legal concepts to lived experience. The Multiple Action Research Group (MARG) has enriched the legal literacy methods with its “Legal Empowerment Through Community Action” program in seven states. Instead of merely presenting laws, MARG utilises participatory rural appraisal techniques, community mapping, and case-based discussions to enable communities to pick up on patterns of rights violations and formulate collective action. In Rajasthan, these approaches empowered the Dalit community to document systematic exclusion from government schemes and mobilise that evidence against local officials, significantly improving scheme delivery. However, Jagori’s Gender Resource Centres in Delhi have produced contextualised legal literacy materials to empower women in informal settlements to challenge their particular problems. Community workshops and peer learning circles active through regular legal literacy camps have enabled these centres to equip women with skills to identify discriminatory patterns and develop strategies to counter such patterns. The reach goes far beyond individual legal problems to question the larger norms. Women learn to move through public institutions simultaneously as they change household and community dynamics of power. These initiatives illustrate the face of legal literacy (participatory methodologies) as a consciousness-raising project that relates individual grievances to structural patterns. To emerge from marginalisation, communities acquire the instruments to label violations, assert rights, and question systemic inequalities by building critical legal consciousness. Strategic litigation initiatives use individual cases as a gateway through which larger forms of injustice can be challenged, based on such litigation being provided in court decisions. These legal strategies are turned into potent instruments of structural change when inscribed in social movements. The Socio-Legal Information Centre (SLIC) has developed an integrated model integrating grassroots mobilisation with strategic public interest litigation. In Chhattisgarh, SLIC partnered with Adivasi communities displaced by mining projects, combining legal action and community organising. Following the documentation of violations of forest rights and environmental laws, they launched strategic litigation culminating in landmark judicial determinations that provided a forum for community consultation rights. Importantly, the legal strategy was designed and implemented with constant community engagement so that advocacy in the courts aligned with community priorities and facilitated the strengthening of grassroots mobilisation, rather than its eclipse. Similarly, the Criminal Justice and Police Accountability Project (CPAProject) integrates legal representation in marginalised communities targeted by criminal law with systematic documentation and advocacy concerning patterns of criminalisation. By linking each specific case to the big structural critique, this effort turns the very legal defence into a means of challenging the discriminatory practices of the police. These approaches illustrate how strategic litigation can connect the individual complaints and systemic change if anchored in community mobilisation. Instead, these initiatives view marginalised communities as clients, co-strategists for ongoing legal struggles to fulfil urgent needs, and as momentum behind a policy reform strategy. Legal empowerment is being enhanced because of digital technologies: reducing information asymmetries, facilitating documentation, and collective action across geographical boundaries. Such tools, when developed with consideration for accessibility and community needs, can have a significant effect on legal capabilities. The Haqdarshak has also designed an application for mobile phones that enables community members to identify deserving beneficiaries of the government schemes and assist them by making applications. The technology streamlines intricate criteria of eligibility, presents them in an understandable form, and even gives step-by-step instructions on manoeuvring bureaucratic inertia. Crucially, the digital tool is housed within the human infrastructure of knowledgeable community facilitators who operate at the site-specific level. This hybrid method has allowed more than 900,000 citizens to benefit from
DIGITAL COLONIALISM: HOW BIG TECHS MARGINALIZE INDIGENOUS RIGHTS
Written by Aakash Varma & Prasi Jain students at Gujarat National Law University, Silvassa Campus Indigenous knowledge is not only the foundation of modern science; it is also what could be described as the reference and referral centre- by Suman Suhaiu Indigenous knowledge systems were preserved through narrative, song, Aboriginal Rock Art, Paintings, and sacred spaces in recent times. Now, such knowledge is being digitized and commodified without one’s consent, silently learned by cloud servers ruled by Big Tech terms and conditions rather than Indigenous treaties or tribal law. The Big Tech corporations are not just providing platforms; they are redefining ownership, their identity, and governance in digital spaces at the cost of Indigenous rights. This has been termed as digital colonialism, in which Global North Big Techs control the Global South’s data and their virtual space. Unlike traditional colonialism, in which colonizers took control over the land and labour, this new world takes data, including the cultural heritage, knowledge systems, and languages of Indigenous peoples. This blog attempts to illustrate how Big Techs of the global north practice exclusion and marginalization of Indigenous peoples. We examine how digital infrastructure and data governance systems reiterate colonial hierarchies in the name of progress and inclusion of all. Because in a more networked and coded world, Indigenous sovereignty must extend beyond land, into data, algorithms, and the digital future itself. A single decree rearranged the world in 1493. The Papal Bull “Inter Caetera” by Pope Alexander VI granted Spain the divine right to take over, convert, and colonize the new lands, known as terra nullius (vacant lands), so-called “discovered” by Columbus, which Indigenous Peoples already inhabited and nowadays known as the “Doctrine of Discovery”. Today, the same pattern is repeated via digital colonialism, as Big Tech corporations of the Global North dominate data, infrastructure, and digital ecosystems. Just as the Papal Bull rendered Indigenous nations invisible to the law, platform governance today disenfranchises Indigenous peoples from the ownership of their data, their representation, and their access to digital means. There is hidden consent in legal “terms and conditions.” Data are pulled out, commodified, and centralised, sometimes even without consultation or benefit to the very same people who create it. As with imperial monopolies, tech monopolies design algorithms and data silos that solidify control. And where colonialism had its “civilization” excuse, Big Tech is now using “innovation” and “connectivity” as a moral rationale for digital extractivism.The legal instrument may differ from that time, from papal bulls to policies, but the rationale behind it is similar; some will dominate and define the world, while others are expected to accept it and adapt. This blog focuses on Adivasi communities dwelling in the Niyamgiri Hills, such as the Dongria Kondh of Odisha. Each stream, each forest, each animal has deep meaning for them, and the territory is ecological as well as spiritual for them. They went out against mining ventures because they feared that destruction of the habitat, water contamination as well as deforestation would compromise the environment and their way of life. Māori Tribe of New Zealand, who are considered the original settlers of two large islands known as New Zealand, protested against the government as they misused census data collected for the 2023 census. How Digital Platforms affect Indigenous community? For indigenous people, digital platforms are a double-edged sword. They provide voice and visibility, but they also carry the potential of cultural dilution, exploitation, and commodification. Negative impacts of Digital Platforms on Indigenous community: With 76.9% of the top 10 most spoken languages in the world, these languages dominate digital content. The lack of support for indigenous scripts restricts participation and the sharing of the information. Native language loss and cultural deterioration are further accelerated by language simplification by digital platforms. Digital media interactions have an effect on indigenous people’s mental health especially when these platforms facilitate online harassment and their community is subject to mockery. Indigenous digital sovereignty means the right of the indigenous community to exercise control over their digital assets, data, and infrastructure that supports the community. The Digital Personal Data Protection Act (DPDPA) 2023 introduced by Indian government sidelines collective data rights needed for indigenous peoples in favour of individual rights of consent, correction, and erasure. It contains no special protections for data from AI, digital mapping, surveillance systems, or health systems. Indigenous digital sovereignty is exposed as processes of consent are at cross purposes and out of reach due to language, culture, and technological barriers. UNDRIP affirms individual rights over cultural heritage and it supports data sovereignty, but it is nonbinding in nature, and this affects countries like India. The principle of Free, Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC) is for indigenous communities, but it is hard to enforce digitally. India’s DPDP Act is not well-suited to the demands of Indigenous peoples because it emphasizes individual consent and lacks community-based methods. The execution of FPIC is further undermined by digital illiteracy, power disparities, and disregard for collective rights, which exposes Indigenous digital data to abuse. In the tribal areas of Andhra Pradesh, India, a new pattern of colonization is unfolding, yet not through violence, but through data and control of the digital realm. Through the Andhra Pradesh Rural Inclusive Growth Project (APRIGP), digital platforms were created to track and monitor Adivasi (Indigenous) farmers, purportedly facilitating agribusiness inclusion. Instead of empowerment, these technologies have undercut customary governance and disrespected Free, Prior, and Informed Consent following the colonial trends. Village councils were excluded as the corporate actors adopted top-down digital systems without local involvement. In this case, data governance is a space of dispossession, where technology shapes land, labor, and identity that communities are not able to shape. Big Tech Platforms and the Mental Health Crisis Among Indigenous Youth Native American tribes in the U.S. have sued Big Tech for claiming that platform algorithms damage Indigenous youth and exacerbate mental health emergencies. According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Native American teenagers have a statistically higher rate of suicide in their communities, which is up
Coding the Climate: Digital Colonialism in Global Environmental Governance
Written by Sanya Darakhshan Kishwar, Assistant Professor & Sakkcham Singh Parmaar student at Jindal Global Law School, O.P. Jindal Global University Abstract This paper explores how digital colonialism reshapes global climate policy by concentrating environmental data and technological control in the hands of powerful tech-corporations. It critiques the marginalisation of indigenous knowledge systems and sovereignty, revealing how digital infrastructures perpetuate historical inequities under the guise of sustainability and innovation. Keywords: Digital Colonialism, Climate Governance, Environmental Data Sovereignty, Indigenous Knowledge Systems. In the digitally interlinked world that we live in, technological innovations and interventions are intrinsic to guiding climate policies and actions. However, with digital progress, there is a parallel emergence of the dangerous trend of “digital colonialism”. Digital colonialism seeks to reconfigure global environmental governance by handing over critical ecological data to dominant tech-corporations, often relegating indigenous knowledge and people in the process. The emergence of digital colonialism is indicative of the fact that, only a few multinational technology corporations seem to hold the power and control over environmental data and technologies. A good example is that of Amazon’s “ Climate Pledge” to reach net-zero carbon emissions by the year 2040 through investments in renewable energy projects and sustainable business practices. Though laudable, the projects have been vehemently criticised for perpetuating colonialism by involving the extraction of natural resources from tribal lands or the building of renewable infrastructure without any commitment to safeguarding indigenous rights and their knowledge systems. Such failures continue a long-standing pattern of marginalisation that ignores the dignity and command over environmental stewardship by indigenous peoples, who by all means are the principal custodians of biodiversity and climate resilience.Examples like these demonstrate how historical inequities continue to be perpetuated in the garb of climate policy and action. These corporations monopolise important climate data that form the basis of monitoring and mitigation as well as adaptation strategies. In the longer run, they go on to influence monumental climate policies almost exclusively inclined towards a west-centric approach. Resultantly, this suppresses the voices of indigenous and local communities that have for centuries sustainably stewarded the ecosystems. This new form of colonialism calls for critical reflection since digital technologies have insinuated themselves into environmental governance at various levels, from data collection and storage to policy formulation, often cementing already existing inequalities in power, race, and geography. Therefore, the authors attempt to examine how digital colonialism shapes global climate governance by concentrating environmental data and technological power in corporate hands, marginalising indigenous knowledge systems, and perpetuating historical inequities under the guise of sustainability. Non-consideration of indigenous practices in the design and deployment of Artificial Intelligence (‘AI’)-based forest monitoring tools could lead to misinterpretations of environmental dynamics and unintended consequences, including the criminalisation of certain customary land and forest management practices. The marginalisation of indigenous perspectives in the development of AI and algorithmic systems reflects a broader pattern of technological design rooted in Global North epistemologies. This dynamic perpetuates a form of digital neo-colonialism; wherein environmental surveillance technologies reinforce existing power imbalances and further erode indigenous knowledge systems and land stewardship practices. For instance, India’s ambitious Smart City projects epitomise the digital colonialism dilemmas in urban and environmental planning. Particularly in Mumbai’s Aarey Colony, infrastructure development aimed at technological modernisation has trespassed on adivasi (tribal) lands leading to displacement and disruption of traditional lifestyles deeply intertwined with ecological well-being. These projects have fashioned themselves on high-level climate models and data analytics, which have hardly fitted the local ecological contexts and indigenous knowledge systems. Consequently, the adivasi communities find their rights over land and natural resources degraded, entirely sidelined in climate adaptation and sustainability frameworks that prioritise technology-led modernisation over culturally and environmentally grounded approaches. This, in turn leads to exclusionary urban policies that marginalise those most dependent upon and knowledgeable of natural ecosystems, drawing further attention to the dissonance between technocratic climate governance and indigenous environmental justice. Similarly, in Kenya, advanced AI-based tools such as M-Situ are deployed to track illegal logging through detection of the chainsaw, fire, and disturbances to the forest. It provides an agency for real-time engagement with the most activities threatening the forests and thus allows swift alerts to forest rangers for effective intervention. However, while high-tech, this approach, more often than not, ignores traditional ecological knowledge, such as controlled burning, which is important for the therapeutic conservation of forest health, biodiversity, and fire control. India and Kenya serve as compelling case studies from the Global South, where digital colonialism intersects with climate governance. Both countries showcase ambitious technological interventions in environmental management, yet reveal how such innovations often marginalise indigenous communities, raising critical questions about data sovereignty, equity, and the neo-colonial dynamics of digital development as well as echoing the need for addressing gaps in the existing legal and policy frameworks. There is a pressing need to address the legal and policy gaps that allow digital colonialism to persist unchallenged. This includes developing regulatory frameworks that are responsive to the sociotechnical complexities of AI and that centre the rights and knowledge systems of historically marginalised communities. The innovative technological solutions displayed at the 28th United Nations Climate Change Conference (‘COP28’) were almost extravagantly hailed as corporate-led responses to the challenge posed by climate change. The most high-profile example was Microsoft’s “Planetary Computer,” which would aggregate large volumes of environmental data and facilitate all sorts of sustainable efforts via AI-dependent cloud computing. Although such platforms offer robust analytical capability to a user, the pre-eminence raises issues about data governance, ownership, and inclusivity, which have become increasingly serious. Placing environmental data in unaccountable corporate systems risks digital colonialism, excluding indigenous voices and reinforcing global inequities without consent, transparency, or benefit-sharing frameworks. In opposition to these models, generations of indigenous Latin Americans have relied on Buen Vivir for a more collective, holistic view of what it means to manage the environment and sovereignty over data. Buen Vivir embodies all the indigenous philosophies that recognise the necessary balance between welfare and the interrelationship with nature, in terms of collectivising the ownership
Attempt to Rape: Trapped Between Rape and Outraging Modesty – A Legal Dilemma?
Written by Saumya Tripathi student at Dr. Ram Manohar Lohiya National Law University, Lucknow Introduction Attempt to commit a crime takes place when a person develops the intention to commit an offense and does everything that is required to commit it but fails. Attempt is punishable under the Section 62 of the Bhartiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (hereinafter, ‘BNS’). Although the BNS does not clearly define the term attempt, the Supreme Court has interpreted it through cases. The law regarding attempts remains complex and unclear due to several reasons, inter alia, a lack of a precise definition of attempt, differences in mental and physical elements, and the lack of a narrow interpretation. This article seeks to analyse the jurisprudence surrounding the attempt to rape in India and how the subjectivity and inconsistency in law has been unfavourable to women in general. In light of the recent controversial verdict of Allahabad High Court which held that groping and untying strings of the pyjama of a minor girl does not constitute attempt to rape, has sparked the debate around the blurring lines of what constitutes preparation and attempt, specifically in rape cases, which is one of the most stigmatised crimes for the victim. The ground is fraught with difficulties due to the sensitive nature of the crime and the non-adaptation to the 2013 amendment which broadened the net of rape laws. The judicial ambiguity about what is the penultimate act in rape cases is a by-product of the fact that it is still stuck in the discarded statutory definition of rape, wherein penetration was the ultimate requirement. The only new input is that the intention of the accused is the key factor in distinguishing cases of attempt to rape and outraging the modesty of women. But again, the matter of fact is that intention is to be gauged by the acts of the accused. Analysing Attempt to Rape Between rape and attempt to commit rape, there is a rare area covered by section 354 IPC i.e. assault or criminal force to woman with intent to outrage her modesty or indecent assault. The dividing line between attempt to commit rape and indecent assault is not only thin but also is practically invisible. The contemporary understanding of the law is intention-centric. In Koppula Venakat Rao, it was held that an accused guilty of an attempt with intent to commit rape, court has to be satisfied that the accused, when he laid hold of the prosecutrix, not only desired to gratify his passions upon her person, but that he intended to do so at all events, and notwithstanding any resistance by her. Incidentally, the line from judgement, “Indecent assaults are often magnified into attempts at rape..” is often quoted to support the argument that to constitute an attempt to rape, severe circumstances of culpability are required. However, it is well to be noted that surrounding factors may not necessarily indicate whether an infallible determination to rape existed. It is to be noted that it is a case of the year 2004, and had this been a case post-2013 amendments, it would squarely fall within the boundaries of the offence of rape. State of MP v. Mahendra was a case where the limits of proximity test were extended and the court recognized that the stage of preparation ends, and attempt begins in a rape case begins the moment accused with a carnal intent takes the victim to a secluded location. The Court held that the act of the accused of closing the doors and taking the victims to a room with the motive of carnal knowledge was the end of ‘preparation’. His following action of stripping the prosecutrices and rubbing his genitals against theirs was deliberately done with manifest intention to commit rape and was reasonably proximate to the offence. On these lines, the judgement of the Allahabad HC in Akash and Ors v. State of UP, that the actions of the accused—grabbing the X’s breasts, breaking the string of her pyjama, and attempting to drag her beneath a culvert—did not constitute an attempt to rape raises significant concerns regarding its interpretation of the law and its application to sexual offences. The accused’s actions in breaking X’s pajama string and attempting to drag her beneath the culvert constitute a direct movement towards commission of rape. The next immediate step would have been rape itself, had the witnesses not interrupted. The Court failed to recognize that the accused had progressed beyond preparation and into the realm of attempt, as they had already engaged in acts directly proximate to the completion of rape. The Problems with the Proximity test Different Interpretations The Supreme Court has established two different criteria under the proximity rule to distinguish between preparation and attempt. The first is an intention-based approach, where the proximity of the act is gauged in relation to the individual’s intention rather than physical actions. The second focuses on physical proximity, considering an act to be an attempt if it is physically close to the commission of the offence. The intention-based approach suggests that an act must reflect intent, which, in most cases, is determined with aid of circumstantial evidence. Scholars and jurists have proposed different interpretations to refine this classification. For example, in a New Zealand case, an objective assessment of physical actions was considered the sole determinant of proximity. These differing perspectives make it difficult to establish a universal interpretation. Complexity of Mens Rea of Attempt to Rape In Koppula Venkat Rao v. State of Andhra Pradesh, it was held that indecent assaults can amount to an attempt to commit rape if the accused intended to perform all the necessary acts leading to the offence but failed. Therefore, determining whether mere disrobing qualifies as an attempt to commit rape hinges on the presence of mens rea. The basic challenge is to distinguish between the specific intent to outrage modesty and the intent to commit rape. In terms of outraging the modesty, mens rea involves an intent to outrage modesty
Bridging the gap: The need for urgent reforms to deal with income inequality
Written by Aditya Raj student at Chanakya National Law University, Patna. Introduction “Big achievement! India to become 4th largest economy in 2025 overtaking Japan; will be 3rd largest by 2028.” This was reported by the popular news outlet Times of India on May 5, 2025. They weren’t the only ones. As India’s nominal GDP is expected to grow by leaps and bounds, several Indian media outlets and a significant part of its population are jubilant about it. The credit for it, to an extent, goes to the huge workforce of the country, which itself is a result of the humongous population of the country. For those in the country who belong to somewhat financially empowered and socially influential classes of the country, which may also include the middle-class segment, such headlines are a pleasant sight, and rightfully so. They cannot be reprimanded for celebrating an achievement of the country. However, the underlying problem that has persisted for decades in our country is that beneath the façade of such picturesque headlines lies the grotesque reality to which many in the country remain oblivious, despite the issue being absolutely ubiquitous. The menace of income inequality is something that has haunted the country for decades and might continue to do so unless and until we take concrete steps to mitigate this massively unequal condition. The absence of those steps is only going to exacerbate the condition. One of the biggest problems when tackling income inequality is how the issue ends up being suppressed under the sensational headlines of rapid economic growth and an increase in “average” statistics of the country. The core problem with such “average” statistics is that they consider the owner of a multiplex in Mumbai and a ragpicker on the streets beside the building as one monolithic unit, which is deeply disturbing. The state of inequality in India The first question that may arise in our minds is: what exactly do we mean when we are referring to “income inequality”? Income inequality, also called economic inequality, can be defined as the significant disparity in income between groups of individuals, countries, and even social classes. To assess this income inequality among nations, the Gini Coefficient has come into existence, in which different countries, classes, or groups are ranked in an index. A perfect score of 0 describes a utopian society where “perfect equality” is present. A score of 1 translates to a society where there is a state of perfect inequality. In short, the lower the number, the better it is for the downtrodden section of that country. As far as India’s case is concerned, the condition is anything but pleasant. “India stands out as a poor and very unequal country, with an affluent elite.” That’s what the World Inequality Report 2022 states about India. For a country with such a large population, the aggressive pursuit of economic growth without catering to the needs of the poor majority will surely exacerbate the inequalities already present. But how did we come to this? What circumstances over time ultimately led to the creation of such an unequal structure in our country? The problem, at least in recorded history, dates back to the British colonial period, since 1922 at least, which saw the enactment of the Income Tax Act, allowing the study of how the share of income evolved over an entire century. Unsurprisingly, economic inequality was rampant during colonial rule, as the colonial elite amassed wealth at the expense of poor Indians. The wealthiest 1 percent segment of India’s population held approximately 13 percent share of the country’s total income in 1922, and this share increased at a rapid pace to 20 percent during the inter-war period, only to fall back again to 13 percent by the time India gained independence. The post-independence period has witnessed certain fluctuations vis-à-vis economic inequality, though there was still a general trend of income inequality being mitigated and the share of the ultra-rich declining. India, after independence, ended up being a country having a centrally directed economy, which was also statist and highly regulated in nature. Key revenue-generating sectors, such as transport, construction, agriculture, railways, banking, oil, and sundries, were entirely controlled by the Government of India. The prices were highly regulated, and several trade barriers were in place. Until the opening of the economy, this era was referred to as the “License Raj.” The policies enacted, mostly socialist in nature, did their part to reduce inequality, as state control over crucial sectors ensured a reduced role for private players in such fields, thus ensuring that billionaires had little scope for benefiting in an unjust manner. All of this did show results with regard to economic inequality. After experiencing a brief uptick during the 1950s, the share of income of India’s wealthiest 1 percent declined significantly, and by 1982, reached just 6.1 percent. However, while it can be said that the socialist haven India had reduced income inequalities, it certainly wasn’t a la-la land. The nominal GDP of India was growing at a glacial pace, with the real growth rate having an average of 1.6 percent per year from 1960 to 1990. Poverty was also rampant in the country during those times. Then India hit the road to a heightened state of economic inequality in 1991, when the Indian economy was liberalized and the Indian market was opened to foreign investors. It was followed by the Indian economy growing at a decent pace. While it certainly benefited the Indian economy, and the end of the “License Raj” did bring relief to the Indian masses, the moves had unforeseen repercussions. It ended up ensuring an increase in the share of income of the wealthy lot. In 2022, the share of income of the wealthiest 1 percent augmented to an unprecedented 22.6 percent, surpassing the inequality that existed during the British colonial era. The wealth held by the top 1 percent saw a similar pattern, with them now holding a share of 40.1 percent of the total wealth
Reciprocity and Regulation: Analyzing the 2025 Amendments to BCI Rules on Foreign Legal Practice in India
Written by Jagatpal Choudhary, a student at Gujarat National Law University, Gandhinagar. Introduction The Bar Council of India [hereinafter “BCI”] has notified Amendment Rules for Registration and Regulations of Foreign Lawyers and Foreign Law Firms in India [hereinafter “Rules”] (such power is conferred by Section 7(1)(d), (e), (ic), (l) and (m) and Section 49(1)(ah), (ag), (c), (e), and (h) read together with Section 24, 29, and 47 of the Advocates Act, 1961), allowing foreign lawyers and law firms [hereinafter “Foreign Lawyers and Firms”] to practice foreign law in India on a reciprocity basis, which means “Indian advocates and law firms may register as foreign lawyers or foreign law firms, allowing them to expand their practice to foreign law and international law consultancy without relinquishing their rights to practice Indian law in domestic forums. This dual registration provides Indian lawyers with an opportunity to broaden their professional horizons while maintaining their status as advocates under Indian law.” Objective of the Amendment Bought Here, answering succinctly to the above questions this, there is a dissenting judgment with the AK Balaji, regarding the expression “fly in and fly out”, it was put forth that it will only cover a casual visit not amounting to “practice” and nothing else, and in case of any doubt, then the interpretation of BCI will have an upper hand as and when decided. Secondly, it was held that there is no absolute right of the foreign lawyer to conduct arbitration proceedings in respect of disputes arising out of a contract relating to international commercial arbitration. Thirdly, the expression mentioned in the Para 63(iv) of the 2012 judgement, B.P.O. Companies providing wide range of customized and integrated services and functions to its customers like word processing, secretarial support, transcription services, proof reading services, travel desk support services, etc. do not come within the purview of the Advocates Act, 1961 or the Bar Council of India Rules. Definition Clause:- Scope and eligibility of Practice for Foreign Lawyers and Law Firms Registration and Regulatory Requirements Validity and Renewal of Registration The Nature of Restrictions and Ethical Obligations on Foreign Lawyers and Firms: Impact on Indian Legal Professionals and Law Firms Implications and Repercussions on the Indian Legal Practice System In conclusion, while the amendments offer substantial opportunities for growth, learning, and internationalization, they also demand vigilance from regulators and adaptability from practitioners. For Indian lawyers and law firms, the move prompts new pathways, competitive benchmarks, and partnership prospects.
Federalism and Centre-State Relations: Balancing Harmony and Autonomy in India’s Constitutional Framework
Written by Shri Ganarchit.B India’s constitutional framework establishes a unique federal system that seeks to harmonize a strong central authority with regional autonomy, creating a delicate balance between national unity and state diversity. Described as a “Union of States” under Article 1, India’s quasi-federal structure grants states their own governments and legislatures while embedding them within a unified polity. This note explores the constitutional design, division of powers, fiscal federalism, executive and emergency provisions, cooperative mechanisms, and contemporary tensions, providing a comprehensive analysis of Centre-State relations as of July 2025. Constitutional Design and Federal Identity Article 1 of the Constitution declares, “India, that is Bharat, shall be a Union of States,” emphasizing an indestructible union rather than a federation allowing secession. This reflects a quasi-federal system where states have significant autonomy but are subject to central oversight. For example, Article 3 empowers Parliament to alter state boundaries or create new states, as seen in the 2014 formation of Telangana, typically after consulting the affected state legislature. This provision underscores the Centre’s pivotal role in shaping the federal landscape while fostering cooperation to maintain national unity. The Preamble further reinforces this balance, protecting states’ existence as integral to India’s federal identity. Division of Legislative Powers The Constitution meticulously divides legislative powers through the Seventh Schedule, which categorizes subjects into three lists under Article 246: Article 248 grants the Centre residuary powers to legislate on unenumerated subjects, which can lead to jurisdictional disputes. Courts resolve these using the “pith and substance” doctrine, assessing a law’s core intent to determine its validity. For instance, a state law on agriculture that incidentally affects banking (a Union subject) is upheld if its primary purpose falls within the State List. Constitutional amendments, such as those under Article 3, allow flexibility for national priorities, but the basic structure doctrine, as affirmed in Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973), prevents the dissolution of states, safeguarding federalism. Articles 249–252 further enable central intervention in state domains under specific conditions, such as a Rajya Sabha resolution or state consent, exemplifying cooperative federalism. This structure ensures clear responsibilities while allowing adaptability for shared concerns. Fiscal Federalism and Financial Dynamics Financial interdependence is a cornerstone of India’s federal system, governed by Article 280, which mandates the Finance Commission to recommend tax-sharing formulas every five years. The 14th Finance Commission (2015–2020) increased the states’ share of central taxes from 32% to 42%, and the 15th Finance Commission (2021–2026) adjusted this to 41% following Jammu & Kashmir’s reorganization into Union Territories. According to the Union Budget 2025-26, tax devolution to states is estimated at ₹14,22,444 crore, reflecting a 10.5% increase from 2024-25 revised estimates. However, challenges persist. Cesses and surcharges, excluded from the divisible pool, reduce actual devolution, with their share in gross tax revenue rising in recent years, prompting state criticism. The GST regime, introduced under Article 279A, compensates states for revenue losses, with ₹1,15,662 crore released in 2022–23 to address cess shortfalls. Centrally Sponsored Schemes (CSS), funded under Article 282, provide critical support in sectors like health and education but often come with central guidelines, limiting state discretion. Critics argue these schemes create vertical fiscal imbalances, as states bear significant expenditure responsibilities with constrained revenue autonomy. Table: Key Financial Devolution Figures (2025-26 Budget Estimates) Item Amount (₹ crore) % Change from 2024-25 RE Total Transfer to States 25,59,764 12.5% Tax Devolution 14,22,444 10.5% Grants (including FC Grants) 11,37,320 – Capital Expenditure Loans 1,50,000 20.0% Source: PRS Legislative Research, Union Budget 2025-26 Analysis, https://prsindia.org/budgets/parliament/union-budget-2025-26-analysis Executive Authority and Emergency Provisions Administratively, the Centre exercises oversight through Articles 256 and 257, mandating state compliance with Union laws and allowing central directives. Governors, appointed by the President, serve as Union agents, with powers to reserve state bills or recommend President’s Rule under Article 356. This provision, used over 100 times by 1994, has been controversial, often perceived as central overreach to dismiss opposition-led state governments. The landmark S.R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994) case addressed this misuse, ruling that President’s Rule proclamations must be based on objective material, are subject to judicial review, and require a floor test to verify a state government’s majority. The Supreme Court emphasized that states are “not mere appendages” of the Centre, reinforcing federalism as a basic structure of the Constitution. Emergency provisions, such as Article 352 (National Emergency) and Article 360 (Financial Emergency), further amplify central authority, allowing Parliament to legislate on state subjects or control state finances. Article 131 enables states to challenge central actions in the Supreme Court, as seen in West Bengal’s 2024 suit over CBI jurisdiction, ensuring judicial checks on federal overreach. Institutional Mechanisms for Cooperation India employs several institutions to promote cooperative federalism. The GST Council, established under Article 279A, unites Union and state finance ministers to set GST policies through weighted voting (75% majority, with states holding two-thirds votes). NITI Aayog, replacing the Planning Commission in 2015, facilitates policy dialogue through its Governing Council, comprising the Prime Minister and all Chief Ministers. The Inter-State Council, under Article 263, aims to enhance policy coordination but remains underutilized due to infrequent meetings. Other mechanisms, like tribunals under Article 262 for inter-state river disputes, provide platforms for resolving conflicts without immediate judicial intervention, embedding state voices in national governance. Contemporary Tensions and Trends India’s federalism faces ongoing challenges, particularly from policies perceived as centralizing. The 2016 demonetization, which invalidated 86% of currency notes, disrupted state economies without prior consultation, drawing sharp criticism from states like West Bengal. Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee called it a “financial chaos and disaster,” highlighting its impact on cash-dependent sectors like agriculture. Similarly, the 2020 labor codes, consolidating 29 central laws into four, faced opposition from states like Tamil Nadu and Kerala, who argued they undermine worker protections, particularly for informal workers. Trade unions and opposition-ruled states criticized the codes for favoring employers and lacking tripartite consultation, violating International Labour Organization principles. Despite these tensions, cooperative federalism endures. The GST framework emerged from extensive Centre-State negotiations, and regional parties have
INDIAN FEDERALISM: SCENARIOS OF POWER SHARING
Written By Arshdeep Kaur student at National University of Study and Research in Law, Ranchi. INTRODUCTION– We Indians have evolved from the times of Kings to the present-day Democratic Government while we still see countries like Britain with Queen as the apex authority. One of the essential features of monarchs is that the power to make decisions, however sovereign, is concentrated in the hands of a single individual at the ruling position. Contrary to this, we see a division or sharing of power in India between Centre and State where States are also provided with a significant amount of autonomy of their own. This article aims to provide gainful insights into the kind of Federalism India possesses, the changing dynamics or the problems surfacing, and key policy suggestions for improvement. IS INDIA FEDERAL? The term Federalism is a dual type of Governance where powers are equally divided between the UNION and the STATES with none being superior to each other, each deriving their respective powers from the same source that is ‘The Law of the Land’. This leads us to the fact that India is not a federal country. The word ‘FEDERAL’ doesn’t appear even once in constitution but ARTICLE 1 describes India as a union of 28 states. The term was coined by Modern Manu-Dr. B.R. Ambedkar because the word ‘UNION’ is indestructible. India as a Federation is not a result of an agreement among States. Thus, are not allowed to secede or separate from the Indian Union. The Constitutional analysts also term India as ‘QUASI FEDRAL’ i.e.; Federal in Structure and Unitary in Spirit or highly Centralized towards the Union (Central Bias). India has basically 6 Federal features: Parliament can make laws for the whole or any part of territory of India under Article 245. The Three lists is however only concerned with powers to legislate whereas Government in India functions through its three organs: – Legislature, Executive and Judiciary within their specific designated areas. In relation to Executive, Union is empowered under Article 73 to exclusively implement the laws made on subjects on which only it has the authority to legislate. State implements under Article 162 respectively the State’s exclusive matters and acts for concurrent subjects unless authority was kept by Union with itself only. Union can transfer its implementing powers to Sates by itself under Article 258. The term ‘Executive Federalism’ comes from Canadian Constitution which doesn’t follow British or American form of Government but a mixture of both. Other inspiration is Government of India Act of 1935 celebrating diversity by giving limited provincial autonomy with a strong Centre. Similarly, Indian Constitution also gives unequal powers to Centre and State. Thus, with this allocation of disproportionate powers between Centre and States makes States to certain degree subordinate to Centre. But this is often justified in the name of national unity but gives birth to Confusion, clashes, disputes as to jurisdiction. However, despite all these efforts being made, disputes are destined to arise regarding Power Dynamics. PRESENT DAY POWER DISPUTES:- Supreme Court, under Article 131, plays a critical role in resolving Centre-State disputes. However, inconsistent rulings on whether states can challenge central laws under this article have created ambiguity, necessitating clearer judicial guidelines. IMPROVING THE RELATION: POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS: – NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL: formed on 6 August 1952 comprising of PM, CMs and Planning Commission members to strengthen relations besides fostering National Development plans and Common Economic Policies. NITI AAYOG (National Institute for Transforming India): It is the think tank of government replacing Planning Commission set up in 2016 with PM Modi as its chairman and BVR Subramaniyam as current CEO enabling states to form economic policy, promote cooperative federalism, Plan and design long term policies for inclusive development. COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM UNDER INTER-STATE COUNCIL: established under Article 263 by President in 1990 to discuss common areas of interest between Centre and State, Inter-State disputes and present policy recommendations under Article 263(b) and (c) on Sarkaria Commission recommendation. A conference was held at Srinagar in 1983 organised by non-communist CMs to bring together Left Parties, Akali Dal, National Conference and Telegu Desam where demand for greater autonomy was put forward by Shri Jyoti Basu, CMO West Bengal that led Central Government to appoint Sarkaria Commission headed by Ranjit Singh Sarkaria (290+ recommendations) over 6 years. But it met only 10 times till 2012 and last in 2006. It recommended on non-financial issues like: -Role of Governors- to be appointed by president out of 3 suggested non-political faces by CM (violated) -Misuse of Article 356 (104 times), time-limit imposition to curb delay in state legislations getting presidential assent. Parliamentary debates talk about States receiving only 32% of Central Tax revenues under CMP despite contributing 60% of development expenditure. So, demand was made for 50% share. Lack of funds in Centrally sponsored schemes, lack of State’s consent in International Treaties and Centre unfair market domination was pointed out. Most cited case is that of 1994 Bommai Judgement that clarified that Indian Constitution is not truly federal with people as legal sovereign and Political Sovereign to be divided into Centre and States, also purposed under GOI Act of 1935. To access situation, Government has time to time appointed commissions like Administrative Reforms Commission chaired by Morarji Desai first on 5 January 1966 under Indira Gandhi due to rise of non-congress state governments in 1967 and 2nd in 2005 to improve public administration by ensuring efficiency, transparency, and accountability. Later, Punchhi Commission came on 27 April 2007 under Justice Madan Mohan Punchhi. CONCLUSION: Indian federalism thus balances a Strong Centre with state autonomy, shaped by historic constitutional debates and frameworks like the GOI Act, 1935 and 1994 Bommai Judgment. While institutions like the Inter-State Council and NITI Aayog aim to foster cooperative federalism, challenges such as fiscal disparities, limited state consultation, and centralization still exist. Strengthening Centre-State collaboration and enhancing autonomy, are crucial for a vigourous, inclusive federal structure.
AN INTRODUCTION TO FEDERALISM AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY
Written by Nikita Kujur During the American Civil War, neither the Southern States, nor the Union was able to destroy the other, thus, concretizing an essential feature of federalism, i.e., the Union or the States cannot abolish the other. This can be taken as finality of the borders of the federating units within the federation giving birth to the doctrine of territorial integrity. A feature, which goes a hand-in-hand with federalism as it allows unity without suppression. The fact that state borders in the US and Australia have remained unchanged for more than hundred years is an example of territorial integrity, but India provides a varying instance. The nearly octogenarian country has been busy in continuously drawing and redrawing its border, thus, diluting the essence of its territorial integrity. The concept of federalism has also undergone an evolutionary phase from confederation to modern-day nation-states ticking the prerequisites for a federal state. Attempts are often made to fit a federal state into a straitjacket formula, but the very concept of federalism has to be tailor-made as per social, economic and political conditions of that particular nation-state. This places Indian federalism as well as its treatment of territorial integrity at variance with other federal states. This write-up is a way to reflect upon how the ability of the Centre to abolish the units can be seen as an attempt towards giving recognition to heterogeneous elements of India, thereby giving way to the true essence of federalism. FEDERALISM AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AN INTRODUCTION The power that giveth can taketh away. These words give an impression of greater centralization, but it also reflects an ever-evolving dynamics of power sharing in India. Such developments are further echoed in the federal structure and territorial integrity of India. The former can be understood as a two level governance mechanism consisting of general and regional government, both working independently and in cooperation, and catering to the same populace. Article IV of the Helsinki Final Act 1975, defines territorial integrity in relation to international law, “Nation-states should not attempt… nor impose a border change through force.” This aspect becomes relevant in the context of drawing the internal boundaries in a nation-state. Thus, federalism and territorial integrity together can be understood as-the former allowing autonomy of the states and the other enabling the continuity of that autonomy. In India’s case, federalism was a political solution for its political problem of accommodating the diverse needs of its diverse populace. Supplementarily, to further assimilate this heterogeneity, India adopted a loose interpretation of territorial integrity. The implication of such interpretation can be seen starting from the State Recognition Act, 1956 and the latest step in this direction being the Jammu and Kashmir Reorganization Act, 2019. This gives an impression that India has not reached the panacea when it comes to the drawing of the territorial borders of federating units. PART I: THE STATE REORGANIZATION ACT, 1956 The State Reorganization Act, 1956 is a reflection of the conundrum between decentralization and dilution of Doctrine of Territorial Integrity. The Constitution allows for redrawing of territorial boundaries by a simple majority in Parliament. This shows that the framers did not envisaged perpetuity when it comes to the internal boundaries, rather they saw the redrawing to accommodate and assimilate the changing needs. The Supreme Court in the case of In re Berubari Union stated: “The Constitution contemplated changes of the territorial limits of the constituent States and there was no guarantee about their territorial integrity.” This was in sharp contrast to what is seen in the US, where the protection of ‘State’s right’ is important, and Doctrine of territorial integrity finds a place in the Constitution. The position of federalism and territorial integrity in India and the US can be credited to how these federations came into existence. As a result, the Indian federalism is seen as an “indestructible Union of destructible units.” Independent India inherited the political borders drawn by the British which continued till 1956, resulting in the continuation of multicultural and multilingual states in India. Drawing of state borders along cultural and linguistic lines was seen as a solution to the continuously emerging trends and challenges in Indian politics, and also as a way of reflecting the federal character of the nation-state. Besides, the existing borders did not hold much rationale when it came to the existing conditions of India. The State Reorganization Act, 1956, from the perspective of classical federal states, such as the US would appear as abolishing the existing units, but taking into consideration the Indian context, such reorganization gave way to linguistic administrative units. Thereby, aiding in imbibing the mother tongue in administrative and judicial capacity, and thus, giving way to grass-root governance. In addition, such dilution of territorial integrity was aimed at ensuring that the marginalized sections of the society can become active participants in the democratic processes of the country. This reorganization destroyed some existing states like earlier Madras Presidency or the Bombay Presidency and gave in its place states like Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra and Gujarat. One cannot imagine a large state like Texas getting split up for administrative efficiency. The case of State Reorganization back in the 1950s was a demand which arose from the bottom rather than something which was imposed on the states from the top. Thus, one can say that by having our own interpretation of territorial integrity we are moving towards a federalism which gives greater recognition to the state’s desires and autonomy. According to Mann, ‘Such reorganization has strengthened the federal structure of Indian nation-state and had also aided in the nation building.’ The dilution of the concept of territorial integrity can also be seen in the light of ethno-federalism, wherein the internal borders are drawn along ethnic lines, in order to create self-governing units. Such creations are often seen as a way of accepting regional aspiration without destabilizing the larger socio-politico structure. It is said that the success rate of such creation is more than one is ready
Centre vs. State: The Federal Tug-of-War in India and the U.S.
Written by Supriya Kumari & Atulya tripathi students at Chanakya National Law university, Patna. IntroductionIn India, the federalism model was adopted to manage its vast diversity of languages, cultures, and regional identities while still maintaining unity. But what does federalism actually mean in practice? And how does India’s version differ from other countries like the USA? What is federalism? Federalism essentially means “distribution of power.” It ensures that one central authority cannot make all of the decisions. Instead, it delegated some powers to smaller units, like states, enabling them to govern themselves in specific areas. For example, think of a large school with various departments: the principal (Centre) is responsible for discipline and a host of policies, while each department (state) is responsible for its students, teaching and learning, and curricula within established parameters. Where Did This Idea Come From? The concept of federalism was shaped by thinkers like John Locke, who believed in limited government to protect individual freedom, and Montesquieu, who stressed the importance of separating powers (like the judiciary, executive, and legislature). These ideas influenced countries like the USA, which became the first modern federal state. Federalism in the Indian Constitution The Indian Constitution doesn’t use the word “federation” directly, but it is very clear about what it means. There are three lists in our Constitution that distribute powers between the Union (Centre) and the States: The Union List is for the Centre, the State List is for the states, and the Concurrent List is for joint duties. However, Indian federalism is not a copy of the American model. It is more centralized because India needed strong unity after Partition and independence. We refer to it as “quasi-federal” for this reason.” This centralization was critical for integrating India’s national integrity and unity with its considerable regional and cultural diversity. In the first three decades after independence, the central government had a significant monopoly on authority and power. The subsequent two or so decades saw a move away from centralization to a more balanced federal structure based on cooperative and competitive federalism. Cooperative federalism emphasized the dialogue between the states and the Centr, while competitive federalism encouraged states to engage in competition to attract investment and enhance development governance through the operation of market forces. Several factors contributed to the rebalancing of federalism, including economic liberalization beginning in 1992, political decentralization due to the introduction of multitiered government, and the growing role and significance of regional parties in state governance stemming from both economic and political decentralization. These factors transformed the power of states, enabled greater autonomy, and allowed states to exercise influence over national decisions as they gained in importance as key players. Centre-State Relations: The Reality While the Constitution gives states certain powers, the Centre has many tools to control or intervene in state matters. It can declare President’s Rule if a state government fails. During emergencies (like war or natural disaster), the Centre can make laws on subjects in the state list. The governor, who is appointed by the Centre, can play a role in state politics. This process sometimes leads to conflict. For example, state governments might feel the Centre is interfering too much, especially if they are ruled by opposition parties. Federalism in the United States In the US there are two paramount clauses, the supremacy clause and the necessary clause, which predominantly shape its federalism. The Supremacy Clause means that law adopted by the federal government will take priority over any state law created to be in antagonism with the prior. The state law will only be valid if it is in line with federal law. Without the Supremacy Clause, each state could have its interpretation or application of a law, which may lead to contradictory applications of federal laws. There would be a mix-up of laws that could only lead to chaos. The Supremacy Clause allows essential national policies, such as civil rights protections, immigration regulations, and income taxes-to be administered uniformly across the states. A classic example is the marijuana legalization issue. While some states in the U.S. have legalized marijuana for medical or recreational use, it is illegal under federal law. Under the Supremacy Clause, federal law technically trumps state law, although in practice the federal government tends not to strictly enforce this conflict, creating somewhat of a legal void. However, The federal government does have the power to override state legislation. The Supreme Court has confirmed the Supremacy Clause in numerous decisions. For instance, in McCulloch v. Maryland, the Court decided that Maryland could not tax a federal bank or otherwise interfere with the actions of federal employees that were legal. On the other hand, the required clause lets Congress make laws that aren’t precisely named in the Constitution, as long as those laws are required for carrying out the authorities enumerated. The Constitution, for example, provides Congress the ability to organize and finance armies. But it doesn’t say how. Under the Necessary and Proper Clause, Congress can pass laws related to military recruitment, supply chains, or establishing training facilities because these all fit the necessary part of executing the fundamental power of maintaining a national defense. The Necessary and Proper Clause is a tool for practical governance, not a blank check. Some people worry that this clause gives Congress unlimited power, as if it could pass any law just because it claims it is “necessary and proper.” But that is not how it operates. The clause does not create new powers; it merely provides Congress with the authority to select effective means of carrying out its already authorized constitutional powers. Any government must have the means to carry out its responsibilities. The section simply states that Congress has the authority to carry out its duties in accordance with the Constitution. The Supreme Court said in the same decision, McCulloch v. Maryland, that the federal government can form a national bank even though the Constitution doesn’t say anything about banks. The case established that Congress has implied
Iska Ram, Kiska Ram: Party-Bound Speakers & Their Enduring Impact On The Legislative Process
Written by Sakshi Vimal student at National Law Institute University, Bhopal. INTRODUCTION “…the Speaker upholds the dignity and freedom of the House, symbolizing liberty and democracy, and must be held by individuals of exceptional ability and impartiality.” ~ Former Prime Minister Nehru The Constitution of India provides for a bicameral system of Parliament, consisting of the Lok Sabha (‘House of the People’) and the Rajya Sabha (‘Council of States’). The office of the Speaker and the Deputy Speaker is an important checkpost in the federal constitution scheme. The convention of Speakers resigning from their party membership has not been developed in India. The current procedure for the election of the Speaker and the Deputy Speaker through election by the majority, therefore, needs to be called into question, especially in light of various instances of misuse of power, the most prominent being bias towards the ruling party. POWERS OF THE SPEAKER AND THE DEPUTY SPEAKER Articles 93-96 of the Constitution deal with the office of the Speaker and the Deputy Speaker of the Lok Sabha and Articles 178-181 deal with the office of the Speaker and the Deputy Speaker of the Legislative Assembly. Moreover, each house has its own rules governing the Procedures and Conduct of Business in the Legislative Assembly, which outline processes such as the election of the Speakers & Deputy Speakers. The Speaker plays a crucial role in ensuring the smooth functioning of the House. The Speaker regulates debates, maintains order, and exercises control over questions, motions, and amendments. The Deputy Speaker performs the Speaker’s duties in their absence. While not vested with the same level of discretion, the Deputy Speaker ensures the continuity of proceedings and upholds the decorum of the House. One of the most important powers vested in the Speaker is under Paragraph 6 of the Tenth Schedule which empowers the Speaker to carry out the disqualification of members of the house. The Speaker/Chairman of the House gives the final decision regarding any disqualifications made under the provisions of the Schedule. However, the biggest loophole is that there exists no procedure or a time bar for the disqualification process. The lack of framework and transparency, more often than not, empowers the Speakers to act arbitrarily and in a partisan manner. SITUATIONS INVOLVING MISUSE The key challenge is that the political affiliations of the Speakers with their parties are a fundamental issue that contributes to the misuse of power in the form of partisanship. Neutrality and non-partisanship are the key requirements for the position of the Speaker. However, there have been instances of delayed decisions by the Speakers to benefit the ruling party, which compromises the impartiality and public trust in the Office. To elaborate, in the case of Nabam Rebia and Bamang Felix v. Deputy Speaker, Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly & Others (2016), the Court openly expressed doubts about the ability of Speakers to remain impartial and neutral in the instances of deciding disqualification petitions. Notably, in Dr. Wilfred A. De Souza v. Tomazinho Cardozo (1999), the Court ruled that the Impartiality of a Speaker is an indispensable requirement for the successful functioning of a democratic system. The office of the Speaker has always been surrounded by controversy in multiple states. For example, in the 2011 case of Balachandra L. Jarkhioli v. B.S. Yeddyurappa, 13 MLAs affiliated with BJP wrote a letter to the Governor stating that they had lost all hope in the leadership of their party after the elections. This action led the Speaker to determine they had voluntarily given up party membership under Paragraph 2(1)(a), leading to their disqualification. Further, the Speaker was seen to have favored a member of the parliament unabashedly. This tendency of the Speaker to act contrary to the constitutional mandate of neutrality was also most evident in the case of Shrimanth Balasaheb Patil v. Hon’ble Speaker, Karnataka Legislative Assembly, the case of 2019. Justice J.S. Verma and Justice Lalit Mohan Sharma, in their dissent in Kihoto v. Zachillhu, were of the opinion that the Speaker’s tenure is dependent upon the continuous support of the majority party and therefore, such a person cannot be considered an impartial adjudicating authority, adding that such an impartial authority is an attribute of the democratic system which is a basic feature of our constitution. This poses a serious constitutional question in relation to the powers of the Speaker & the Deputy Speaker. On paper, the post of the Speaker is a creation of the Constitution and hence, requires the powers of the Speaker to be exercised in accordance with the Constitution. However, the Speaker’s powers to carry out the disqualification of House members lead to Speakers often taking advantage of these legislative loopholes to stray away from their constitutional duty. Further, the Court in Kuldip Nayar v. Union of India has upheld that the role of the upper house, as an institution of federal bicameralism, constitutes a part of the basic structure of the Constitution. But the Party-bound Speakers add to creating a crisis of democracy. CONTEMPORARY RELEVANCE Today, the position has succumbed to being a reward for politicians affiliated with various political parties. The role of the Speaker was meant to be upheld by individuals of exceptional ability and impartiality. However, it has become a comfortable job for politicians nearing retirement who further favor their political parties in key matters and affairs. In light of this, although the Speaker’s role is that of the representative of the House, they simultaneously represent their constituency and often rely on the political party’s leadership for approval to contest future elections from the same constituency. This dual role of the Speaker is obsolete and compromises the independence and impartiality required for the Speaker’s position leading to biasness in decisions thereby undermining the constitutional principle of fairness in legislative proceedings and infringing on the sanctity of parliamentary democracy. At the heart of the issue lies the health of India’s constitutional democracy. If the current approach continues, where Speakers remain closely aligned with their political parties,